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ARTICLE
WHAT GIDEON DID
Sara Mayeux*
Many accounts of Gideon v. Wainwright’s legacy focus on what
Gideon did not do—its doctrinal and practical limits. For constitutional theorists, Gideon imposed a preexisting national consensus
upon a few “outlier” states, and therefore did not represent a dramatic
doctrinal shift. For criminal procedure scholars, advocates, and journalists, Gideon has failed, in practice, to guarantee meaningful legal
help for poor people charged with crimes.
Drawing on original historical research, this Article instead
chronicles what Gideon did—the doctrinal and institutional changes
it inspired between 1963 and the early 1970s. Gideon shifted the legal
profession’s policy consensus on indigent defense away from a charity
model toward a public model. By 1973, this new consensus had
transformed criminal practice nationwide through the establishment of
hundreds of public defender offices and the expansion of lawyers’
presence in low-level criminal proceedings. This Article describes these
changes primarily through the example of Massachusetts, while contextualizing that example with national comparisons.
The broad outlines of these post-Gideon changes are familiar to
legal scholars. But situating these changes in a longer historical context
and tracing them in detail from the perspective of lawyers on the ground
in the 1960s yields two insights that help to explain the seemingly
permanent post-Gideon crisis in indigent defense. First, the post*
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Gideon transformation was indeed limited in its practical effects, but
its limits derived not only from politics but also from history—and from
the legal profession itself. Lawyers themselves, long before Gideon,
framed indigent defense as low-status, low-pay, less-than-fullyprofessional legal work. That framing survived even as private
charities became post-Gideon public defenders. Second, the postGideon transformation was also limited—or, perhaps, destined to be
perceived as limited—by tensions inherent in the attempt to provide
large-scale legal assistance through government bureaucracies.
Characteristics now identiﬁed as symptoms of crisis—such as politically
determined funding, ever-expanding caseloads, and triage advocacy—
ﬁrst appeared as innovations that lawyers perceived Gideon to require.
As public defenders proliferated, so too did complaints that they were
underfunded and overworked, and that they encouraged guilty pleas
over trials.
The origins of the indigent defense crisis lie not only in Gideon’s
neglect but also, paradoxically, in Gideon’s transformative inﬂuence.
This history lends some support to recent scholarly expressions of
skepticism about Gideon, but it also provides some reasons for
optimism: If the indigent defense crisis derives not only from intransigent political indifference but also from contingent choices made by
lawyers, then lawyers may retain more power than they realize to
mitigate the crisis.
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INTRODUCTION
“But it may be that what is most important about a ‘development’
project is not so much what it fails to do but what it does do; it may be
that its real importance in the end lies in the ‘side effects’ . . . .” 1
On an ordinary morning in 1973, a local police court judge took his
seat on the bench. His docket that day spanned the usual gamut: a
woman with a penchant for phoning a neighbor and yelling curse words,
the regular carousel of public intoxication charges. Nothing distinguished that day from any other, except that a New York reporter was
present to observe the judicial goings-on in this provincial backwater.
Later in the day, after court had adjourned, the local judge spoke to the
New York reporter. He mocked the elaborate procedures he was
expected to follow by his higher-ups in Washington, D.C. “‘Take those
two bitches screaming at each other,’” the judge mused. “‘What’s the
Supreme Court got to do with them? Or those drunks! It’s a farce that I
have to ask every one of them if he wants a lawyer.’”2 Ten years before, the
U.S. Supreme Court had famously held, in the landmark case of Gideon v.
Wainwright, that judges must appoint counsel for criminal defendants too
poor to afford a lawyer.3 Down in the basement of the judicial pyramid,
local police court Judge Elijah Adlow remained unconvinced.
Judge Adlow sat not in the backwards and benighted South, which,
today, is often described as Gideon’s primary target.4 He sat in Boston.
Across the Charles River, the Harvard mandarins intoned the requisite
respects for Gideon; it showed, they supposed, that the “legal process” was
1. James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: “Development,” Depoliticization, and
Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho 254 (Univ. of Minn. Press 1994) (1990).
2. Richard Harris, Annals of Law: In Criminal Court—I, New Yorker, Apr. 14, 1973,
at 45, 72, http://archives.newyorker.com/?i=1973-04-14#folio=044 (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Harris, In Criminal Court—I].
3. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (holding Sixth Amendment’s
guarantee of counsel “is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth
Amendment”).
4. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has
Inﬂuenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution 273 (2009)
[hereinafter Friedman, The Will of the People] (describing Chief Justice Earl Warren’s
motivation in Gideon as desire to impose federal right to counsel on “ﬁve remaining states,
all in the South”); Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Warren Court and American Politics 386 (2000)
(“Gideon was the last important purely southern criminal procedure case.”); William J.
Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice 222 (2011) [hereinafter Stuntz,
Collapse] (“Gideon mattered chieﬂy in the South.”); Donald A. Dripps, Why Gideon Failed:
Politics and Feedback Loops in the Reform of Criminal Justice, 70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
883, 895 (2013) [hereinafter Dripps, Why Gideon Failed] (“By 1963, only a few states,
concentrated in the south, did not appoint counsel for all felony defendants. Outside of
those states, Gideon did not require dramatic changes.”); cf. Corinna Barrett Lain,
Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court’s Role in the Criminal
Procedure Revolution, 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1361, 1396 (2004) (suggesting part of Gideon’s
attraction was it “increased the opportunities for judicial oversight of suspect Southern
courts”).
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“redeeming itself.”5 Nor, apart from his blunt style, was Adlow a lone
maverick. Some Massachusetts judges supported the Warren Court’s
mandates, but most were indifferent, and a handful, like Adlow, resisted
actively.6 Throughout the 1960s, Massachusetts lawyers complained that
“a few” judges were “hostile . . . to the entire concept of Gideon.”7 The
Massachusetts legislature, for its part, refused to fund the ﬂedgling state
public defender agency at the levels requested, much less the levels
prosecutors received.8
It may seem odd to encounter hostility to Gideon in Massachusetts.
Constitutional scholars typically list Massachusetts as one of the forty-ﬁve
states where the right announced in Gideon “was already settled practice.”9 This characterization of Gideon relies on state law in 1963, as well
as the Supreme Court briefs and opinion in Gideon itself.10 From this
bird’s eye perspective, it appears that most states already provided
counsel, at least in felony cases, before Gideon.11 Thus, Gideon was a
largely symbolic judicial exhortation to a few “backward”12 “holdout
states,”13 “concentrated in the south,”14 to catch up with the “enlightened” rest of the nation.15 Twenty-three states signed an amicus brief
5. Paul Freund, Justice Was Done for One and All, N.Y. Times (June 21, 1964),
http://www.nytimes.com/1964/06/21/justice-was-done-for-one-and-all.html?_r=0 (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review) (noting that through reading book about Gideon, “we are
made . . . to feel that, in the redemption of a forlorn outcast, the legal process is
redeeming itself”).
6. See infra section III.A.3 (describing how various judges actively resisted applying
right to counsel in all criminal cases).
7. Mass. Defs. Comm., Report to National Legal Aid and Defender Association on
Suffolk County Model Defender Project 16 (1966) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review),
in Papers of Herman LaRue Brown, 1890–1969, Harvard Law School Library Historical &
Special Collections box 3, folder 4 (Modern Manuscripts Collection), Cambridge, Mass.
[hereinafter LRB Papers].
8. See infra Part III (describing obstacles to funding Massachusetts public defender
agency).
9. Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Unwritten Constitution 112 (2012); see also Justin
Driver, Constitutional Outliers, 81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 929, 939–40 (2014) (“[T]he overwhelming majority of the nation already adhered to the rule that Gideon would articulate even
before the Court issued its landmark decision.”).
10. See infra notes 355–356 (discussing state law in 1963 and amicus briefs in
Gideon).
11. See, e.g., Driver, supra note 9, at 939 (stating “overwhelming majority of the
nation already adhered to the rule that Gideon would articulate even before the Court
issued its landmark decision”).
12. Powe, supra note 4, at 394 (“Gideon required ﬁve backward states to change their
laws and behavior.”).
13. Driver, supra note 9, at 939 (noting “only ﬁve holdout states continued to deny”
right to counsel at time of Gideon).
14. Dripps, Why Gideon Failed, supra note 4, at 895 (“By 1963, only a few states,
concentrated in the south, did not appoint counsel for all felony defendants.”).
15. Lain, supra note 4, at 1398 (describing how Gideon “validated a well-established
national consensus, suppressing Southern states that were out-of-step with the rest of the
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endorsing Clarence Earl Gideon’s right-to-counsel claim—an amicus
brief coordinated and drafted by an assistant attorney general for the
State of Massachusetts.16
Alternatively, perhaps Judge Adlow’s hostility is not surprising at all.
Criminal procedure scholars typically describe Gideon as a groundbreaking decision whose potential has never been realized.17 Far from “settled
practice,” the Gideon right has been consistently undermined by legislators, taxpayers, and lower-level judges nationwide.18 Fifty years later,
“indigent defendants navigate courts nearly alone.”19 This characterization of Gideon relies on policy reports, personal experiences, and
newspaper exposés, all drawing upon ﬁrst-person observation of day-today practice in the nation’s criminal courts in the decades after 1963.20 In
this view from the trenches, some states appear worse than others, but
public defenders nationwide are underfunded and overworked.21 Moreover, because of harsh sentencing laws and coercive plea bargaining practices, even relatively well-funded public defenders have little leverage in

country’s enlightened sense of fairness and equality”).
16. Brief for the State Government Amici Curiae, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (No. 62-155), 1962 WL 115122; see also Anthony Lewis, Gideon’s Trumpet 141–48
(1964) [hereinafter Lewis, Gideon’s Trumpet] (describing states’ work on Gideon amicus
brief); Krista Zanin, Through the Skill of a Local Lawyer, Massachusetts Is Part of Gideon’s
Legacy, Mass. Bar Ass’n Law. J., Mar. 2003, http://www.massbar.org/publications/
lawyers-journal/2003/march/through-the-skill-of-a [http://perma.cc/GJ8F-ZLPN] (discussing
Massachusetts Assistant Attorney General’s role in coordinating and drafting brief). Some
sources list twenty-two state signatories because New Jersey was inadvertently omitted from
the list on the ﬁled brief. See Bruce A. Green, Gideon’s Amici: Why Do Prosecutors So
Rarely Defend the Rights of the Accused?, 122 Yale L.J. 2336, 2340 n.19 (2013)
17. See infra section V.A (summarizing criminal procedure scholarship on Gideon).
18. See infra section V.A (same).
19. Matt Apuzzo, Holder Backs Suit in New York Faulting Legal Service for Poor, N.Y.
Times (Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/25/nyregion/holder-backssuit-in-new-york-faulting-legal-service-for-poor.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(summarizing plaintiffs’ claims in class action lawsuit challenging New York’s indigent
defense system); see also Karen Houppert, Chasing Gideon: The Elusive Quest for Poor
People’s Justice, at x (2013) [hereinafter Houppert, Chasing Gideon] (“[I]nnocent people
are routinely . . . denied basic access to an attorney.”). For scholarly expressions of similar
claims, see, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Shrinking Gideon and Expanding Alternatives to
Lawyers, 70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1287, 1288 (2013) (describing indigent defense as
“Potemkin lawyering . . . far removed from Gideon’s vision”); Stephen B. Bright & Sia M.
Sanneh, Fifty Years of Deﬁance and Resistance After Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 Yale L.J.
2150, 2152 (2013) (“Every day in thousands of courtrooms . . . the right to counsel is
violated.”).
20. E.g. Eve Brensike Primus, Effective Trial Counsel After Martinez v. Ryan: Focusing
on the Adequacy of State Procedures, 122 Yale L.J. 2604, 2606 (2013) [hereinafter Primus,
Effective Trial Counsel] (describing consensus “that excessive caseloads, poor funding,
and a lack of training plague indigent defense delivery systems throughout the states”).
21. Id.
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advocating for their clients.22 Thus, Gideon remains an “unfulﬁlled
promise.”23
The dominant scholarly narratives about Gideon are not necessarily
inaccurate nor are they irreconcilable. Even if Gideon ampliﬁed existing
right-to-counsel doctrine in most states, states may have varied both
before and after Gideon in how effectively they enforced that doctrine.24
Or perhaps Gideon initially reﬂected a national consensus that later
eroded.25 However, both the “outlier” and “failed promise” narratives
emphasize what Gideon did not do—its doctrinal and practical limits.
Scholars have devoted less attention to what Gideon did—the doctrinal,
institutional, political, and conceptual changes that it inspired.26 Return22. See Gabriel J. Chin, Race and the Disappointing Right to Counsel, 122 Yale L.J.
2236, 2254 (2013) (arguing even zealous defense lawyers generally cannot challenge “war
on drugs or other broad government policies”); David E. Patton, Federal Public Defense
in an Age of Inquisition, 122 Yale L.J. 2578, 2580–81, 2588–90 (2013) (describing legal
and political obstacles to federal defenders’ adversarial leverage).
23. Erwin Chemerinsky, Lessons from Gideon, 122 Yale L.J. 2676, 2680 (2013) (“I also
lament [Gideon’s] unfulﬁlled promise.”); see also Primus, Effective Trial Counsel, supra
note 20, at 2606 (suggesting “promise of Gideon v. Wainwright remains largely
unfulﬁlled”).
24. In the right-to-counsel context, as in many other legal contexts, commentators
frequently identify a gap between ideals (embodied in doctrine) and reality (embodied in
practice). See, e.g., Justin F. Marceau, Gideon’s Shadow, 122 Yale L.J. 2482, 2487 (2013)
(identifying “mismatch between the ideal and the real in the Gideon context”); Carol S.
Steiker, Gideon at Fifty: A Problem of Political Will, 122 Yale L.J. 2694, 2701 (2013)
(describing indigent defense as “embarrassment to the ideal of justice”).
25. Many observers frame Gideon’s history as a declension narrative, in which the
states made progress in enforcing Gideon until the 1980s’ “punitive turn” and/or the onset
of some ﬁscal crisis. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 23, at 2686 (describing indigent
defense burden as having “increased tremendously as a result of an enormous increase in
criminalization, prosecution, and incarceration” in “decades following Gideon”); Margaret
A. Costello, Fulﬁlling the Unfulﬁlled Promise of Gideon: Litigation as a Viable Strategic
Tool, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 1951, 1956 (2014) (“During the 1960s and 1970s, crime rates
increased signiﬁcantly, leading to more prosecutions and a greater need for indigent
defense counsel.”); Roger A. Fairfax, Jr., Searching for Solutions to the Indigent Defense
Crisis in the Broader Criminal Justice Reform Agenda, 122 Yale L.J. 2316, 2319 (2013)
(noting “overbroad criminalization and enforcement strategies . . . have contributed to
unmanageable caseloads” for defenders); Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor
Representation, 49 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 461, 465 (2007) [hereinafter Hashimoto, Price]
(“[I]ndigent defense budgets have not kept pace with the increased number of cases
pouring into the indigent defense system.”); M. Clara Garcia Hernandez & Carole J.
Powell, Valuing Gideon’s Gold: How Much Justice Can We Afford?, 122 Yale L.J. 2358, 2375
(2013) (“Gideon’s spirit is drowning in the undertow of the criminalization tide.”); see also,
Houppert, Chasing Gideon, supra note 19, at ix–x, 91 (describing how Gideon initially
spurred “genuine” progress in indigent defense, later eroded by “massive changes” in law
enforcement).
26. For discussions of Gideon within general histories of the Warren Court, see
Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and the Pursuit of Justice 91–98 (1999); Powe, supra
note 4, at 397–444. Outside of synthetic histories such as these, relatively few scholarly
studies explore Gideon’s reception in detail. For a notable exception, see Steven M. Teles,
The Rise of the Conservative Legal Movement: The Battle for Control of the Law 31–35
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ing to the perspective of lawyers and judges on the ground in the 1960s,
who worked in the midst of this whirlwind of changes, raises questions
not clearly answered by either the “outlier” or the “failed promise”
accounts of Gideon.
Consider, again, Massachusetts: In the view of the Bay State’s highest
court as of 1967, Gideon had “created a requirement of representation of
criminal defendants on a scale unprecedented in this Commonwealth.”27
Given that Massachusetts already had a judicial rule providing for counsel in most felony cases before Gideon, why did Massachusetts jurists
nevertheless understand Gideon to impel such momentous changes? Why
were some local judges, like Judge Adlow, so critical of Gideon? How were
Massachusetts debates over Gideon’s implementation resolved, with what
consequences? If Gideon has failed to achieve the ostensible goals that
lawyers and legal scholars assign it—such as providing the poor with
effective legal advocacy, or equalizing the treatment of rich and poor by
the criminal courts—what has Gideon achieved, for better or worse?
While there is certainly no shortage of writing on Gideon, reconstructing
Gideon’s initial reception in local legal communities can still illuminate
underemphasized dimensions to the historical import of this landmark
case.
As this Article chronicles, Gideon catalyzed a shift in the legal profession’s consensus understanding of why and how to provide indigent
criminal defense. Before Gideon, particularly on the East Coast, indigent
defense was often viewed as a charitable bar initiative that aimed to help
the “worthy” poor, particularly those with strong innocence claims.28 The
day-to-day tasks of indigent defense were viewed as training fodder rather
than fully professional legal work, suitable for recent law graduates who
wanted to gain courtroom experience before joining a ﬁrm.29 By deﬁning
indigent defense as a constitutional right, Gideon appeared to render this
charity model obsolete; selective charity could not meet a universal
entitlement.30 Elite lawyers reconceptualized indigent defense as a state
responsibility and a practice specialty in itself, rather than training for
(2008). Teles focuses on Gideon’s symbolic role in helping to catalyze the organized bar’s
support for public interest lawyering, primarily in the civil context. Id.; see also Jerold H.
Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright—From a 1963 Perspective, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 2035, 2056–57
(2014) [hereinafter Israel, From a 1963 Perspective] (reﬂecting he initially underestimated Gideon’s import because he focused on limits of “its immediate practical impact
and its potential doctrinal contributions” rather than “its symbolic impact”).
27. Abodeely v. County of Worcester, 227 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Mass. 1967). For a similar
judicial estimate of Gideon’s impact, see In re Articles of Incorporation of the Def. Ass’n of
Phila., 307 A.2d 906, 908 (Pa. 1973) (“Commencing with . . . Gideon . . . , the scope of judicially mandated representation of the poor increased dramatically.”).
28. See infra section I.B.2 (describing indigent defense prior to Gideon).
29. See infra section I.B.1 (describing personnel practices of pre-Gideon indigent defense charity).
30. See infra section I.C, Part II (tracing shift in conception of indigent defense from
charity model to constitutional entitlement).
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future practice.31 In the new ideal articulated in Gideon-era professional
standards, government-salaried, career public defenders should represent poor defendants as a matter of right, whether or not they are
“worthy.”32
Between 1963 and the early 1970s, this new consensus transformed
criminal practice nationwide in two important ways. First, Gideon motivated the establishment and expansion of hundreds of public defender
offices, in some places through the conversion or public subsidy of preGideon private charities: Between 1964 and 1973, the number of defender
organizations nationwide quadrupled from 145 to 650.33 Just prior to
Gideon, only 25% of Americans lived in an area with an organized
defender.34 Ten years later, 64% did, and almost every large city in the
United States had some type of public defender.35 Second, Gideon
expanded lawyers’ presence in low-level criminal proceedings. Before
Gideon, only a handful of states provided counsel in nonfelony cases.36 By
1970—two years before the Supreme Court expressly announced a
misdemeanor right to counsel—thirty-one states were attempting to
provide counsel in some set of lower-level cases.37 When Judge Adlow
complained about Gideon, it was really these post-Gideon changes that
angered him. Adlow was open to appointing private counsel if he
thought a lawyer was genuinely needed, but he thought that public

31. See infra Part II (providing account of new post-Gideon policy consensus on
indigent defense).
32. See infra Part II (explaining shift in conception of indigent defense from
privilege to right).
33. Nat’l Legal Aid & Def. Ass’n, In Search of Justice: The Final Report of the
National Defender Project 114 (1973) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter
In Search of Justice], in Record Group: Grants, Grant # 06400098, Reels 2070–71, Ford
Foundation Archives, Rockefeller Archive Ctr., Sleepy Hollow, N.Y. [hereinafter Ford
Foundation Archives]. This number includes both municipal public defenders and
nongovernmental organizations providing criminal defense, usually with some public
subsidy.
34. Nat’l Legal Aid & Def. Ass’n, The Other Face of Justice: A Report of the National
Defender Survey Funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the U.S.
Department of Justice 13 (1973) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Other
Face of Justice]. In 1951, under 14% of Americans lived in an area with an organized
defender, public or private. See Emery A. Brownell, Legal Aid in the United States: A
Study of the Availability of Lawyers’ Services for Persons Unable to Pay Fees 137 chart IV.B
(1951).
35. Other Face of Justice, supra note 34, at 13. Speciﬁcally, 92% of “metropolitan
counties” (deﬁned as counties with over 500,000 residents) had an organized defender in
1973. Id.
36. See John F. Decker & Thomas J. Lorigan, Comment, Right to Counsel: The
Impact of Gideon v. Wainwright in the Fifty States, 3 Creighton L. Rev. 103, 106 (1970)
(describing increase in number of states appointing counsel in low-level cases after
Gideon).
37. Id. The Supreme Court addressed the question in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407
U.S. 25 (1972).
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defenders complicated simple cases with overwrought constitutional
arguments.38
In their broad outlines, these post-Gideon changes are familiar to
legal scholars.39 But situating these changes within a longer historical
context and tracing them in detail from the perspective of lawyers and
judges on the ground yields two insights that help to explain the United
States’ seemingly permanent crisis in indigent defense. First, the postGideon transformation was indeed limited in its practical effects—as
scholars and advocates have lamented—but its limits derived not only
from politics but also from history, or what social scientists call path
dependence.40 Neither inchoate precursors nor ad hoc experiments, preGideon indigent defense efforts had enduring consequences for postGideon institutions, as lawyers carried vestiges of the charity model into
the post-Gideon world. Second, the post-Gideon transformation was also
limited—or, perhaps, destined to be perceived as limited—by its own
internal ambiguities. With or without charitable vestiges, the public
model of indigent defense contained the seeds of its own critique. Like
an optical illusion, the Gideon vision of universal, state-provided legal
assistance oscillated from the start with its darker inverse of impersonal,
38. See Deckle McLean, The Justice of Elijah Adlow, Bos. Globe, Apr. 27, 1969, at C8
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (describing Adlow’s preference for appointing
private counsel and quoting Adlow’s complaint that public defenders use “legalistic
tricks”).
39. For sources brieﬂy discussing the post-Gideon expansion of public defender
offices, see, e.g., Andrew Lucas Blaise Davies & Alissa Pollitz Worden, State Politics and the
Right to Counsel: A Comparative Analysis, 43 Law & Soc’y Rev. 187, 189–90 (2009)
[hereinafter Davies & Worden, State Politics] (describing different types of stateimplemented indigent defense programs); Richard D. Hartley et al., Do You Get What You
Pay For? Type of Counsel and Its Effect on Criminal Court Outcomes, 38 J. Crim. Just.
1063, 1063 (2010) (describing increase in number of public defender offices and
increased representation by public defenders post-Gideon); Hashimoto, Price, supra note
25, at 469 (recounting state efforts to comply with Gideon decision); Erica Hashimoto, The
Problem with Misdemeanor Representation, 70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1019, 1035 (2013)
[hereinafter Hashimoto, Problem] (noting limited effect of Gideon decision); Alissa Pollitz
Worden et al., A Patchwork of Policies: Justice, Due Process, and Public Defense Across
American States, 74 Alb. L. Rev. 1423, 1424 (2011) [hereinafter Worden et al., Patchwork]
(noting decentralized state implementation of Gideon decision). Legal scholars are less
likely to attribute the expansion of counsel in low-level proceedings to Gideon because the
misdemeanor right to counsel is now attached doctrinally to Argersinger. See, e.g.,
Hashimoto, Price, supra note 25, at 477 (describing Argersinger’s inﬂuence); Hashimoto,
Problem, supra, at 1035–36 (deﬁning Gideon as guaranteeing felony counsel and arguing
that Argersinger affected more states).
40. Although “path dependence” has many meanings, some more technical than
others, the term is used here only to loosely invoke something like Paul Pierson’s
deﬁnition: the way that early policy choices become “self-reinforcing” over time, closing
off alternative paths and making later policy “reversals very difficult.” Paul Pierson, Politics
in Time 10–11 (2004). More generally, this Article takes inspiration from Pierson’s insight
that understanding policy development “often requires . . . attention to processes that play
out over considerable periods of time.” Paul Pierson, The Study of Policy Development, 17
J. Pol’y Hist. 34, 34 (2005).
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bureaucratic case processing. Characteristics now identiﬁed as symptoms
of crisis—such as inadequate funding, ever-expanding caseloads, and
triage advocacy oriented around pleas instead of trials—ﬁrst appeared as
lawyers began to implement the transition to large-scale indigent defense
that they thought Gideon required.41 The origins of the indigent defense
crisis lie not only in Gideon’s neglect but also, paradoxically, in Gideon’s
transformative inﬂuence.
The Article proceeds chronologically, using archival materials and
other primary historical sources to reconstruct the landscape of indigent
criminal defense before and after Gideon primarily through the example
of Massachusetts, while also contextualizing that example with
nationwide comparisons.42 The Article builds upon a number of excellent historical studies about particular dimensions of legal aid and
indigent defense in Massachusetts, as well as the larger historical literature on the history of legal aid nationwide.43 In its long timeframe,
use of one jurisdiction as a case study, and emphasis upon the dominant
role of elite lawyers in shaping the politics of indigent defense, the
Article most directly parallels, and builds upon, Michael McConville and
Chester Mirsky’s pioneering study of indigent defense in New York City
41. See infra section III.B (detailing conﬂicts arising out of state implementation of
Gideon decision).
42. While no state offers a perfect microcosm of indigent defense nationwide, tracing
policy developments over a long timeframe within one jurisdiction is the most controlled
way to isolate change over time. For indigent defense, Massachusetts offers an appealing
case study both for practical reasons (including the wealth of archival materials, the state’s
small size and the relatively small number of actors involved in indigent defense, and the
available secondary literature on Massachusetts legal history for contextualizing those
materials) and for conceptual reasons (including the high concentration of legal scholars
in and around Boston who were supportive of Gideon in principle, the disconnect between
those scholars’ views and the realities of the Boston criminal courts, and the state’s
reputation, deserved or otherwise, as a “liberal” bellwether—see Lily Geismer, Don’t
Blame Us: Suburban Liberals and the Transformation of the Democratic Party 14–16
(2014)). As discussed infra in section III.C, the major post-Gideon changes in
Massachusetts reﬂected broad national patterns, although, to be sure, further research
would likely illuminate a more complex pattern of local and regional variation.
43. For a recent overview of, and illuminating revision to, the historiography on legal
aid, see generally Felice Batlan, Women and Justice for the Poor: A History of Legal Aid,
1863–1945 (2015) (reconstructing history of legal aid from women’s history perspective).
On the history of public defenders, see infra Parts I, II. For historical studies of legal aid
and indigent defense in Massachusetts, see generally Batlan, supra, at 36–45 (describing
legal aid work of Boston’s Women’s Educational and Industrial Union); Alan Rogers, “A
Sacred Duty”: Court Appointed Attorneys in Massachusetts Capital Cases, 1780–1980, 41
Am. J. Legal Hist. 440 (1997) (surveying history of court-appointed counsel in capital
cases); Michael Grossberg, Altruism and Professionalism: Boston and the Rise of
Organized Legal Aid, 1900–1925: Part II, 22 Bos. B.J., June 1978, at 11, 20–21 (describing
early history of Boston Legal Aid Society); Christopher G. Griesedieck, The Right to
Counsel in Boston, 1963–1983: The Legal Services Movement from Gideon to the
Committee for Public Counsel Service (Apr. 2011) (unpublished B.A. honors thesis,
Boston College) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (surveying Boston bar’s legal aid
efforts primarily by examining Boston Bar Journal).
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from 1917 through the 1980s.44 However, this Article departs from
Professors McConville and Mirsky’s interpretation in two ways. First,
Professors McConville and Mirsky dismissed organized indigent defense
as an elite ploy to ensure “the rapid processing and inevitable conviction
of indigent defendants,” believing that “institutional defenders” could
never be true adversaries of the state.45 Instead of measuring past defenders against an adversarial ideal, this Article seeks to understand lawyers’
own changing conceptions of the defender’s role.46 Second, Professors
McConville and Mirsky posited the New York Legal Aid Society as an
unchanging “microcosm” of indigent defense nationwide. 47 They recognized neither signiﬁcant differences between public and voluntary defenders nor meaningful change over time, arguing that “indigent
criminal defense systems came into being prior to Gideon, and survived
thereafter in a substantially unchanged form.”48 In their account, Gideon
“simply expanded the number of defendants” subjected to representation by “non-adversarial” defenders.49 This Article instead emphasizes
institutional diversity and change over time in the history of indigent
defense, arguing both that pre-Gideon public and voluntary defenders
were genuinely opposing models and that Gideon triggered changes in
kind, not just scale, in the practice of indigent defense.
44. Michael McConville & Chester L. Mirsky, Criminal Defense of the Poor in New
York City, 15 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 581 (1987); see also Chester L. Mirsky, The
Political Economy and Indigent Defense: New York City, 1917–1998, 1997 Ann. Surv. Am.
L. 891, 894–902 (reviewing his earlier research on origins of indigent defense in New York
City); James B. Jacobs, Remembering Chester Mirsky, N.Y.U. L. Mag., Autumn 2006, at 48,
48, http://blogs.law.nyu.edu/magazine/2006/remembering-chester-mirsky/ [http://perma.cc
/LJS7-XN43] (describing Professors McConville and Mirsky’s project “as a classic”).
45. McConville & Mirsky, supra note 44, at 610; see also Mirsky, supra note 44, at
1013–15 (describing organized indigent defense as nonadversarial and incompatible with
rule of law).
46. These interpretive departures reﬂect differences of both methodology and
generational standpoint. Professors McConville and Mirsky relied primarily on published
articles and annual reports, which they took to reﬂect lawyers’ beliefs. See George Fisher,
Plea Bargaining’s Triumph: A History of Plea Bargaining in America 196–97 (2003)
(noting Professors McConville and Mirsky, in their related project on plea bargaining,
“emerged from their investigation convinced that [lawyers’] rhetoric was genuine” but
suggesting “disavowals of zealous advocacy” could also be interpreted as strategic). In addition to published sources, this Article draws on archival research into lawyers’ and organizations’ correspondence, private notes, and meeting minutes. Also, Professors McConville
and Mirsky carried out their research at a moment of growing concern about public
defenders’ caseloads. Thus, they may have been primed to ﬁnd historical precursors for a
nonadversarial, “case processing” model of indigent defense. In that way, their article not
only offers valuable insight into the history of indigent defense but is also, itself, a primary
source reﬂecting the 1980s critiques of public defenders described in Part IV, infra.
47. McConville & Mirsky, supra note 44, at 583.
48. Id. at 583, 592 n.40, 631 (concluding voluntary defender represented only superﬁcial rejection of public defender, because voluntary and public defenders’ lawyering
practices were “identical”).
49. Id. at 654; see also id. at 694 (noting Gideon increased “proportion of the population served by institutional defenders”).
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Parts I and II describe the rise and fall of the pre-Gideon charity
model of indigent defense, in which privately funded organizations
staffed by short-term trainees defended small numbers of “worthy”
clients. In the 1950s, this selective conception of indigent defense was
threatened by doctrinal development toward a constitutional right to
counsel in all criminal cases. Part II explains how Gideon triggered the
ﬁnal abandonment of the charity model, at least intellectually, by the
national legal elite. The charity model did not characterize pre-Gideon
indigent defense in every part of the country, but it would powerfully
shape the limits of Gideon’s implementation everywhere. At the time of
Gideon, some cities, concentrated in the West, had longstanding municipal public defender offices, while rural areas and much of the South
continued to rely on case-by-case appointments of private counsel. But
the charity model predominated in the East Coast cities familiar to the
national legal elite. When lawyers began the process of implementing
Gideon, they looked to existing public defender offices as models to some
extent, but often through the lens of assumptions carried over from the
charity model. More generally, the existence of both a charity model and
a public model sustained the perception among lawyers that the right to
counsel could be implemented through a variety of institutional setups.
This perception helps to explain why the public model was not simply
implemented wholesale after Gideon, even though it most closely approximated Gideon-era professional standards.
Parts III and IV provide the Article’s core account of historical
change, tracing how local efforts to conform laws, institutions, and
practices with Gideon generated a new hybrid public-charity model of
indigent defense. In implementation, local bar leaders modiﬁed the
public model partly to accommodate local conditions and legislative and
judicial resistance, but also to incorporate elements of the charity model
that they still valued or, at least, did not consider problematic. Public
defenders remained low-pay, low-status lawyers like their charitable predecessors, but no longer controlled their caseloads. Instead of deﬁning
their role as providing intensive trial advocacy for especially sympathetic
defendants, they now saw themselves as providing triage assistance for all
defendants, usually by negotiating pleas.
The magnitude of the shift in how defenders conceptualized their
work likely exceeded any corresponding shift in the incidence of guilty
pleas overall. While the ratio of pleas to trials may have increased somewhat, plea bargaining was not new and most defendants, with or without
counsel, had pled guilty long before Gideon. But now, the experience of
pleading was typically mediated by a public defender, and so courtroom
participants and observers—including defendants themselves—often
construed plea bargaining as a suboptimal form of advocacy necessitated
by defense-side resource constraints. Across both advocacy and scholarship, complaints mounted about overworked, underfunded public
defenders who did little but advise guilty pleas. As time passed and Gideon
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ﬂoated above the muck of day-to-day practice into the constitutional
pantheon, these complaints became reinterpreted not as ironic side
effects of Gideon’s implementation but as evidence that Gideon was being
neglected, generating the diagnosis of crisis that persists to this day. Part
V suggests how this history might enrich scholarly and policy discussions
about both Gideon speciﬁcally and indigent defense more generally,
followed by a more general concluding reﬂection on Gideon’s meaning
and legacy.
Before proceeding, some caveats are in order. In arguing that the
post-Gideon indigent defense crisis can be understood, to an underappreciated extent, as the product of pre-Gideon historical legacies and internal
contradictions embedded within the Gideon consensus, it is emphatically
not the Article’s intent to deny either the existence or the virulence of
political antipathy toward criminal defendants and toward the poor. Nor
can this Article fully capture Gideon’s initial reception and implementation in every part of the country. Post-Gideon responses differed in
places like Los Angeles and Chicago, which had long-established municipal public defenders, and in regions like the Deep South, with little preGideon organized defender tradition of any kind.50 This Article shows,
however, that even in states where Gideon did have immediate, transformative, and lasting effects on criminal practice, those effects soon
appeared, to many observers, like a crisis.
I. BEFORE GIDEON : THE CHARITY MODEL OF INDIGENT DEFENSE
The story of organized indigent defense in Massachusetts begins in
1935 with the unlikely meeting of two disparate Boston lawyers: Wilbur
Hollingsworth, who had worked his way through the night program at
the working-class Suffolk Law School, and LaRue Brown, a graduate of
Phillips Exeter, Harvard College, and Harvard Law School, who had
served in the Wilson and Harding administrations.51 Hollingsworth
50. In the Deep South and in Texas, cities were slower to establish public defenders
after Gideon for complicated reasons beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g., Hernandez
& Powell, supra note 25, at 2362–64 (discussing post-Gideon developments in El Paso);
Jennifer E. Laurin, Gideon by the Numbers: The Emergence of Evidence-Based Practice in
Indigent Defense, 12 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 325, 349 (2015) (noting Houston “was the
largest court system in the country without a public defender office” until 2010); Sara
Mayeux, Notes Toward a History of the Indigent Defense Crisis in the Deep South 8–19
(July 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing
halting efforts to establish public defender in Atlanta after Gideon); Albert Samaha,
Indefensible: The Story of New Orleans’ Public Defenders, BuzzFeed News (Aug. 13, 2015,
1:21 AM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/albertsamaha/indefensible-new-orleans-public-defendersoffice#.vhKdxVRp [http://perma.cc/LLR8-9PT3] (“Before Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans
didn’t even have a full-time public defender’s office.”).
51. On Brown, see Obituaries: LaRue Brown Dies, 85, Bos. Globe, Apr. 4, 1969, at 31
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Obituaries: LaRue Brown Dies]
(summarizing Brown’s accomplishments); see also Brown, Herman LaRue Papers, 1890–
1969: Finding Aid, Harvard Univ. Lib. (2003), http://oasis.lib.harvard.edu/oasis/deliver/

28

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 116:15

decided to start an organization to help poor people charged with
crimes, and, in the course of soliciting support from the bar, showed up
one day at Brown’s office.52 Brown connected Hollingsworth with a fellow
white-shoe lawyer, Daniel Lyne, who, along with Richard Hale, of the law
ﬁrm Hale and Dorr, and Raynor Gardiner, of the Boston Legal Aid
Society, had experimented a few years before with a short-lived “voluntary defender” project.53 Now, with Hollingsworth’s initiative, the
Voluntary Defenders Committee reopened on a permanent basis, with
Hollingsworth as chief counsel, Lyne and Gardiner among the board
members, and Brown as the board’s chairman.54 Clients came to the
Committee through a mix of jail referrals, court appointments, and
office walk-ins.55
A.

The Voluntary Defenders Committee of Boston

The Voluntary Defenders Committee met an important need.
Before Gideon, less-than-wealthy Massachusetts defendants went to court
with whatever low-cost or volunteer counsel they could scrounge together. For most of the pre-Gideon era, they had no state right to
appointed counsel except in capital cases, and only a limited, uncertain
federal right.56 The Boston Legal Aid Society, founded in 1900, had a
~law00070 [http://perma.cc/E9UH-4KMZ] (providing timeline of Brown’s biography).
Brown served as an assistant attorney general from 1918–1919 and solicitor general of the
United States Railroad Administration from 1920–1921. Id. On Hollingsworth, see Andrew
Garber, Average Students Stand out in These College Scholarships: Wilbur Hollingsworth
Has Given $70,000 to 140 Students While Living on Social Security, Portland Press Herald
(Portland, ME), Nov. 28, 1998, at 1A (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (describing
how Hollingsworth worked full-time and attended law school at night).
52. See Transcript of LaRue Brown’s Reminiscences (estimated 1963) (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter LaRue Brown Reminiscences], in LRB Papers,
supra note 7, box 16, folder 4.
53. On the earlier experiment, see Richard W. Hale, Boston Voluntary Defenders
Committee, 15 Mass. L.Q. 31, 31 (1930) (describing Committee and concluding its services were unnecessary in Massachusetts).
54. Flyer, Voluntary Defs. Comm. (Nov. 18, 1935) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) [hereinafter Voluntary Defs. Comm. Flyer], in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 1,
folder 1 (listing Voluntary Defenders Committee members); Before the Judge with No
Lawyer: Defendant Without Money Will Be Helped by Defenders’ Committee, Bos. Globe,
June 9, 1935, at 48 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Bos. Globe, Before
the Judge] (explaining Committee’s role of “aid[ing] citizens without funds who are
brought into criminal courts”).
55. See Hale, supra note 53, at 35 (listing breakdown of Voluntary Defenders
Committee case sources).
56. As of 1959, Massachusetts statutes required courts to appoint counsel only in
capital cases. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 313, § 23 (1959) (codiﬁed as amended at ch. 276,
§ 37A (2002)). See generally Rogers, supra note 43 (chronicling history of appointed
counsel in Massachusetts capital cases). Like most states, Massachusetts had a right-tocounsel provision in its state constitution but construed the provision narrowly. See Mass.
Const. pt. I, art. XII; Allen v. Commonwealth, 87 N.E.2d 192, 194–95 (Mass. 1949)
(holding Massachusetts Constitution does not require appointed counsel); William M.
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blanket policy of refusing criminal cases. In Boston’s famously insular
Irish Catholic neighborhoods, anyone in serious legal trouble would
likely have turned to his ward boss or parish priest, who might, in turn,
have referred him to one of the city’s small but growing cadre of Irish
lawyers.57 But overall, probably about half of Massachusetts criminal
defendants appeared in court on their own.58 In his historical study of
plea bargaining, George Fisher found that about half of defendants in
Middlesex County had counsel by 1844, and that the number hovered
around that percentage through the early 1900s.59 Although comprehensive data is unavailable for subsequent decades, one 1953 study

Beaney, The Right to Counsel in American Courts 80–82 (1955) (noting most states
construed right-to-counsel provisions narrowly). In 1958, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court promulgated a rule requiring the appointment of counsel in felony cases
prosecuted in the superior courts. See Sup. Judicial Ct. R. 10, 337 Mass. 812 (1958)
(adopting rule for assignment of counsel in noncapital felony cases).
In 1942, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment required
states to provide counsel in noncapital cases presenting “special circumstances.” See Betts
v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 473 (1942) (“[W]hile want of counsel in a particular case may result
in a conviction lacking in . . . fairness, we cannot say that the Amendment embodies an
inexorable command that no trial . . . can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a
defendant who is not represented by counsel.”); see also Allen, 87 N.E.2d at 195 (declining
to apply Betts where defendant, thirty-two-year-old black man, was “mature,” “not mentally
defective,” and had not raised questions of “unfair conduct by the public authorities” or
complex factual or legal issues). The Betts rule was widely viewed as “amorphous.” Beaney,
supra, at 164; see also id. at 188–94 (collecting criticisms of Betts doctrine); Jerold H.
Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The “Art” of Overruling, 1963 Sup. Ct. Rev. 211, 264
[hereinafter Israel, Overruling] (describing Betts rule as vague and manipulatable).
57. On the Boston Legal Aid Society refusing criminal cases, see Grossberg, supra
note 43, at 16 (listing “defending criminal complaints” as one of “Society’s most
signiﬁcant taboos”). On the role of the ward boss and parish priest, see Thomas H.
O’Connor, The Boston Irish: A Political History 121–22, 139–40 (1995) [hereinafter
O’Connor, Boston Irish]. On Irish lawyers, see Paula M. Kane, Separatism and Subculture:
Boston Catholicism, 1900–1920, at 51–52 (1994) (noting 20% of Boston lawyers were Irish
by 1900). For references to ward bosses referring constituents to “legal advice” or “legal
services,” see O’Connor, Boston Irish, supra, at 122, 124, 180–81, 212; William V. Shannon,
Boston’s Irish Mayors: An Ethnic Perspective, in Boston, 1700–1980: The Evolution of
Urban Politics 199, 207 (Ronald P. Formisano & Constance K. Burns eds., 1984). For
parallel examples of legal assistance within minority communities, see Batlan, supra note
43, at 99–100 (describing New York mission that “aided Chinese immigrants who had been
arrested”); id. at 178 (noting Chicago Negro Fellowship League “provided pro bono
lawyers to African American men accused of serious crimes”).
58. This estimate is based on Professor Fisher’s book recounting the history of plea
bargaining in the United States and a series of surveys of criminal prosecutions in
Massachusetts in the early 1950s undertaken by the Voluntary Defenders Committee. See
Fisher, supra note 46, at 97; see also Voluntary Defs. Comm., Survey of Criminal
Prosecutions in Massachusetts for the Years 1949–1950–1951–1952, at 9 (1953) (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Voluntary Defs. Comm. Survey] (ﬁnding 57.5%
of indicated defendants and overall 54% of criminal defendants were unrepresented), in
LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 1, folder 3.
59. Fisher, supra note 46, at 97.

30

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 116:15

reported that over half of Massachusetts defendants received no legal
assistance.60
Boston’s Voluntary Defenders Committee was modeled after similar
organizations in New York and Philadelphia, formed as East Coast alternatives to the “public defender.” During the Progressive Era, legal reformers urged local governments to provide lawyers for the poor.61 In
1914, Los Angeles opened the nation’s ﬁrst municipal public defender;
by 1930, a number of cities, including San Francisco and Chicago, had
followed suit.62 These ﬁrst-generation public defenders were celebrated
not in the language of constitutional rights, but rather in the Progressive
Era vocabulary of good-government reform. Public defenders, their
advocates predicted, would crowd out the crooked “shysters” who
trawled jailhouses for desperate clients, cooperate with prosecutors, and
negotiate plea bargains to eliminate costly trials.63
Before Gideon, the public defender remained primarily a West Coast
and Midwestern innovation because in East Coast cities, the private bar
opposed it.64 Criminal lawyers worried that public defenders would steal
60. Voluntary Defs. Comm. Survey, supra note 58, at 9 (“Considering all defendants,
54% were without legal assistance.”).
61. In the 1890s, California lawyer Clara Foltz ﬁrst promoted the idea of a “public
defender” to counter the public prosecutor. See generally Barbara Babcock, Woman
Lawyer: The Trials of Clara Foltz 288–319 (2011) (“As a personal achievement, [Foltz’s]
conception of the public defender ranks with opening the legal profession to women and
winning the constitutional clauses.”); Barbara Allen Babcock, Inventing the Public
Defender, 43 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1267, 1270–74, 1280–313 (2006) [hereinafter Babcock,
Inventing] (chronicling Foltz’s role in origin of public defenders). By the 1910s and 1920s,
public defender proposals appeared often in law and criminology journals, although these
proposals often differed from Foltz’s original idea in their emphasis on plea bargaining
rather than trial advocacy. For discussions of Progressive Era public defender proposals,
see Fisher, supra note 46, at 194–200; Babcock, Inventing, supra, at 1274–79; Gregory
Barak, In Defense of the Rich: The Emergence of the Public Defender, 3 Crime & Soc.
Just. 2, 8–11 (1975); Sara Mayeux, The Case of the Black-Gloved Rapist: Deﬁning the
Public Defender in the California Courts, 1913–1948, 5 Cal. Legal Hist. 217, 224–29
(2010) [hereinafter Mayeux, Deﬁning the Public Defender]; McConville & Mirsky, supra
note 44, at 596–610.
62. See Lisa J. McIntyre, The Public Defender: The Practice of Law in the Shadows of
Repute 38–41 (1987) (chronicling origins and early history of Cook County public
defender system); McConville & Mirsky, supra note 44, at 602 (recounting establishment
of public defenders in Los Angeles and other cities).
63. See Mayeux, supra note 61, at 224–27 (discussing reformer agendas); see also
Fisher, supra note 46, at 196–97 (contrasting attitudes of early reformers); Babcock,
Inventing, supra note 61, at 1274–77 (comparing Foltz’s vision for public defenders with
other Progressive models).
64. See Beaney, supra note 56, at 218 (“The organized bar has raised substantial
objections, and exerted powerful opposition, to the public-defender plan from the very
beginning.”); McConville & Mirsky, supra note 44, at 602–03 (“[T]he organized bar
sought to insure that those who could afford an attorney would be required to retain a
private lawyer.”). For a tally of public defenders as of 1957, see Edward N. Bliss, Jr.,
Directory of Public Defenders (1957) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). This
pamphlet, researched by an investigator for the Los Angeles Public Defender, listed public
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their business, but more damaging to the reform’s prospects was the
opposition of elite corporate lawyers. They had little interest in criminal
work themselves but viewed government-provided criminal defense as a
slippery slope toward socializing the legal profession.65 They preferred
philanthropically funded indigent defense controlled by the private bar,
along the model of civil legal aid societies. The New York legislature
rejected a public defender bill in 1912, and two years later, the New York
City Bar Association officially denounced the public defender model.66
Instead, from 1917 to 1920, the Rockefeller family underwrote an experimental “voluntary defender” program in New York, which was deemed
successful and made a permanent division of that city’s Legal Aid Society,
and soon inspired imitation in Philadelphia and Boston.67
In some ways, voluntary defender organizations reﬂected the elite
legal aid movement’s conservative philosophy.68 During the Progressive
Era, prominent lawyers promoted legal aid as a vehicle for convincing
immigrants that they could vindicate their rights through existing institutions rather than revolutionary politics,69 establishing a lasting template
of assimilationist legal aid rhetoric that voluntary defender supporters

defenders in California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Minnesota, Missouri,
Nebraska, New York (Monroe County), Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Tennessee,
plus the Boston, New York City, and Philadelphia voluntary defenders.
65. See McConville & Mirsky, supra note 44, at 600–02 (“The elite characterized such
notions as visionary, the ‘prelude to complete socialization of the bar, and as subversive of
fundamental rights.’”).
66. Id. at 611–13. On elite lawyers’ parallel fears of government control of civil legal
aid, see Grossberg, supra note 43, at 13–14.
67. See McConville & Mirsky, supra note 44, at 617–18. Some East Coast lawyers
endorsed public defenders, including most famously the New York lawyer Mayer Goldman,
a proliﬁc advocate for the public defender. See Obituary, Mayer C. Goldman, Defender of
Poor, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1939, at 21 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (detailing
Goldman’s endorsement of public defenders). For discussions of Goldman’s proposals in
the secondary literature, see Fisher, supra note 46, at 195; Babcock, Inventing, supra note
61, at 1277–79; McConville & Mirsky, supra note 44, at 605. For other examples of East
Coast support for public defenders, see, e.g., Alexander Holtzoff, Defects in the
Administration of Criminal Justice, 9 F.R.D. 303, 305 (1949) (detailing exhortations from
New York federal judge for more public defenders).
68. The phrase “elite legal aid movement” is used here to refer to the male- and
lawyer-dominated “second generation of legal aid associations [that] developed in the late
nineteenth and the early twentieth century” and promoted legal aid as a way to assimilate
immigrants, in contrast to the earlier and more expansive tradition of legal aid provided
through women’s organizations. See Batlan, supra note 43, at 4–5. On this movement’s
conservatism, see Grossberg, supra note 43, at 20 (“Lacking a comprehensive theory of
urban poverty, legal aid lawyers refused to recognize the complex web of political,
economic, and social circumstances facing poor urbanites . . . .”).
69. See Batlan, supra note 43, at 87 (describing how New York Legal Aid Society
deﬁned mission “as Americanizing and disciplining new immigrants into the wage economy”); id. at 97–98 (quoting rhetoric touting legal aid to mitigate workers’ “tendency
towards communism” and make immigrants into “loyal and enthusiastic citizens”).
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echoed for decades thereafter.70 One member of the Boston Voluntary
Defenders board predicted that making every defendant “feel he has had
a fair trial will go a long way towards reducing crime.”71 Conversely, if
defendants concluded “that there is one law for the rich and another for
the poor,” they might leave prison bitter.72 Beyond rhetoric, the activities
of voluntary defender organizations also embodied the elite legal aid
movement’s primarily procedural conception of justice.73 They focused
upon representing individual defendants, not lobbying for substantive
law reform.
At least in Boston, however, the Voluntary Defenders Committee
attracted supporters with a range of political commitments and reasons
for joining. Wilbur Hollingsworth came from a modest background and
was driven by an idiosyncratic egalitarianism more than by any particular
ideology.74 Longtime board chairman LaRue Brown was a New Deal
Democrat and staunch civil libertarian; he sometimes supported
Republicans for state office, but only because, like many Massachusetts
“Yankees,” he viewed the state-level Irish Catholic Democratic Party
machine as irredeemably corrupt.75 Along with his wife Dorothy—whose
sister was the Nation editor Freda Kirchwey—Brown supported an array
of civil libertarian causes and prisoners’ rights campaigns in addition to
the Voluntary Defenders.76
70. In a 1901 speech, the theologian Lyman Abbott endorsed legal aid as a safeguard
against “revolution”; decades later, the Boston Voluntary Defenders Committee quoted his
words on the cover of its annual report. Lyman Abbott, Speech at the 25th Anniversary
Dinner of the Legal Aid Society in New York, in 1953 Annual Report of the Voluntary
Defenders Committee (1954) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter 1953
Annual Report], in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 1, folder 5.
71. Letter from Samuel Vaughan, Counselor-at-Law, Loring, Coolidge, Noble & Boyd,
to Robert Cutler (July 14, 1936) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers,
supra note 7, box 6, folder 1.
72. 1939 Annual Report of the Voluntary Defenders Committee (1940) (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 6, folder 11; see also Letter
from Samuel Vaughan to Wilbur Hollingsworth, Voluntary Defs.’ Comm. (Mar. 7, 1944)
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (proposing language for annual report saying
because of Voluntary Defenders Committee’s provision of counsel to defendants “without
funds,” no one “can get an anti-social attitude from a feeling that he has not had a proper
presentation of his side of the case”), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 6, folder 7.
73. See Batlan, supra note 43, at 139, 161–62 (describing elite legal aid movement’s
procedural conception of justice); id. at 168 (contrasting “law-based model of legal aid”
with “holistic approach” advanced by social workers).
74. See Garber, supra note 51 (describing how Hollingsworth, late in life, established
scholarship for mediocre students).
75. See Obituaries: LaRue Brown Dies, supra note 51 (describing Brown as “highly
respected New England liberal and an ardent Democrat” who encouraged “Republican
and Democratic [candidates] alike”). On Yankee views of the Irish machine as corrupt and
the Massachusetts tradition of liberal Republicans, see generally Geismer, supra note 42, at
14–15.
76. Estelle B. Freedman, Maternal Justice: Miriam Van Waters and the Female
Reform Tradition 284, 318 (1996) (referencing Brown’s involvement in prison reform);
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Characteristics of the Charity Model

1. Indigent Defense as Low-Pay Training for Novice Lawyers. — True to
its name, the Voluntary Defenders Committee relied largely on volunteer
labor. Long-time chief counsel Wilbur Hollingsworth was paid decently, if
modestly.77 But his assistants worked for free in the organization’s early
years, and even after they started to be paid, earned very little.78 For
instance, in 1947, the median net income for a salaried Massachusetts
lawyer was $5,438.79 The next year, Hollingsworth’s salary was $5,400,
right around the median, but assistant counsel Thomas Dwyer made only
$2,000—less than half the median—and assistant counsel James Leydon
only $1,500.80 Through the 1950s, Hollingsworth’s assistants and
secretaries earned “considerably” less than their counterparts in Boston
law ﬁrms, district attorney’s offices, and even the Boston Legal Aid
Society.81 LaRue Brown noted in 1954 that a lawyer at the Boston ﬁrm
that is now Ropes & Gray had “expressed a desire to work in our office
for a year,” but could not afford such a large pay cut.82
Members of the board rationalized the low-pay, high-turnover model
as a way to provide young lawyers with courtroom practice before they
joined private ﬁrms. Typically, Hollingsworth’s assistants stayed for one to
three years.83 The exceptional assistant who stayed much longer—
Thomas Dwyer, who worked under Hollingsworth for seven years—
proved the rule, because he still viewed the work as a stepping stone

Obituaries: LaRue Brown Dies, supra note 51.
77. See Memorandum from LaRue Brown 3 (1956) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (describing Hollingsworth’s salary as “modest”), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box
6, folder 12.
78. For instance, Laurence Channing’s name appears on 1937 letterhead as assistant
counsel, but the 1938 budget form notes that he served “on a part time basis without
compensation.” Form, 1938 Budget for the Voluntary Defenders Committee for the
Community Federation of Boston (Nov. 9, 1937) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter 1938 Budget Form], in LRB papers, supra note 7, box 6, folder 2.
79. Albert P. Blaustein & Charles O. Porter, The American Lawyer 16 (1954).
80. Dwyer’s salary for 1948 was listed at $2,000; his 1947 salary was $1,400; and his
predicted salary for 1949 was $2,400 in the Committee’s Greater Boston Community Fund
Budget Summary Sheet for 1949, a copy of which was attached to the Letter from Daniel J.
Lyne, Treasurer, Voluntary Defs. Comm., to Samuel Vaughan, Secretary, Voluntary Defs.
Comm., Inc. (Nov. 18, 1948) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra
note 7, box 6, folder 9. Leydon’s salary was listed at $1,500 for 1948 and was predicted at
$2,000 for 1949. Id.
81. Notes for Budget Meeting (1954) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB
Papers, supra note 7, box 1, folder 6.
82. Id.
83. For instance, staff lists in the organization’s annual reports suggest that Laurence
Channing assisted Hollingsworth from 1936 to 1940; Edward Duggan from 1941 to 1942;
Irving Helman for a few months in 1943; J. Marshall Leydon from 1948 to 1949; Simon
Scheff from 1950 to 1951; George H. Lewald from 1952 to 1954; Howard A. Weiss from
September 1953 to August 1954; and Samuel A. Wilkinson from 1955 to 1957.
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toward private practice.84 Upon resigning, he thanked Hollingsworth and
the Committee “for the invaluable training and experience.”85 In a 1954
grant application, the Committee explained that “its budget has never
been sufficient” to hire “experienced criminal lawyers at high salaries.”
But, the application continued, that deﬁciency had its silver lining. The
office had made a “practice of hiring young lawyers who are interested in
court work and have been recently admitted to the bar . . . . The program
[had] worked out so well over the years that it would probably be
continued regardless of budgetary requirements.”86
Students supplied another font of free labor. In 1949, a group of
Harvard Law students formed a club to aid Hollingsworth and staff; the
next year, the law school gave them office space and an annual subsidy.87
The Harvard Voluntary Defenders, as they were known, conducted legal
research, interviewed clients in jail, tracked down witnesses, and
appeared at arraignments and in lower-level district court proceedings.88
Perhaps aggrandizing their involvement, they soon boasted that they had
relieved Hollingsworth’s “overworked staff of most of their jail, investigatory, and district (lower) court work.”89 Harvard Law School’s dean,
Erwin Griswold, praised the program as “a very considerable bargain,”
enabling “one lawyer operating out of the Boston office,” in Suffolk
County, to provide indigent defense in neighboring Middlesex County
for “a very small expenditure of money.”90 For Griswold, the legal

84. See Letter from Thomas E. Dwyer to LaRue Brown (Aug. 5, 1953) (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review) (noting Dwyer had for some time been considering taking next
“step” to private practice), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 6, folder 13.
85. Id.
86. Voluntary Defs. Comm., Report for First Six Months of Expansion Program
Under Grant from the Fund for the Republic (1954) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 1, folder 6. This is not to say that the board
thought these salaries were adequate. The 1951 Annual Report insisted, “We have got to
pay our existing staff more money. We want to pay Mr. Hollingsworth’s assistants, respecttively, $5,500 and $3,000 per year.” 1951 Annual Report of the Voluntary Defenders
Committee (1952) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter 1951 Annual
Report], in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 6, folder 11.
87. Harvard Law Underwrites HVD Group, Harv. L. Sch. Rec., Nov. 8, 1950, at 1;
Voluntary Defender Committee Hailed as Permanent Harvard Law Function, Harv. L. Sch.
Rec., Mar. 1, 1950, at 1.
88. Voluntary Defender Committee Hailed as Permanent Harvard Law Function,
supra note 87, at 1; see also Joel Woodey, For the Indigents Voluntary Defenders Defend,
Harv. L. Rec., Sept. 9, 1960, at 13 (describing student prison visits).
89. Harvard Voluntary Defs., Third Annual Report (1952) (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review), in Harvard Law School Special Collections Red Set SMC box 10, folder 3
#8636257 [hereinafter HLS Special Collections]. The same phrase occurs in the Harvard
Voluntary Defs., Fifth Annual Report (1954) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in
HLS Special Collections, supra, Red Set SMC box 10, folder 3 #8636257.
90. Letter from Erwin N. Griswold to Robert Prouty (Oct. 26, 1955) (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Letter from Griswold to Prouty], in LRB Papers, supra
note 7, box 1, folder 7.
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problems of the poor could be “effective[ly]” handled by “young Law
students . . . in their spare time.”91
As implied by Griswold’s description, elite law schools neither
expected nor encouraged their students to pursue criminal defense as a
permanent career. By the turn of the twentieth century, the American
bar had become highly stratiﬁed.92 Corporate practice sat atop the ladder
of prestige; criminal defense, along with personal-injury law, languished
at the bottom.93 At Harvard, renowned for training “corporate experts,”
students were required to take advanced courses in corporations, taxation, and ﬁnancial accounting, but only one introductory course in
criminal law.94 Columbia Law School did not even offer criminal law
before 1931, when the young Herbert Wechsler revived the course.95
Wechsler’s inﬂuential curriculum, however, avoided the “nuts and bolts”
of criminal practice, focusing instead upon philosophical rumination
about the nature of punishment.96 The aim was not to prepare criminal
practitioners, but high-level policymakers.97
On the West Coast, indigent defense could be a respectable career
option. In Los Angeles, public defenders enjoyed civil-service protections
and salaries, and some of the office’s attorneys remained in the office for

91. Id. (“[O]ne attorney operating out of the Boston office can keep a dozen or
more young Law students busy in their spare time working up cases for him . . . . Because
of our interest and cooperation, you can provide an effective service in Middlesex County
at a very small expenditure of money.”).
92. See Robert W. Gordon, The Legal Profession, in Looking Back at Law’s Century
287, 287–90 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002) (noting increasing stratiﬁcation in legal
industry); see also McConville & Mirsky, supra note 44, at 599–600 (describing
“disaffection of elite lawyers from the practice of criminal law” in New York City). This
hierarchy had racial and class dimensions. Prestigious corporate ﬁrms almost exclusively
hired white Protestant men educated at university-based law schools; Jewish and immigrant
lawyers educated at proprietary law schools predominated in personal-injury law and
criminal defense. African American lawyers and women also often made their start by
taking criminal cases. See generally Kenneth W. Mack, Representing the Race: The
Creation of the Civil Rights Lawyer (2012) (chronicling lives of several African American
lawyers who took criminal cases early in careers); Barbara Allen Babcock, Women
Defenders in the West, 1 Nev. L.J. 1 (2001) (describing careers of several early women
lawyers who worked as defenders); Joel E. Black, Citizen Kane: The Everyday Ordeals and
Self-Fashioned Citizenship of Wisconsin’s “Lady Lawyer,” 33 Law & His. Rev. 201, 211–13
(2015) (detailing unusual career of Kate Kane, female lawyer who challenged common
beliefs about “women’s ability to practice law”).
93. See Gordon, supra note 92, at 289 (discussing “prestige hierarchy” within legal
profession).
94. Arthur E. Sutherland, The Law at Harvard: A History of Ideas and Men, 1817–
1967, at 367 (1967); see also id. at 337–39 (describing curriculum of 1960s).
95. Anders Walker, The Anti-Case Method: Herbert Wechsler and the Political
History of the Criminal Law Course, 7 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 217, 227 (2009).
96. Id. at 231.
97. See id. (describing focus on training students on “criminal law policy” and
disdain towards “criminal practitioners”).
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decades.98 In the 1930s and 1940s, the head public defender in Los
Angeles was paid two to four times what Hollingsworth earned (which
Hollingsworth does not appear to have known).99 Each year, the Los
Angeles Times pictured the public defender alongside the sheriff, postmaster, school superintendent, district attorney, and other local officials
in its souvenir poster of “Professional Men of Los Angeles.”100 To elite
lawyers back East, however, the civic standing of Western public defenders appeared like a ﬂaw, not a feature. LaRue Brown disparaged public
defenders as “costly.”101 In contrast, he wrote, the Voluntary Defenders
enjoyed “a tremendous amount of devoted service from underpaid staff
members whose primary interest is the work they do [and] not what they
get for it.”102 Brown also worried that public defenders would be “subject
to political pressure, for appointments to [the] staff etc., because politicians control the ﬁnances.”103 Brown did not appear to have had much
actual data about public defenders; rather, he projected onto them his
general disdain for local government.104 Like many New England
“Yankees,” Brown viewed Boston’s municipal offices—including the
district attorney’s office—as swamps of Irish patronage, and assumed that
a public defender would become similarly bogged down.105
98. See, e.g., Burt A. Folkart, Ellery Cuff, 92; Joined Public Defender in ‘28, L.A.
Times (Sept. 16, 1988), http://articles.latimes.com/1988-09-16/news/mn-2023_1_publicdefender [http://perma.cc/UMW8-6C29] (describing defender’s thirty-ﬁve-year career);
Public Defender Vercoe to Retire, L.A. Times, Oct. 30, 1946, at A1 (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) (describing defender’s thirty-two-year career).
99. See Frederic H. Vercoe’s Individual Financial Statement to Bank 1 (Aug. 12,
1937) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in Frederic H. Vercoe Papers, Dep’t of
Special Collections, Charles E. Young Research Library, UCLA, box 8, folder: Financial
Statement, Coll. 725. Vercoe recorded an annual salary of $7,200 for 1937; Hollingsworth’s
salary in 1937 was $1,725. The gap narrowed when Hollingsworth’s salary was raised to
$3,650.
100. See, e.g., Prominent Public Officials, L.A. Times, Jan. 1, 1924, at 40 (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review); Representative Judiciary, Civic, and Professional Men of Los
Angeles, L.A. Times, Jan. 2, 1941, at 20 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
101. 1952 Annual Report of the Voluntary Defenders Committee (1953) (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter 1952 Annual Report] (noting in Brown’s
“Statement of the President” that “Office of Public Defender[] is not only less efficient,
but more costly to the community”), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 5, folder 2; see also
1951 Annual Report, supra note 86 (praising voluntary defender as less costly).
102. LaRue Brown, Handwritten Notes on Back of Memorandum for 1956 Budget
Request for Voluntary Defenders Committee (Oct. 11, 1955) (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 1, folder 8.
103. Suggestions on Voluntary Defenders Budget (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 6, folder 10.
104. The observation that Brown did not have much data about other public defender
offices is based on the author’s review of the defender-related materials in the LaRue
Brown Papers.
105. On Boston Yankee disdain for Irish patronage politics, see generally Lawrence J.
Vale, From the Puritans to the Projects: Public Housing and Public Neighbors 290–91
(2000).
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The pre-Gideon dominance of the charity model in Boston was not
inevitable, then; it reﬂected the distinctive choices and political assumptions of prominent East Coast lawyers. Within American legal culture, the
West Coast offered an alternative public model by the 1910s and 1920s,
but that model’s inﬂuence was limited by geographic distance and professional hierarchies. Nor was the pre-Gideon charity model simply a
necessary accommodation to funding levels. The Voluntary Defenders
Committee did complain about volatile budgets, but for ideological
reasons, never sought public subsidies, which might have proven more
stable. Thus, the Voluntary Defenders board not only worked within
resource constraints but also helped to generate and preserve those
resource constraints through their skepticism about publicly funded legal
aid. This skepticism was widely shared among the leaders of the East
Coast bar. In 1952, Boston’s most famous legal aid advocate, the Hale and
Dorr law ﬁrm partner Reginald Heber Smith, convened a gentlemen’s
dinner at the Ritz-Carlton to discuss how the Legal Aid Society and the
Voluntary Defenders “might extend their work to meet the full need in
Metropolitan Boston . . . without resort to government subsidies.”106
In some ways, Boston took the charity model to an extreme. New
York and Philadelphia also rejected the public defender model, but their
voluntary defenders received larger and steadier donations from local
philanthropists.107 As a result, they hired more staff attorneys, paid
somewhat higher salaries, and served more clients.108 The New York
Legal Aid Society, which received annual subsidies from Wall Street law
ﬁrms, functioned something like a public defender by the 1950s in the
sense that its lawyers were routinely appointed by the courts any time a
defendant requested counsel.109 Still, the New York and Philadelphia
106. Letter from Reginald Heber Smith to the Hon. John C. Higgins (Feb. 4, 1952)
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 1, folder 4; see
also Grossberg, supra note 43, at 17–18 (discussing Smith’s career and prominence).
107. See Beaney, supra note 56, at 216 (discussing ﬁnancing methods for voluntary
defenders in New York and Philadelphia).
108. The New York Legal Aid Society’s criminal branch had twenty-four staff attorneys
in the late 1950s, plus investigators and clerical staff. Philadelphia’s voluntary defender
had ﬁve staff lawyers in the late 1950s, so it was closer in size to Boston’s, but it also had
four investigators and ﬁve clerical workers. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. & the Nat’l
Legal Aid & Def. Ass’n, Equal Justice for the Accused 121–22 n.16 (1959) [hereinafter
Equal Justice for the Accused]. At the New York Legal Aid Society, attorney salaries ranged
from $3,200 to $7,650 in 1957; at the Defender Association of Philadelphia, from $4,200 to
$5,600. In Boston, the starting salary was only $2,000. Id. at 122 n.21.
109. See Beaney, supra note 56, at 207 (“In . . . New York, it is customary for the court
to appoint a lawyer from the legal-aid society when the defendant expresses a desire for
counsel.”). The New York Legal Aid criminal branch handled 3,035 cases in the ﬁrst quarter of 1950, Beaney, supra note 56, at 216 n.34, an order of magnitude higher than the
Boston Voluntary Defenders Committee’s caseloads in the same period. Professors
McConville and Mirsky note that the city originally provided office space for the voluntary
defenders and describe the organization as an “unofficial” part of “the administration of
criminal justice in New York County.” McConville & Mirsky, supra note 44, at 623.
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voluntary defenders resembled Boston’s in the core respects: They were
philanthropically rather than publicly funded; they relied partly on
volunteer labor; and they paid staff attorneys “less than” their city’s
market rate for lawyers in private practice.110
2. Defending the “Worthy” Poor. — The Voluntary Defenders
Committee never purported to offer a universal service. Hollingsworth
evaluated would-be clients based on their “apparent worthiness,”111 borrowing a formulation frequently used by civil legal aid societies.112
However, legal aid societies developed detailed criteria for determining
what types of clients and cases were “worthy.”113 A smaller and more
informal operation, the Voluntary Defenders Committee instead relied
on a loose set of background assumptions about what types of clients the
organization represented. The ideal client was young, with no criminal
history, accused of a crime he “did not commit,” and extremely poor—
preferably, “penniless.”114 The opposite of “worthy” clients were “habitual” or “professional” criminals.115 As explained in an early annual re110. Equal Justice for the Accused, supra note 108, at 51.
111. Voluntary Defs. Comm., Request for Public Contributions (Nov. 18, 1935) (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 1, folder 1. The
Committee’s annual reports identiﬁed the organization’s mission as representing “worthy”
defendants. See, e.g., 1949 Annual Report of the Voluntary Defenders Committee (1950)
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (noting Committee was “[o]rganized to provide
counsel for indigent and worthy persons accused of crime”), in LRB Papers, supra note 7,
box 6, folder 11.
112. In determining worthiness, the Voluntary Defenders Committee initially stated
that it had adopted “the principles adopted in civil matters by the Boston Legal Aid
Society.” Voluntary Defs. Comm. Flyer, supra note 54. The New York Legal Aid Society had
a similar rule of aiding only “worthy” individuals. McConville & Mirsky, supra note 44, at
615–16, 618–19; see also Batlan, supra note 43, at 132 (quoting Chicago Legal Aid Society
board member who disagreed with society’s practice of “stating that the society limited its
services to ‘worthy cases’”).
113. See Grossberg, supra note 43, at 15–16 (describing Boston Legal Aid Society’s
“elaborate screening process designed to detect ‘meritorious poor’”).
114. 1941 Annual Report of the Voluntary Defenders Committee (1942) (“Voluntary
Defenders Committee was organized to give to the penniless defendant . . . the same right
to representation that the defendant with funds has always enjoyed.”), in LRB Papers,
supra note 7, box 6, folder 11. “The work of the Voluntary Defenders Committee . . . has
demonstrated that there are many more people than we had supposed who, through some
unfortunate set of circumstances, ﬁnd themselves in jail quite helpless to defend
themselves in court for a crime they did not commit.” Letter from Raynor M. Gardiner to
Samuel Vaughan (June 8, 1937) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers,
supra note 7, box 6, folder 2 (describing how clients were mainly under twenty-six years of
age and uniformly “without inﬂuence”); see also 1936–1937 Annual Report of the
Voluntary Defenders Committee (1937) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter 1936–1937 Annual Report], in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 6, folder 11.
115. See 1935–1936 Annual Report of the Voluntary Defenders Committee (1936) (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter 1935–1936 Annual Report] (“The
Committee will not . . . defend the habitual criminal.”), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box
6, folder 11; 1937–1938 Annual Report of the Voluntary Defenders Committee (1938) (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) [1937–1938 Annual Report] (“The Committee . . . does
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port, the Committee would not represent a “man who admits his guilt
but intends to plead not guilty and ‘beat the rap’; and while the
Committee is careful not to judge a man solely by his police record, ‘ﬁrstoffender cases’ have a special claim on its services. Organized crime is
not helped in any way.”116 Luckily, the Committee reported, this requirement proved easy to enforce, because “professional criminals . . . do not
apply to the Voluntary Defender. They want a lawyer of their own
choosing, and seem to be able to pay for his services.”117
Given the larger cultural context of the era, race and gender likely
helped to shape the organization’s “worthiness” determinations, at least
implicitly. By the Progressive Era, ideas about criminality had become
closely intertwined with racial stereotypes, and social scientists and legal
scholars often described African Americans as especially prone to petty
and violent street crime.118 Meanwhile, references to “professional criminals” would have invoked, at least in a vague sense, the specter of bootlegging, bookmaking, and protection rackets within European (and
especially Italian) immigrant communities.119 However, the organization’s
statistics do not permit systematic analysis of exactly how these cultural
tropes structured its work. The Committee did not report statistics on its
clients by race, although the annual reports’ descriptions of particular
cases occasionally identify clients as “colored.”120 The reports did include
statistics by religion for some years, which could serve as a rough proxy
for ethnicity, but reported these statistics only as an aggregate encompassing both rejected and accepted clients, so it is not possible to tally
whether certain types of applicants were more likely to be rejected.121
The Committee distinguished its “worthy” clients from “professional
criminals” partly out of fundraising necessity. American culture had long
not defend habitual or professional criminals.”), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 6,
folder 11; 1938 Budget Form, supra note 78 (deﬁning “scope of work” as “[t]o assist poor
people (not habitual criminals) who are accused in criminal cases”); Pamphlet, The
Voluntary Defenders Committee: Its Story and Its Service (1936) (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review) (“The Committee does not defend the habitual criminal.”), in LRB Papers,
supra note 7, box 5, folder 3; see also Bos. Globe, Before the Judge, supra note 54, at 48
(noting Committee will refuse case if defendant “is a gangster or a man with a long
record”).
116. 1937–1938 Annual Report, supra note 115.
117. 1936–1937 Annual Report, supra note 114.
118. See generally Khalil Gibran Muhammad, The Condemnation of Blackness: Race,
Crime, and the Making of Modern Urban America 88–145 (2011) (detailing development
of social scientiﬁc ideas linking race with criminality during Progressive Era).
119. On cultural tropes of organized crime, see David E. Ruth, Inventing the Public
Enemy: The Gangster in American Culture, 1918–1934, at 2 (1996).
120. See, e.g., 1945 Annual Report of the Voluntary Defenders Committee (1946) (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“[W]e were asked to represent four colored soldiers.”),
in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 5, folder 2; 1952 Annual Report, supra note 101
(describing client as “extremely polite and naive little colored boy”).
121. See, e.g., 1952 Annual Report, supra note 101 (providing number of defendants
identiﬁed as Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish).
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stigmatized swaths of the poor as “undeserving” of aid, particularly those
who indulged in any kind of vice.122 To repel that stigma, the Committee
ﬁlled its annual reports with elaborate narratives of sympathetic clients:
gullible outsiders framed by career criminals; family men whose children
suffered while their fathers were jailed.123 Dynamics within the legal
profession further encouraged the Committee to portray its clients as
extremely destitute and socially isolated. By the 1930s, the complaint that
unscrupulous lawyers made a lucrative specialty out of abetting “professional criminals” was a cliché of elite law reform literature.124 To maintain
support from the private bar, the Committee needed both to distance
itself from disreputable criminal practice and to avoid any appearance of
competing with reputable private ﬁrms. Fundraising materials emphasized that the Voluntary Defenders would not represent “anyone who can
pay a lawyer.”125
But “worthiness” was not merely a fundraising device, nor, in practice, an unyielding moral prerequisite. The Voluntary Defenders became
much less selective over time, suggesting that “worthiness” also functioned pragmatically as a ﬂexible framework for allocating limited
122. Michael B. Katz, The Undeserving Poor: America’s Enduring Confrontation with
Poverty 1–3, 6–7 (rev. ed. 2013) (tracing history of cultural ideas about “undeserving
poor” and “redeﬁnition of poverty as a moral condition”); see also David Huyssen,
Progressive Inequality: Rich and Poor in New York, 1890–1920, at 70–80 (2014) (tracing
intellectual genealogy of distinctions between “worthy” and “unworthy” poor and
providing examples of charities denying aid to those deemed “unworthy”); Vale, supra
note 105, at 19–20, 26–28 (describing how, dating to seventeenth century, Massachusetts
communities were reluctant to aid poor people “seen as undeserving”); id. at 86
(describing how Progressive Era settlement houses in Boston categorized poor into “hierarchy of worthiness”).
123. See, e.g., 1946 Annual Report of the Voluntary Defenders Committee (1947) (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter 1946 Annual Report] (lamenting “sheer
tragedy” that families suffer when father is wrongfully imprisoned), in LRB Papers, supra
note 7, box 6, folder 11; 1952 Annual Report, supra note 101 (describing typical client as
“ordinary individual involved in difficulties which were many times due to circumstances
beyond his control”); Voluntary Defs. Comm., Its Story and Its Service (1936) (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review) (describing “[t]hree [s]tories from [c]ase [r]ecords,” including
case of “young clerk” who was “unjustiﬁably arrested”), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box
5, folder 3.
124. See, e.g., U.S. Nat’l Comm’n on Law Observance & Enf’t, Report on Prosecution
27–28 (1931) (decrying “‘professional’ defender” who “advise[s] lawbreakers how to operate successfully”); Sienna Delahunt, The Gentlemen at the Bar, in Raymond Moley, Our
Criminal Courts 62, 62–63 (1930) (describing criminal practice as disreputable “since it is
impossible to build up a clientele except among professional criminals”).
125. E.g., 1935–1936 Annual Report, supra note 115 (“The committee will not
represent anyone who can afford to employ private counsel . . . .”); 1937–1938 Annual
Report, supra note 115 (noting “Committee does not charge fees, nor does it defend
anyone who can pay a lawyer” and “rejects a case if the defendant or his family can afford
to pay for counsel”). New York voluntary defenders had the same policy of “avoiding cases
in which a private lawyer could earn a fee.” McConville & Mirsky, supra note 44, at 625
n.274; see also id. at 625–26 (discussing how New York defenders avoided antagonizing
private bar by refusing to take compensable cases).
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resources. In the early years, Hollingsworth rejected one-fourth to onethird of would-be clients.126 By the late 1950s, the Committee only
rejected one applicant out of ten.127 By then the Committee had a larger
budget and staff, especially as compared to the war years of the 1940s
when Hollingsworth essentially worked alone.128 The Committee had not
officially relaxed its standards, nor did it systematically benchmark caseloads to resources: While both caseloads and budgets steadily increased,
they did not increase in perfect tandem, so per-case expenditures ﬂuctuated year-to-year.129 Still, on some intuitive level, Hollingsworth seems to
have gradually expanded the meaning of “worthiness” based on a rough
sense of the Committee’s growing capacity.130
The Committee also kept caseloads low by limiting its jurisdiction to
particular courts. By one estimate, the Voluntary Defenders Committee
handled 70% of all felony cases in Suffolk County.131 In neighboring
counties, however, the Committee only operated during years when
funds allowed and, except for a Springﬁeld office opened in 1954, had
virtually no presence outside of metropolitan Boston.132 And even in
Boston, the Committee generally appeared only in the superior courts,
not the lower-level district courts.133 In fact, lawyers rarely appeared in
126. See infra Table 2 (tallying percentage of cases rejected during 1935–1958).
127. See infra Table 2 (showing percentage of cases rejected decreased signiﬁcantly).
128. See 1943 Annual Report of the Voluntary Defenders Committee (1944)
[hereinafter 1943 Annual Report] (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (noting
organization operated “with a staff reduced to the General Counsel and clerical help”), in
LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 6, folder 11.
129. See infra Table 1 (showing ﬂuctuation of per-case expenditure during 1935–
1958).
130. The emphasis here is on the word “rough.” By the late 1950s, the Committee was
running budget deﬁcits, and its 1958 Annual Report described the organization as “undermanned and underpaid.” Annual Report of the Voluntary Defenders Committee, in
Indigent Defendant 5, 5 (1958) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers,
supra note 7, box 5, folder 3.
131. Wilbur Hollingsworth, [Draft] Budget 1964–5 (Sept. 12, 1963) (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) (“For many years the District Attorney of Suffolk County has
estimated that the Defenders Committee is obliged to handle at least seventy percent of
the felony cases.”), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 2, folder 4.
132. See 1952 Annual Report, supra note 101 (referencing previous year’s discontinuation of work in Middlesex County and lamenting “limited funds” require “conﬁn[ing] our work to Suffolk County”). On the Springﬁeld office, see Clipping, Defenders’
Service Launched, Springﬁeld Daily News, Aug. 23, 1954 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (reporting opening of Voluntary Defenders Committee’s office in Springﬁeld), in
LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 1, folder 6. Even though it generally operated on a larger
scale, the New York Legal Aid Society also shrunk its geographic jurisdiction in years where
it received fewer contributions. See Beaney, supra note 56, at 217 n.36 (discussing how
New York Legal Aid Society suffered budget deﬁcit in 1933 and temporarily discontinued
branch service in Harlem and Brooklyn).
133. See 1946 Annual Report, supra note 123 (“For some years we have accepted very
few cases in the District and Municipal Courts . . . . While we would like to appear more
often in these courts . . . with the staff consisting of only two attorneys, to attempt to
defend persons in all of these courts would be physically impossible.”).
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the Massachusetts district courts for either side; non-attorney police
officers often represented the prosecution.134 The long-term descendants
of the eighteenth-century justice of the peace courts, the district courts
remained judge-dominated, fast-paced, informal tribunals into the late
twentieth century, with verdicts issued by judges rather than juries.135
District court proceedings were generally not even transcribed, as there
was no need to preserve the record for appeal, since parties who lost in
district court could request a de novo jury trial in superior court.136 Yet
the district courts resolved 95% of the criminal cases in Massachusetts,
which were primarily misdemeanors but included some low-level
felonies.137
3. Defenders as Trial Lawyers. — Within its limitations, the Voluntary
Defenders Committee promoted a robust conception of a defender’s
duties to his clients that emphasized the vindication of innocence claims.
Early in his tenure, Hollingsworth reﬂected on what he had learned
about the beneﬁts of defense counsel. “Juries are usually able to truly
decide the case from the facts,” he observed, but “without counsel, a
defendant is often unable to get the true facts before the jury.”138
Hollingsworth described a recent manslaughter trial in which his client
was charged with killing her husband; she claimed that he was abusive
and that she had stabbed him in self-defense.139 Thanks to
Hollingsworth’s work tracking down eyewitnesses to corroborate her
134. See Fisher, supra note 46, at 4, 244 n.8. Into the 1970s, nonattorney police
officers prosecuted district court cases in Boston—a practice the Boston Lawyers’
Committee for Civil Rights decried as possibly ultra vires and as “demean[ing to] the
criminal process.” Stephen Bing & Stephen Rosenfeld, The Quality of Justice in the Lower
Criminal Courts of Metropolitan Boston 29–30 (1970); see also Harris, In Criminal
Court—I, supra note 2, at 48 (observing district attorneys prosecuted felonies in Boston
Municipal Court, but police officers prosecuted misdemeanors).
135. See Margo Miller, Should State’s District Courts Have Juries?, Bos. Globe, Aug. 1,
1971, at 10 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (describing history of district courts,
lack of juries, and criticisms of courts’ informality). The district courts were uniﬁed in
1921 into a statewide system of seventy-six district courts, with the Boston Municipal Court
remaining administratively independent. Beginning in 1964, they began experimenting
with juries in some cases. Mass. Corr. Ass’n, The Basic Structure of the Administration of
Criminal Justice in Massachusetts 34–35, 70 (5th ed. 1968) [hereinafter Basic Structure].
136. See Basic Structure, supra note 135, at 33 (noting that district court trials proceed
“without a jury but a person thus convicted has a right to a jury trial de novo, in the
Superior Court”); Anson Smith, Poorer the Man, Poorer the Justice, Bos. Globe, Jan. 19,
1972, at 1 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (describing de novo trial system and
noting district court trials were transcribed only if defendant hired his own stenographer).
137. See Basic Structure, supra note 135, at 33 (“About 95% of all criminal charges are
disposed of” in district courts). In addition to misdemeanors, district courts could try
felonies with possible sentences of up to ﬁve years but could only impose sentences of up
to two-and-a-half years. Id. at 34.
138. Letter from Wilbur G. Hollingsworth to Samuel Vaughan (Dec. 3, 1937) (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Letter from Hollingsworth to Vaughan Dec. 3,
1937], in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 6, folder 2.
139. Id.
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story, the jury acquitted the woman of all charges.140 Hollingsworth did
not mention trying to negotiate a plea deal for the woman, nor (in an
age before the full constitutionalization of criminal procedure) did he
mention mounting any procedural challenges to the police
investigation.141 Rather, he deﬁned his role as investigating the facts and
arguing, on the basis of those facts, for the jury to acquit.142
Trial practice was central to Hollingsworth’s work—which is not to
say that he tried all or even most of his cases. If a client admitted his
guilt, Hollingsworth encouraged a plea and might reject altogether a
client who admitted guilt but insisted on a trial.143 However,
Hollingsworth tried enough cases that trial preparation and court
appearances must have occupied the bulk of his time. For example, out
of the 264 cases where Hollingsworth actually represented defendants in
1944, he pled out approximately 172—about 65%—of his cases and tried
about 17%—approximately forty ﬁve cases.144 That worked out to fortyﬁve trials—almost one trial every work week.145 Also, when he did try
cases, he usually won.146 In 1944, for instance, he won a “not guilty”
verdict in thirty of his forty-ﬁve trials.147 Hollingsworth boasted that no
“law ﬁrm in Boston . . . [had] a higher percentage of acquittals.”148 For
clients, then, the charity model often worked well, but those clients were
a small group. Hollingsworth could try so many cases because he had the
140. See id. (explaining beneﬁt defendant receives when counsel investigates incident
for which client is charged). On a separate occasion, Hollingsworth noted an investigation
he undertook for a robbery case that ultimately defeated a strong case against the
defendant. See Letter from Wilbur G. Hollingsworth to Samuel Vaughan (May 4, 1937)
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (recounting how counsel’s investigation
“established a story quite different from that told by the complaining witnesses”), in LRB
Papers, supra note 7, box 6, folder 2.
141. See Letter from Hollingsworth to Vaughan Dec. 3, 1937, supra note 138
(describing investigation and trial without mention of plea negotiations or procedural
objections).
142. Id. For similar descriptions of his role in these terms, see 1944 Annual Report of
the Voluntary Defenders Committee (1945) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter 1944 Annual Report] (documenting Voluntary Defenders Committee’s
initiation of investigation upon accepting defense of indigent client), in LRB Papers, supra
note 7, box 6, folder 11; cf. Letter from Wilbur G. Hollingsworth to Samuel Vaughan (May
3, 1943) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (noting his work sometimes includes social
services referrals), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 6, folder 6.
143. See 1944 Annual Report, supra note 142 (explaining Committee’s decision not to
represent guilty defendants who insist on going to trial).
144. See id. (documenting results of 450 applications for assistance made to
Committee).
145. See id. (“Counsel for the Committee represented defendants in forty-ﬁve trials.”).
146. Id.
147. Id. Similarly, of sixty-seven charges that went to trial in 1943, Hollingsworth won
acquittals on ﬁfty-one charges. 1943 Annual Report, supra note 128.
148. Ratio of Defendants Lacking Counsel Brings Free Legal Service to Area,
Springﬁeld Union, Aug. 23, 1954 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers,
supra note 7, box 1, folder 6.
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discretion to reject cases altogether. There is no way to track what
happened to the nameless defendants whom Hollingsworth refused to
represent or the many more who never made it into his office. Perhaps
they found other lawyers, but many of them probably went to court alone
and pled guilty.
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TABLE 1: VOLUNTARY DEFENDERS COMMITTEE EXPENDITURES AND
CASELOAD, 1935–1958
Year

Nominal
Total
Expenditures

Real Total
Expenditures
(2013 $)

Total
Cases
Handled*

Nominal
Expenditures
per Case**

Real
Expenditures
per Case**

FY 1935–
1936

$1,977

$33,200

151

$13

$219

FY 1936–
1937

2,767

44,900

193

14

227

FY 1937–
1938***

4,924

81,400

298

17

273

1939

5,502

92,300

321

17

288

1940

5,491

91,200

280

20

326

1941

5,789

91,500

266

22

344

1942

5,570

79,600

257

22

310

1943

6,224

83,800

263

24

319

1944

6,951

92,000

254

27

362

1945

7,597

98,300

230

33

427

1946

9,519

113,000

247

39

457

1947

9,924

103,000

343

29

300

1948

13,264

128,000

387

34

331

1949

16,139

158,000

428

38

369

1950

16,164

156,000

399

41

391

1951

19,671

176,000

625

31

278

1952

21,408

188,000

648

33

290

1953

24,063

210,000

844

29

249

1954

24,405

212,000

1,030

24

206

1955

29,730

259,000

1,160

26

223

1956

No Data

No Data

No Data

No Data

No Data

1957

No Data

No Data

No Data

No Data

No Data

1958

35,334

285,000

1,120

32

258

* In the Annual Reports published from 1936 through 1959, the Voluntary
Defenders listed a total number of cases including a breakout ﬁgure for “cases declined.”
“Cases declined” is subtracted from total cases to arrive at the “total cases handled.” It
should be noted that the Committee sometimes conducted some research and
investigation in these cases before ultimately declining to represent the defendant. However, because there is no way of assessing how much time was generally spent on these
cases, these preliminary investigations have been excluded from the total cases handled, so
that the caseload data above reﬂects only cases in which the Voluntary Defenders
represented the defendant in court in some capacity. It is likely that the Voluntary
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Defenders did not spend enough time on these cases to alter the data in any systematic
way.
** These ﬁgures were determined by dividing the total expenditures by the total
cases handled. This ﬁgure should be interpreted only as a rough average to aid in
comparing the Committee’s level of resources across years, not as an estimate of resources
devoted to any individual case, which likely varied from case to case.
*** The data for 1937–1938 is for June 1937 through September 1938, not a twelvemonth year.
Rounding Note: In this table, all nominal ﬁgures have been rounded up to the next
whole dollar. The raw ﬁgures (including dollars and cents, if given) were entered for
conversions, but the conversion calculator rounds to the nearest hundred or thousand
dollars (depending on the order of magnitude).
Sources: Annual Reports (1936–1955, 1959), in LRB Papers, supra note 7. The
Measuring Worth simple purchasing power calculator (http://measuringworth.com/),
which multiplies by percentage increase in Consumer Price Index (CPI), was used to
convert nominal ﬁgures into real ﬁgures. For detailed citations and data used for
calculations, see Appendix.
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TABLE 2: VOLUNTARY DEFENDERS COMMITTEE PERCENTAGE OF CASES
DECLINED, 1935–1958
Year

Number of Applicants

Number of Cases
Declined

Percent Declined

FY 1937–1938

317

97

31%

1939

425

104

24%

1940

450

51

11%

1941

406

140

34%

1942

356

99

28%

1943

389

126

32%

1944

358

104

29%

1945

325

95

29%

1946

360

113

31%

1947

488

145

30%

1948

485

98

20%

1949

518

90

17%

1950

508

109

21%

1951

708

83

12%

1952

735

87

12%

1953

915

71

8%

1954

1,185

155

13%

1955

1,250

90

7%

1956

No Data

No Data

No Data

1957

No Data

No Data

No Data

1958

1,297

177

14%

Sources: Annual Reports (1936–1955, 1959), in LRB Papers, supra note 7. For
detailed citations and data used for calculations, see Appendix.

C.

Right-to-Counsel Doctrine Undermines the Charity Model

In the 1950s, jurists increasingly hinted that counsel might be a constitutional right, not a charitable benefaction.149 Under the 1942
Supreme Court case of Betts v. Brady, counsel was constitutionally
required in noncapital cases only if they presented special circumstances.150 In its ﬁrst eight years of applying Betts, the Court found
149. Of course, for federal cases, the Supreme Court found a right to appointed
counsel earlier. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 467 (1938) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment
constitutionally entitles one charged with crime to the assistance of counsel . . . .”). Prior
to Gideon, however, the scope of that right and its practical implementation generated
“widespread confusion.” Beaney, supra note 56, at 76.
150. 316 U.S. 455 (1942); see also Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640, 677 (1948) (restating
right to counsel in noncapital state felony cases presenting “special circumstances”).
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“special circumstances” about half of the time.151 But after 1950, the
Court found “special circumstances” in every right-to-counsel case that it
decided.152 And in 1956, the Court pronounced that “[t]here can be no
equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount
of money he has.”153 Although not made in the context of a right-tocounsel ruling, such a “sweeping statement” cemented the perception
that the Warren Court was especially concerned with the plight of
indigent defendants.154 Court-watchers speculated that the Justices would
soon replace Betts with a blanket right to counsel.155 In 1960, the attorney
general of Massachusetts, Ed McCormack, foresaw that it was “just a
question of time . . . before the right of representation by counsel will
invariably be held a constitutional right.”156
The doctrinal momentum exerted a gravitational pull upon the elite
bar’s policy preferences. As the Court moved towards a more comprehensive right to counsel in the 1950s, the elite bar adjusted to the idea of
publicly funded indigent defense. For too long, wrote the Wall Street law
ﬁrm partner and prominent legal-aid supporter Harrison Tweed,
“lawyers as well as laymen” had equated public defense with the
“hobgoblin” of communism.157 In reports and model legislation, bar
leaders now recommended that cities establish organized defender
offices.158 These recommendations left to local choice whether these
offices should be fully public or public–private hybrids. The New York
Legal Aid Society proposed in 1957 that it accept public funds for
criminal cases but remain a private entity, lest indigent defense become
151. See Beaney, supra note 56, at 170 (“In the fourteen noncapital cases which came
before the Supreme Court between 1942 . . . and 1950, half of the claims were allowed and
half rejected.”).
152. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 350–51 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(noting Court had not found “special circumstances to be lacking” since 1950); see also
Israel, Overruling, supra note 56, at 251–61 (summarizing line of cases through which
Court eroded Betts rule).
153. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
154. Israel, Overruling, supra note 56, at 245; see also Israel, From a 1963 Perspective,
supra note 26, at 2041–42 (charting inﬂuence of “Griffin principle” on arguments made to
Court and on its opinions).
155. See Beaney, supra note 56, at 156–58, 170 (noting Court saw increase in “petitions for review by the Supreme Court of state cases involving counsel claims”).
156. Letter from Edward McCormack to Paul Feeney (May 25, 1960) (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Letter from McCormack to Feeney] (recounting
suggestion of Dean Erwin Griswold of Harvard Law School), in LRB Papers, supra note 7,
box 1, folder 12.
157. Harrison Tweed, Foreword to Equal Justice for the Accused, supra note 108, at 5,
5–6. Tweed had served as president of the New York Legal Aid Society, the New York City
Bar Association, and the American Law Institute.
158. Equal Justice for the Accused, supra note 108, at 29–30; Brownell, supra note 34,
at 249; Commissioners on Uniform State Laws Approve Model Defender Act, 43 J. Am.
Judicature Soc’y 95, 95 (1959). For a scholarly endorsement of the public defender model
from the same decade, see Beaney, supra note 56, at 220–21, 224.
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“an indirect form of patronage.”159 But even partial endorsements of
public defense reﬂected signiﬁcant movement in the profession’s mainstream position. In the civil realm, many bar leaders accepted publicsector legal aid only in the late 1960s and even then, only reluctantly.160
Why did the elite bar begin to shift its position? In theory, a right to
counsel could still be satisﬁed through private charity or even case-bycase appointments. But elite lawyers had long complained about the
quality of court-appointed counsel—those complaints were partly why
the ﬁrst public and voluntary defenders had been established.161 Nor was
it realistic to imagine that the volume of cases implied by a universal
entitlement could be handled through private charities alone, given the
volatility of philanthropic funding. And in a world where the right to
counsel was an enforceable right, it would not be merely unfortunate if
charities could not serve everyone. It would be, in the eyes of lawyers,
dangerous: The federal courts might start releasing state prisoners if
their convictions had been uncounseled.162 More generally, lawyers may
have simply assumed some association between rights and public
funding, even if the association was not fully theorized. While state
constitutions confer many affirmative rights, American legal culture had
no strong jurisprudential tradition explaining how positive rights derived
from the federal Constitution should be implemented.163
In Boston, judicial recognition of a right to counsel quite literally
undermined the charity model of indigent defense. Throughout the
1950s, the Voluntary Defenders Committee’s primary funder—United
Community Services, metropolitan Boston’s community chest—threatened to withdraw its donations, arguing “that a job of this magnitude
should be undertaken by the State rather than by a private charitable
organization.”164 For a time, the Committee staved off its funders’ threats
159. McConville & Mirsky, supra note 44, at 629 (quoting Legal Aid Society Attorney
in Chief).
160. See Teles, supra note 26, at 34.
161. See McConville & Mirsky, supra note 44, at 596–99 (describing Progressive Era
critiques of assigned counsel).
162. In 1954, Massachusetts observers warily noted “a number of U.S. Supreme Court
decisions” suggesting that Betts had “created a grave problem for Massachusetts.” Clipping,
Defenders’ Service Launched, Springﬁeld Daily News, Aug. 23, 1954 (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 1, folder 6.
163. See Emily Zackin, Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Why State
Constitutions Contain America’s Positive Rights 1–3 (2013) (“America is widely believed to
be exceptional in its lack of positive constitutional rights and its exclusive devotion to
negative ones,” but “state constitutions force us to question th[is] ubiquitous assertion . . . .”). In other policy contexts, poverty lawyers’ attempts to constitutionalize “a more
robust welfare state” would meet with “extremely limited success.” Id. at 5.
164. Memorandum from Raynor Gardiner to LaRue Brown in Regard to Voluntary
Defender (Sept. 28, 1955) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra
note 7, box 1, folder 7. On reliance on United Community Services (UCS) by 1950, see
1950 Annual Report of the Voluntary Defenders Committee (1951) (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 5, folder 2. “Community chest” or
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with supportive letters from local legal luminaries.165 But then, in 1958,
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted an administrative rule
requiring the superior courts to appoint counsel in all felony cases.166
United Community Services reacted by ominously informing the
Voluntary Defenders that its funding for 1960 represented a “terminal
allotment.”167 After years of threats, United Community Services had
followed through, arguing—in LaRue Brown’s paraphrase—that if the
state requires counsel, “let the state pay for it.”168
With its coffers dwindling, the Voluntary Defenders Committee took
its funders’ advice and lobbied for statewide public defender legislation.169 In response, in 1960, the Massachusetts legislature enacted a
barebones bill establishing a “Massachusetts Defenders Committee” to be
appointed by the state Judicial Council.170 The brief act stated only that
“red feather” agencies were established in cities nationwide in the ﬁrst decades of the
twentieth century to centralize fundraising for all of a region’s social services agencies, and
federated into United Way in 1970. See Olivier Zunz, Philanthropy in America 51–52, 69,
177 (2011). On UCS of Boston in particular, see Stephan Thernstrom, Poverty, Planning,
and Politics in the New Boston 9–10 (1969).
165. See, e.g., Letter from Griswold to Prouty, supra note 90 (encouraging UCS to
grant Committee’s request for ﬁnancial support); Letter from Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr. to
LaRue Brown (Oct. 21, 1955) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (expressing
“unreserved[] . . . support” for Committee’s funding application to UCS and permitting
Brown to use letter accordingly), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 1, folder 7. Describing
other letters, see Memorandum from Wilbur Hollingsworth to LaRue Brown (Nov. 7,
1955) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (listing letter senders who wrote to “urge full
support of our office by the U.C.S. so that it will not be necessary to curtail any of our
present activities”), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 1, folder 7. It is not entirely clear why
Boston’s UCS became so opposed to funding indigent defense; Philadelphia’s equivalent
organization funded that city’s Defender Association without complaint. UCS had a
conservative reputation within Boston, but under its 1950s leadership was trying to move
away from that reputation, for instance by funding juvenile delinquency projects. See
Thernstrom, supra note 164, at 8–9.
166. Sup. Judicial Ct. R. 10, 337 Mass. 812, 813 (1958); see also Pugliese v.
Commonwealth, 140 N.E.2d 476, 479 (Mass. 1957) (holding state constitution’s due process guarantee required appointing counsel for intellectually disabled, noncapital defendant).
167. Letter from UCS Associate Director to Raynor M. Gardiner (Feb. 8, 1960) (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 1, folder 12.
168. LaRue Brown, Equal Justice Under the Law, 50 Mass. L.Q. 57, 59 (1965).
169. Opinion, From Private to Public, Bos. Pilot, May 14, 1960 (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) (advocating for speedy passage of pending legislation that would
provide indigent defense services “at public expense” to “entire Commonwealth”), in LRB
Papers, supra note 7, box 1, folder 12; see also LaRue Brown, Letter to the Editor, Averting
Broken Lives, Broken Homes Not Measured in Dollars and Cents, Bos. Globe, May 7,
1959, at 14 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (urging legislature to enact public
defender bill).
170. Act of Aug. 5, 1960, ch. 565, 1960 Mass. Acts 490, 490–91 (codiﬁed at Mass. Gen.
Laws ch. 221, § 34D) (repealed in 1983); At the State House: Senate Sends Furcolo Bill to
Create 11-Member Public Defender Group, Bos. Globe, Aug. 4, 1960, at 2 (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review); see also Hollingsworth–Brown Correspondence Tracking the Bill’s
Progress (Aug. 1960) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (documenting bill’s passage
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the Committee would “provide counsel” for indigent defendants in all
cases where counsel was legally required, and authorized the Committee
to “adopt such rules and regulations” and “appoint such professional,
clerical and other assistants as may be necessary” to carry out that task.171
In effect, the new agency was just the Voluntary Defenders Committee
with a few new board members and a new name.172 LaRue Brown
remained chair of the board, Wilbur Hollingsworth remained chief
counsel, and for a time, the agency even used its predecessor’s leftover
stationery.173
II. THE GIDEON CONSENSUS: TOWARDS A PUBLIC MODEL OF
INDIGENT DEFENSE
Handed down in March 1963, Gideon catalyzed the elite bar’s halting
support for urban public defender offices into an establishment consensus.174 This effect may seem unexpected because Gideon arose from a
sleepy Florida beach town and the Supreme Court’s published opinions
in Gideon nowhere use the phrase “public defender.” Reading the decision literally, one might conclude that the Court intended only that
judges would appoint private counsel for indigent defendants, case by
case. Justice Black’s majority opinion opens by highlighting the Florida
trial judge’s apology to the accused burglar Clarence Earl Gideon that he
was unable to “appoint Counsel to defend you in this case.”175 Later in
the opinion, Justice Black emphasizes that defendants need lawyers because the government “hires lawyers to prosecute.”176 Nowhere acknowledged in Gideon is the reality that in some places—including Alameda
by Senate and signing into law by governor), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 1, folder 13.
The bill passed with an emergency preamble making it effective immediately, which Attorney General Ed McCormack suggested. See Letter from McCormack to Feeney, supra note
156.
171. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 565, § 1 (1960). The statute was later revised to provide for
appointment directly by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. Act of April 24, 1962,
ch. 366, 1962 Mass. Acts (codiﬁed at Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 221, § 34D) (repealed in 1983)
(“[P]lacing the appointive power of the members of the Massachusetts Defenders
Committee in the justices of the Supreme Judicial Court.”).
172. See Letter from Wilbur Hollingsworth to LaRue Brown (Aug. 16, 1960) (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting Judicial Council named ﬁve past Voluntary
Defenders Committee board members and six new members to initial board of
Massachusetts Defenders Committee), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 1, folder 12.
173. See id. For leftover stationery, see Letter from Wilbur G. Hollingsworth to LaRue
Brown (Oct. 10, 1960) (showing correction to new name on former Committee’s letterhead), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 1, folder 12.
174. For background on Gideon, see Lewis, Gideon’s Trumpet, supra note 16, at 3–10.
For the many rich journalistic and ﬁrst-person remembrances of the backstory behind
Gideon and its immediate effects in Florida, see Houppert, Chasing Gideon, supra note 19;
Bruce R. Jacob, The Gideon Trials, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 2059 (2014); Bruce R. Jacob, Memories
of and Reﬂections About Gideon v. Wainwright, 33 Stetson L. Rev. 181 (2003).
175. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 337 (1963).
176. Id. at 344.
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County, California, where Chief Justice Warren, as district attorney, had
helped to establish a public defender in 1927—the government had also
long hired lawyers to defend.177
But beyond Gideon’s text, a penumbral Gideon quickly developed
through the decision’s reception and elaboration by elite legal-liberal
journalists, lawyers, and academics.178 In these commentators’ interpretation, Gideon had less to do with rural Florida than with cities, and either
required or strongly encouraged those cities to establish public defenders or some private equivalent.179 Within a year of the decision, New York
Times reporter Anthony Lewis summarized and advanced this reading of
Gideon in his widely read, celebratory book about the case, Gideon’s
Trumpet. After recounting the history of public defenders, Lewis reported
an expert consensus that “there is no decent alternative in populous
urban areas to an office that has a regularly employed staff of lawyers
representing indigents,” whether “a public defender or, alternatively, a
voluntary legal-aid organization.”180 In their public speeches if not in
their legal opinions, Supreme Court Justices endorsed this consensus. At
a national conference on indigent defense in 1969, Chief Justice Warren
fondly recalled his interactions with the Alameda County public defender,181 and his recently appointed successor, Chief Justice Burger, predicted that “the organized defender approach” would soon “be the prevailing mode of representation.”182
Throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s, this reading of Gideon was
reinforced through professional handbooks of “best practices” and quasiofficial guidance documents.183 A handbook published by the National
177. Moreover, the other indigent defense case decided on the same day, Douglas v.
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), involved the Los Angeles public defender.
178. As one New York judge observed, the decision “prompted the legal profession to
reexamine the procedures by which [the right to counsel] is afforded to an indigent
defendant.” Mitchell D. Schweitzer, Book Review, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 183, 184 (1965)
(quoted in Israel, From a 1963 Perspective, supra note 26, at 2057). On midcentury legal
liberalism, see Laura Kalman, The Strange Career of Legal Liberalism 2 (1998) (deﬁning
legal liberalism as “trust in the potential of courts, particularly the Supreme Court,” to
enact nationwide policy change and noting this faith has been associated with political
liberalism since Warren Court era, because of “liberal law professors’ and social reformers’
faith in the transformative power of the Warren Court” increased).
179. See Lewis, Gideon’s Trumpet, supra note 16, at 209–10 (summarizing commentary
after Gideon).
180. Id. at 200.
181. Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 Yale L.J.
1179, 1220 (1975).
182. Beth Lynch & Nancy E. Goldberg, The Dollars and Sense of Justice; A Study of
the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration as It Relates to the Defense Function of
the Criminal Justice System, at v (1973).
183. See Alissa Pollitz Worden & Andrew Lucas Blaize Davies, Protecting Due Process
in a Punitive Era: An Analysis of Changes in Providing Counsel to the Poor [hereinafter
Worden & Davies, Protecting Due Process], in 47 Studies in Law, Politics, and Society: New
Perspectives on Crime and Criminal Justice 71 (Austin Sarat ed., 2009) (noting by 1970s,
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Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA) in 1965 explained that
case-by-case appointments could work only in low-poverty areas: “In
urban areas the community should consider the institution of a public
defender or other centrally-administered service.”184 In 1973, the federal
government’s National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals recommended that every jurisdiction maintain both
“a full-time public defender organization, and a coordinated assigned
counsel system involving substantial participation of the private bar.”185
Although contemplating the occasional use of assigned counsel, these
standards envisioned public defenders as the primary providers of indigent defense.186 The standards further speciﬁed that a city’s head public
defender should be paid as highly as “the presiding judge of the trial
court,” while line defenders should be salaried comparably to “attorney
associates in private law ﬁrms.”187 Joint standards issued by the NLADA
and the American Bar Association (ABA) similarly proposed
“experienced, competent, and zealous” public defenders salaried
roughly the same as prosecutors.188
The Gideon consensus gained material support from the Ford
Foundation, the juggernaut of Cold War-era big philanthropy, which
operated almost as an unofficial government agency in the 1960s.189 In
legal profession “agreed on the core components of a ‘best practices’ model for indigent
defense”); Nancy A. Goldberg, Defender Systems of the Future: The New National
Standards, 12 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 709, 709 (1975) (describing history and content of
national standards recommending establishment of defender systems). This Article interprets these documents as efforts to translate Gideon’s requirements into policy recommendations. In contrast, Professors McConville and Mirsky lambasted them as a cynical
effort to give an “adversarial veneer” to indigent defense systems that they viewed as
incompatible with Gideon. McConville & Mirsky, supra note 44, at 652; see also id. at 658
(arguing ABA, NLADA, and National Advisory Commission standards sought to rationalize
“continued reliance on institutional defenders and assigned counsel,” which had failed “to
provide adversarial advocacy in conformity with Gideon’s mandate”).
184. Other Face of Justice, supra note 34, at 164; see also Lynch & Goldberg, supra
note 182 (arguing “volume of cases requires an organized system of well-trained defenders” rather than “noblesse oblige”).
185. Other Face of Justice, supra note 34, at 159 (quoting Standard 13.5, Method of
Delivering Defense Services).
186. The ABA’s draft standards on defense services were more equivocal, stating that
jurisdictions should utilize “a defender or assigned counsel system or a combination of
these.” Id. at 161 (quoting Standard 1.2).
187. Id. at 159 (quoting Standards 13.7 and 13.11).
188. In Search of Justice, supra note 33, at 20 (quoting 1965–1966 Defender
Standards).
189. See Alice O’Connor, Poverty Knowledge: Social Science, Social Policy, and the
Poor in Twentieth-Century U.S. History 126–29 (2002) (describing Ford Foundation and
other large foundations’ personnel overlap and policy inﬂuence on Kennedy and Johnson
Administrations); Zunz, supra note 164, at 174–80, 211 (describing enormous wealth and
policy inﬂuence of Ford Foundation as well as Carnegie, Rockefeller, and Duke Foundations at midcentury and quoting Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s description of Ford
Foundation’s anti-poverty programs as “new level of American government”). On the Ford
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1963, the Ford Foundation announced a $2.3 million grant to the
NLADA—later increased to $4.3 million—to establish, expand, and assist
public defenders nationwide.190 In Gideon’s Trumpet, Anthony Lewis
celebrated the Ford grant as a visionary philanthropic response to
Gideon.191 Actually, the NLADA had applied to Ford for the grant two
years before.192 But Gideon infused the initiative with urgency and
purpose.193 Gideon also inspired Ford to recruit “a Project Director of
national stature” to give the project greater visibility—the U.S. Army’s
Judge Advocate General, Charles “Ted” Decker.194
On paper, the Gideon consensus in favor of publicly funded indigent
defense contravened elements of the traditional charity model. Voluntary
defender organizations had never paid salaries comparable to law ﬁrms,
nor attempted to represent every indigent defendant within their area.
The Gideon consensus also left open important questions, including who
was supposed to pay for all of these new, well-compensated public
defenders. Today, most legal scholars assign states the primary ﬁscal
responsibility for satisfying Gideon.195 Initially, however, inﬂuential
interpreters of Gideon offered a range of views about who should pay for
indigent defense. Some, like Clinton Bamberger of the Johnson
Administration’s Office of Economic Opportunity, did locate
responsibility with the states.196 Others, including Attorney General
Foundation’s role in founding most of the major liberal public-interest law ﬁrms, see Teles,
supra note 26, at 51–52.
190. See Nat’l Def. Project of the Nat’l Legal Aid & Def. Assoc., Basic Policy Statement
and Application Guide 8 (1965) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (describing
expanded budget to “provide increased geographic distribution” of National Defender
projects), in Ford Foundation Archives, supra note 33, Reel 2071, Grant #06400098.
191. See Lewis, Gideon’s Trumpet, supra note 16, at 211 (describing Ford Foundation
project as response to Gideon).
192. Nat’l Legal Aid & Def. Ass’n to the Ford Found., A Proposal for a Defender
Development Project (Sept. 17, 1961) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (presenting
1961 letter from NLADA to Ford Foundation applying for grant), in Ford Foundation
Archives, supra note 33, Reel 3032, Grant #06400098.
193. See Email from John J. Cleary, Former Deputy Dir., Nat’l Def. Project of the Nat’l
Legal Aid & Def. Ass’n to Sara Mayeux, Sharswood Fellow, Univ. of Pa. Law Sch. (Oct. 6,
2014, 10:27 PM) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (describing remembrances of
former project staffer on National Defender Project as having “helped implement Gideon
(1963)”).
194. Letter from Clarence H. Faust to Henry T. Heald, Grant Request—Public Affairs
(Nov. 6, 1963) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in Ford Foundation Archives, supra
note 33, Reel 2070, Grant #06400098; see also Letter from Orison S. Marden to Joseph M.
McDaniel, Jr. (Oct. 11, 1963) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (describing selection
of Project staff, including Decker), in Ford Foundation Archives, supra note 33, Reel 2070,
Grant #06400098.
195. See, e.g., David Rudovsky, Gideon and the Effective Assistance of Counsel: The
Rhetoric and the Reality, 32 Law & Ineq. 371, 373 (2014) (noting Gideon “imposed an
unfunded mandate on state and local governments”).
196. See E. Clinton Bamberger, Speech to Nat’l Legal Aid & Def. Ass’n Conference
(Nov. 18, 1965) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (referring to “States’ obligations to
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Robert Kennedy, construed Gideon as a mandate to the legal profession.197 General Decker urged “the bar and the bench [to] seek the
necessary funds” to provide indigent defense in their area, whether from
private funders or “from other sources.”198 The NLADA proposed yet
another alternative, arguing that federal agencies must provide the funds
because “the states must comply not only with their own state codes, but
with the mandates of the Federal Constitution as well.”199 Given these
uncertainties, the Gideon consensus among elite commentators sat atop
roiling confusion in the criminal court trenches over how to actually
implement the consensus.
III. AFTER GIDEON: THE HYBRID PUBLIC-CHARITY MODEL OF
INDIGENT DEFENSE
Six months after Gideon, a hundred New England judges, legislators,
journalists, and lawyers gathered to try to ﬁgure out what changes Gideon
required of their states.200 Similar discussions took place within each
state. Lawyers involved with the Massachusetts Defenders Committee referenced Gideon frequently in their 1960s correspondence, circulating
memos with pithy titles like “Budget under Gideon” and less pithy titles
like “Study of the Impact upon the Massachusetts Defenders Committee
of the Decision by the Supreme Court of the United States of Gideon v.
Wainwright, 373 U.S. 335.”201 One Massachusetts Defenders board memprovide the representation required by recent decisions of the Supreme Court”), in LRB
Papers, supra note 7, box 2, folder 11.
197. See Hon. Robert F. Kennedy, Address Prepared for Delivery Before the New
England Conference on the Defense of Indigent Persons Accused of Crime 6 (Nov. 1, 1963),
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2011/01/20/11-01-1963Pro.pdf [http:
//perma.cc/F6B2-BUVH] (stating in reference to providing counsel to indigent, “To you
of the courts, the law schools and the profession, I offer the Justice Department’s pledge
of full cooperation in meeting that challenge”).
198. Charles L. Decker & Arnold S. Trebach, Status Report: The National Defender
Project (May 8, 1964) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in Ford Foundation Archives,
supra note 33, Reel 2071, Grant #06400098.
199. Lynch & Goldberg, supra note 182, at vi, 26; see also Goldberg, supra note 183, at
736–37 (arguing for “stable,” “long-term” federal funding of local and state defender
offices). In the mid-1970s, the ABA proposed a federal Center for Defense Services to fund
state public defenders. See Norman Lefstein & Sheldon Portman, Implementing the Right
to Counsel in State Criminal Cases, 66 A.B.A. J. 1084, 1084–85 (1980) (describing proposal
to establish Center for Defense Services to strengthen indigent defense representation).
200. Letter from Paul C. Reardon, Conference Chairman, New England Def.
Conference, to LaRue Brown, Re: New England Defender Conference (Sept. 25, 1963)
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 5, folder 13. The
agenda included a panel on states’ obligations to provide counsel, including “the effects of
recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court,” describing the problem as “national in scope and emergency.” Program, New England Law Inst., Inc., The New England
Conference on the Defense of Indigent Persons Accused of Crime 1–2 (Oct. 31, 1963) (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 5, folder 13.
201. Voluntary Defs. Comm., Study of the Impact upon the Massachusetts Defenders
Committee of the Decision by the Supreme Court of the U.S. of Gideon v. Wainwright, 373
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ber worried that Gideon had launched his state’s courts into “a period of
serious crisis.”202
At the time and since, critics have charged the Warren Court with
reducing the lofty principles of the Bill of Rights into a workaday “code
of criminal procedure.”203 Yet, in a federalist polity with thousands of
differently organized and partially overlapping court systems and police
departments, each with its own procedures and terminology, seemingly
speciﬁc constitutional mandates still required extensive translation to
map onto local institutional realities. In carrying out that translation,
state and local policymakers drew not only upon abstract standards and
guidance documents, but also upon their own memories, assumptions,
and personal contacts. In Massachusetts, the result was neither unchanging continuation of the pre-Gideon charity model nor plug-and-play implementation of the post-Gideon public model, but rather, a new and
ultimately unstable hybrid containing elements of both models.
A.

From Voluntary Defenders to Public Defenders

By 1969, the Massachusetts Defenders Committee was a fully statefunded agency with dozens of salaried attorneys.204 But the path to this
outcome was circuitous. For the ﬁrst few years after Gideon, the legislature
and the governor responded to the agency’s requested budgets by slashing them.205 In funding requests, the agency explained that its “volume
of cases” was multiplying because of recent Supreme Court decisions and
warned “that convictions [would] be overturned” if defendants were not

U.S. 335 (1964) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Voluntary Defs.
Comm., Study of the Impact of Gideon], in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 5, folder 3.
202. Frederick H. Norton, Esq., Address on Justice for the Poor: The Effect of Recent
Decisions of the United States Supreme Court on the Administration of Justice in
Massachusetts 1 (Mar. 5, 1964) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers,
supra note 7, box 2, folder 5.
203. See generally Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal
Procedure, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 929, 953–54 (1965) (“[I]n applying the Bill of Rights to the
states, the Supreme Court should not regard these declarations of fundamental principles
as if they were a detailed code of criminal procedure, allowing no room whatever for
reasonable difference of judgment . . . .”). For a recent update of Friendly’s critique, see
Stuntz, Collapse, supra note 4, at 78, 216–18.
204. See Edgar A. Rimbold, Public Defender of Indigent Defendants in Criminal
Cases: “No Tub Thumping,” 14 Bos. B.J., Jan. 1970, at 7, 13 (describing Massachusetts
Defenders Committee costs as “entirely borne by the Commonwealth”).
205. For instance, Governor John Volpe slashed the 1965–1966 request from $709,000
to $250,500 before sending it to the legislature. David Hern, Budget Slash for Defenders,
Bos. Sunday Herald, Mar. 7, 1965 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers,
supra note 7, box 2, folder 16. In 1964, a member of the MDC board told a local bar
association that the agency had met with “extreme difficulty in obtaining from” the
Massachusetts legislature “sufficient funds to perform its duties in a matter which it feels is
required under the Constitution.” Norton, supra note 202, at 8.
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provided adequate counsel.206 Nevertheless, state legislators resisted
expanding the defender agency—although, at least in part, out of concern for the private bar. Like some of the public defender’s early
opponents, lawyers within the Massachusetts legislature believed that
“spending the state’s money to defend criminals . . . takes away fees from
some deserving lawyers.”207 Rather than principled arguments, the pumppriming effect of outside funding would ultimately convince the legislature to fund the agency’s expansion.
Securing funding was one of many challenges the agency’s lawyers
faced as they struggled to implement the changes they thought Gideon
required. Three challenges that the Massachusetts Defenders Committee
encountered in the 1960s demonstrate especially clearly how pre-Gideon
legacies shaped efforts to implement the new public model. First, in
debates over how aggressively to lobby the legislature for higher salaries,
the agency divided over how thoroughly Gideon required repudiating the
pre-Gideon charity model. Second, to lawyerize the district courts as
Gideon seemed to require, the agency would have to massively expand its
staff. When the state proved reluctant to fund the expansion, the agency
turned to foundation and federal grants to bridge the gap. But once the
agency had secured funds to hire lawyers for the district courts, a third
issue arose, as defenders tussled with local judges who bristled at public
defenders’ interference with their traditional prerogatives.
1. Deﬁning a Salary Scale. — Once defenders were deﬁned as salaried
state employees, questions arose about what their salaries should be.208
While Gideon-era professional standards recommended that defenders
earn salaries commensurate with law ﬁrm associates or prosecutors, it was
no simple matter to realize those recommendations through the
complex politics of state budget requests. In 1964, the Massachusetts
Defenders Committee requested state funds to raise every attorney’s
salary to a ﬂoor of $5,000. That ﬁgure would, a few years before, have
aligned defenders’ pay with entry-level prosecutors. But that same year,
Massachusetts passed an “extremely large increase in pay for judges and
206. Form, Mass. Defs. Comm., Summary of Requests for Appropriations 1–2 (Oct. 8,
1964) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 2, folder 7.
For other references to Gideon in funding correspondence, see, e.g., Form, Mass. Defs.
Comm., Additional Budget Request (Apr. 7, 1964) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review),
in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 2, folder 5.
207. LaRue Brown Reminiscences, supra note 52, at 16; see also Letter from Herman
LaRue Brown to Rutherford (draft) (Dec. 10, 1965) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(recalling difficulties persuading lawyers within Massachusetts legislature of necessity of
funding indigent defense), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 2, folder 10.
208. The issue of public employee salaries has a rich political history of its own. See
generally Nicholas R. Parrillo, Against the Proﬁt Motive: The Salary Revolution in
American Government, 1780–1940 (2013) (chronicling how salaries replaced fee-based
compensation for government work). Public defenders postdated the larger “salary
revolution,” so the question was not whether they should be salaried but what their salaries
should be.
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district attorneys.”209 Boston prosecutors now earned between $10,000
and $20,000.210 In contrast, public defenders earned “the lowest salary
paid to an attorney performing legal duties on a full-time basis by any
State agency” in Massachusetts.211
Hollingsworth and the board quarreled over whether the agency
should accept this reality or more aggressively lobby the legislature to
equalize defender and prosecutor pay. Whether out of genuine conversion to the Gideon consensus, self-serving reasons (as the board suspected), or a combination of both, Hollingsworth maintained that public
defenders should be paid equally to prosecutors. Accordingly, when the
board asked him to prepare a post-Gideon budget estimate, he replied by
simply sending them the district attorney salary scale.212 Hollingsworth
had grown frustrated by what he perceived as the board’s sluggish
reaction to Gideon. In July 1963, he complained to the board that “for
three and one-half months, with all of the experience and knowledge at
our command, we have done nothing but talk.”213 “The Gideon
decision,” Hollingsworth wrote, “is now the law of this Commonwealth
and makes it mandatory to provide counsel in every court of the
Commonwealth to every defendant charged with a serious crime . . . .
The Massachusetts Defenders Committee is not presently providing such
representation.”214
Hollingsworth’s insistence on comparing defender and prosecutor
salaries exasperated the board. “We need ﬁgures of cases” to calculate
the budget, LaRue Brown wrote, “not . . . salaries of politically appointed
assistant district attorneys,” which Brown thought were higher than the
209. Letter from Wilbur Hollingsworth, Chief Counsel, Mass. Defs. Comm., to Samuel
Wilkinson, Chairman, Mass. Defs. Comm. (Mar. 9, 1964) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) [hereinafter Letter from Hollingsworth to Wilkinson], in LRB Papers, supra note
7, box 2, folder 4.
210. See Wilbur Hollingsworth, Draft Budget, Budget 1964–1965 (Sept. 12, 1963) (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Hollingsworth, Draft Budget 1964–1965],
in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 2, folder 4. By comparison, ﬁrst-year salaries in large law
ﬁrms revolved around $7,000 in the mid-1960s. Richard L. Abel, American Lawyers 82
(1991) (“[S]tarting salaries offered by large law ﬁrms skyrocketed from about $7,000 in
the mid-1960s to $70,000 twenty years later.”).
211. Draft Letter from Samuel A. Wilkinson, Chairman, Mass. Defs. Comm., to Budget
Dir. (Mar. 20, 1964) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7,
box 2, folder 7.
212. Letter from W.G. Hollingsworth, Chief Counsel, Mass. Defs. Comm., to Budget
Sub-Committee (Sept. 12, 1963) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers,
supra note 7, box 1, folder 17; see also Letter from Hollingsworth to Wilkinson, supra note
209 (“[I]f Ways and Means wants to pay an assistant district attorney $9,400 for prosecuting motor vehicle violations in Middlesex, it should not complain if the Defenders
Committee asks for more than $3,000 for a man to defend serious felonies.”).
213. Letter from Wilbur Hollingsworth, Chief Counsel, Mass. Defs. Comm., to Edward
Duggan, Chairman, Lyne, Woodsworth & Evarts (July 9, 1963) (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 2, folder 4.
214. Hollingsworth, Draft Budget 1964–1965, supra note 131.
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agency could realistically ask for.215 Brown worried that requesting too
large a budget would provoke a backlash, and legislators might replace
the agency with an assigned counsel system.216 Perhaps Brown was right
that Hollingsworth’s proposal would have backﬁred. But Brown’s many
years defending the charity model’s low-pay, high-turnover salary scale
likely colored his judgment on this point. Even after Gideon, Brown
described indigent defense not as a career track but as a way station for
“young attorneys,” providing “valuable training and experience, which
they later made use of when they went with a law ﬁrm.”217 Hollingsworth
thought Gideon rendered this model obsolete, and as a result, a rift
developed between him and the board, which continued to view the
agency as “a training ground for young lawyers.”218 Partly because of this
disagreement, the board ﬁred Hollingsworth in June 1964 and promoted
one of his assistants, Edgar Rimbold, to replace him as chief counsel.219
After he was ﬁred, Hollingsworth told the press, “I think that at the
present time the public defender project in Massachusetts is a complete
failure.”220
2. Lawyerizing the District Courts. — In Massachusetts, Gideon proved
especially disruptive in the district courts, where lawyers had traditionally
been sparse. About a year after Gideon, Wilbur Hollingsworth argued in a
test case that Gideon required counsel in all district court cases.221 The
state’s highest court rejected Hollingsworth’s argument but agreed that it
215. Letter from LaRue Brown to Wilbur Hollingsworth (Sept. 13, 1963) (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 6, folder 12. It is not clear
from the ﬁles if Brown actually sent this letter (or a similar letter) to Hollingsworth.
216. See id. (“Asking for so large an amount could quite possibly greatly encourage
those who would prefer an assigned counsel system to our committee . . . .”).
217. New England Law Inst., Inc., The New England Conference on the Defense of
Indigent Persons Accused of Crime: Reports on Discussions of Panel Topics “A,” “B,” and
“C” 26 (1963) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 5,
folder 14. Others at the conference questioned whether the goal was “to educate the bar
or to provide competent counsel?” If the latter, then public defenders should be
“adequately paid and work on a full-time basis.” Id.
218. Unidentiﬁed Newspaper Clipping Attached to Mass. Defs. Comm. Meeting
Minutes, Founder Of Defenders To Fight ‘Quit’ Demand, June 19, 1964 (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Founder to Fight Demand], in LRB Papers, supra note
7, box 2, folder 4.
219. Defenders Appoint New Chief, Bos. Globe, July 1, 1964, at 6 (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review); Defenders Fire Hollingsworth, Bos. Globe, June 20, 1964, at 3 (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). For the vote to terminate Hollingsworth, see Minutes
from Massachusetts Defenders Committee Meeting (June 19, 1964) (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 2, folder 4. Disagreements over
Gideon were not the sole cause. Once they decided to terminate Hollingsworth, Brown and
other board members dredged up other complaints. There were also personality conﬂicts
and some legitimate concerns about Hollingsworth’s office management.
220. Founder to Fight Demand, supra note 218; see also Hollingsworth Bids High
Court Probe Defenders, Bos. Globe, June 14, 1964, at 1 (reporting Hollingsworth’s
description of Massachusetts Defenders as “lousy system”).
221. Commonwealth v. O’Leary, 198 N.E.2d 403 (Mass. 1964).
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was “prudent” for district courts to appoint counsel in all but “the most
triﬂing” cases.222 Soon thereafter, the court revised state judicial rules to
require district courts to appoint counsel in all cases with a possible
prison term.223 Complying with that rule presented enormous logistical
challenges. One statewide study estimated that 60% of defendants
charged with “serious charge[s]” in district court were uncounseled.224
Combining that ﬁgure with his understanding of Gideon, LaRue Brown
estimated 32,250 cases each year in which counsel was required but not
being provided.225 To expand its caseload on that order of magnitude,
the Massachusetts Defenders Committee would need a massive infusion
of resources—and perhaps twenty-six times its current number of
lawyers.226 In light of these calculations, Brown described Gideon’s
“burden upon the defense mechanism” as “almost appalling.”227 Board
member Raynor Gardiner grumbled “that any attempt to take care of all
the more serious cases in the district courts is a little like trying to bail
out the ocean.”228
As it happened, “trying to bail out the ocean” was precisely the sort
of innovative project that 1960s foundations and federal agencies were
eager to fund. In 1965, the Massachusetts Defenders Committee partnered with Action for Boston Community Development (ABCD), a
public–private hybrid established to coordinate Ford Foundation urban
renewal funding for metropolitan Boston, and secured a grant from
Ford’s National Defender Project to hire defenders for the Suffolk
County district courts.229 The next year, the agency secured a much larger
grant from the federal Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO)—the
lead agency in President Johnson’s War on Poverty—to expand into the

222. Id. at 405.
223. Sup. Judicial Ct. R. 10, 347 Mass. 808, 809 (1964).
224. Voluntary Defs. Comm., Study of the Impact of Gideon, supra note 201, at 2.
225. Id. at 3.
226. See Bos. Office Case Load (1964) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review)
(estimating need for 182 attorneys in Suffolk County alone), in LRB Papers, supra note 7,
box 2, folder 16.
227. Letter from LaRue Brown to Permanent Charity Fund (Apr. 16, 1964) (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 2, folder 1. The archival
copy is a draft, so it is not clear if Brown sent this version.
228. Letter from Raynor Gardiner to LaRue Brown (Mar. 19, 1964) (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 2, folder 5; see also Frederick H.
Norton, Jr., The Gideon Case: A Mandate for the Organized Bar, 8 Bos. B.J., Sept. 1964, at
7, 8 (observing Massachusetts Defenders Committee could handle superior court cases but
had resources “completely inadequate” to handle volume of district court cases).
229. Mass. Defs. Comm., Second Report to National Legal Aid and Defender
Association on Suffolk County Model Defender Project (1966) (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review) [hereinafter Mass. Defs. Comm., Second Report], in LRB Papers, supra note
7, box 3, folder 6; Huge Free Attorney Plan, Bos. Globe, Jan. 25, 1965, at 30 (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review) (announcing National Defender Project $138,000 grant for
Suffolk County model defender program).
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district courts statewide.230 With the OEO funds, the Massachusetts
Defenders nearly doubled its legal staff, bringing its total to ﬁfty-eight
attorneys, and opened regional offices throughout the state.231 Towards
the end of 1966, chief counsel Edgar Rimbold reported that the Ford
and OEO grants had enabled the agency to provide “complete representation” in all seventy-two district courts statewide—“a striking increase”
from the previous year.232 Rimbold continued: “This is ‘volume representation’ of the type that appears to be mandatory for any state to furnish,
if it is to conform with the Gideon requirements.”233
By 1967, these multiple funding streams had converged into a much
expanded, if ﬁscally byzantine, agency.234 Outside funding worked where
reasoned argument had failed to convince the Massachusetts legislature
to expand the agency’s budget. With grant monies, the agency could hire
staffers on short-term contracts and then ask the legislature to fund their
salaries on a permanent basis, replacing abstract budget requests with
actual people who would lose their jobs absent legislative action. In 1967,
with the OEO grant scheduled to terminate at the end of the year,
Massachusetts Defenders staffers personally contacted every member of
230. See Press Release, Voluntary Defs. Comm., at 1 (July 21, 1966) (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter 1966 Press Release] (announcing $579,544 OEO grant
for Massachusetts Defenders expansion), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 5, folder 3. The
OEO was established by the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act to coordinate $947 million in
federal funding for job training, rural economic development, legal services, and other
anti-poverty programs, spurring a “feverish” frenzy of grant proposals from programs large
and small throughout the country. Annelise Orleck, Introduction: The War on Poverty
from the Grass Roots Up, in The War on Poverty: A New Grassroots History, 1964–1980, at
1, 9–11 (2011) (Annelise Orleck & Lisa Gayle Hazirjian eds., 2011). In securing an OEO
grant, the Massachusetts Defenders Committee took advantage of a brief window before
Congress amended the Act to prohibit using OEO funds for criminal defense. See 42
U.S.C. § 2809(a)(3) (1970) (“No funds or personnel made available for such program . . .
shall be utilized for the defense of any person indicted . . . for the commission of a
crime . . . .”).
231. See 1966 Press Release, supra note 230 (announcing ability to increase legal staff
using OEO funds).
232. Mass. Defs. Comm., Second Report, supra note 229, at 16, 21.
233. Id. at 4.
234. The Boston office housed twenty-one attorneys paid directly by Massachusetts;
eight attorneys paid by the Ford Foundation through the National Defender Project,
which in turn made a grant to ABCD; and eight attorneys paid by the OEO through the
vestigial corporate entity of the Voluntary Defenders Committee. Satellite attorneys statewide were paid primarily through the OEO grant. These numbers are taken from a
handwritten table of all attorneys and their salary sources in 1966 to 1967 and 1967 to
1968 among a stack of budget materials. Massachusetts Def. Comm., Budget Materials
1966–1968, in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 4, folder 10. The OEO grant was made to the
Voluntary Defenders Committee because OEO grants required “maximum feasible
participation” from poor people, Equal Opportunity Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-452,
§ 202(a)(3), 78 Stat. 508, 516, and the Massachusetts Defenders Committee’s board
consisted primarily of attorneys. So they revived the Voluntary Defenders Committee and
expanded it with six generic placeholder board spots for poor people, none of whom
seem to have actually attended any meetings.
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the state Senate.235 Their lobbying worked; the state assumed the salaries
of the OEO-hired lawyers.236 The next year, the agency again warned the
legislature of looming layoffs.237 The legislature responded with an
appropriation that, while short of the agency’s request, was enough to
“absorb all of the [Ford Foundation] Model Defender Program” and “all
of the work . . . under the OEO program.”238
3. Battling Judges. — Once defenders had been hired and paid, they
still needed judges to appoint them to cases. Particularly in the district
courts, appointments were not always forthcoming. The MDC reported
that Boston’s Judge Adlow felt that the higher courts, in interpreting
Gideon, had “gone too far.”239 After an incident in which a defender
refused Adlow’s demand that the defendant testify,240 Adlow stopped
appointing the Massachusetts Defenders in his courtroom, complaining,
in one lawyer’s account, that they “worr[ied] too much about
constitutional rights and things like that in petty cases.”241 As board
member William Homans, Jr. described, in Adlow’s view, public
defenders “should only handle serious cases” and “‘petty stuff’ should
be . . . handled by the judge in his own way.”242 As an example of Adlow’s
235. Minutes from Massachusetts Defenders Committee Meeting 1 (June 29, 1967)
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“[I]t was necessary for the staff of the MDC to
contact every Senator in the State.”), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 3, folder 15; see
also Letter from James G. Crowley, Reg’l Adm’r, Office of Econ. Opportunity, to William P.
Homans, Jr., Exec. Dir., Voluntary Defs. Comm. (July 10, 1967) (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review) (establishing December 31, 1967, as end date), in LRB Papers, supra note 7,
box 3, folder 15.
236. See Letter from Albert L. Kramer to LaRue Brown & Edward J. Duggan (July 24,
1967) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 3, folder
15.
237. Minutes from Massachusetts Defenders Committee Meeting 1 (Apr. 3, 1968) (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter April 1968 Mass. Defs. Comm. Minutes]
(“We are seeking additional money because if we obtain only that amount recommended
by the Governor we will lose three attorneys in Boston . . . .”), in LRB Papers, supra note 7,
box 4, folder 11.
238. Minutes from Massachusetts Defenders Committee Meeting 1 (Aug. 8, 1968) (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 4, folder 12.
239. April 1968 Mass. Defs. Comm. Minutes, supra note 237.
240. Memorandum from Edgar A. Rimbold, Chief Counsel, Mass. Def. Comm., to
Comm. Members 2 (Jan. 29, 1965) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers,
supra note 7, box 2, folder 14; see also Adlow and Due Process, Bos. Globe, Oct. 17, 1966,
at 16 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (describing similar incident); Robert Kenney,
Judge Adlow Castigates Public Defenders, Orders Accused to Testify, Bos. Globe, Oct. 15,
1966, at 1 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (describing similar incident).
241. Memorandum from William P. Homans, Jr. 3 (Oct. 17, 1966) [hereinafter
Memorandum from Homans] (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers,
supra note 7, box 3, folder 5.
242. Id. at 6. The MDC again assigned an attorney to Adlow’s courtroom in October
1966, but the attorney received no appointments for two months. Letter from Frederick H.
Norton, Jr., Sec’y, Mass. Defs. Comm., to Hon. Elijah Adlow, Chief Justice, Bos. Mun. Court
(Dec. 20, 1966) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 3,
folder 5.
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“own way,” Homans recounted Adlow’s claim “that in [Adlow’s] court the
Negro people were treated less harshly because they were not as
responsible for their conduct as white people.”243 Perhaps Adlow
intended this statement as a reassuring illustration of his leniency, or,
more likely, as a provocation implying that he might stop being so lenient
if lawyers kept challenging him. The Massachusetts Defenders heard
instead a distressing admission that Adlow decided cases according to
paternalism, racism, and personal whim—all the more reason why
defendants in Adlow’s courtroom needed lawyers.244
Judge Adlow, in the words of one Boston lawyer, “was more
ﬂamboyant than most judges here, but he wasn’t at all atypical.”245 In
Roxbury, a district judge bristled when a robbery witness refused to
identify the defendant as the robber, testifying that it had been too dark
for her to see. The judge, on his own motion, held the witness for perjury
and “found the defendant guilty.”246 The Lowell district court regularly
encouraged defendants to waive the right to counsel en masse.247 In New
Bedford, a district court judge once ﬁned public defenders’ clients three
times the ﬁne he assessed unrepresented defendants appearing the same
day on the same charge.248 Into the late 1960s, the presiding judge of the
Dorchester district court appointed personal friends rather than the

243. Memorandum from Homans, supra note 241.
244. One Boston lawyer described Adlow as “paternalistic toward defendants—as long
as they go along with him . . . . There is no rule of law in that courtroom.” Harris, In
Criminal Court—I, supra note 2, at 57. Observers differed dramatically in interpreting
Adlow’s idiosyncrasies. Compare Arthur L. Berney & Harry A. Pierce, An Evaluative
Framework of Legal Aid Models, 1975 Wash. U. L.Q. 5, 23 n.45 (remembering Adlow’s
approach to law as “always ad hoc, often visceral, and frequently nonconstitutional, but—
one felt warmly—thoroughly fair more often than not”), and Theodore Chase, The
President’s Page: The Courts and the Massachusetts Defenders Committee, 13 Bos. B.J.,
Feb. 1969, at 3, 4 (describing Chief Justice of Boston Municipal Court as unconcerned
with “technical niceties” but “practical and expeditious”), with James K. Glassman, A Day
in Court: Brass Tacks, Harvard Crimson (Nov. 23, 1968), http://www.thecrimson.com
/article/1968/11/23/a-day-in-court-pbybou-walk/ [http://perma.cc/Z34D-CA9P] (describing
visit to Adlow’s courtroom as “frightening confrontation with irrational authority”).
245. Harris, In Criminal Court—I, supra note 2, at 45; see also id. at 74 (“[M]any
judges apparently share Judge Adlow’s resentment toward lawyers who get in the way.”).
Nor were Massachusetts judges unique: Public defenders nationwide complained of
judicial pressure and abuse. See Alschuler, supra note 181, at 1237 (“Public defenders
almost universally conceded that . . . judges subject [them] to . . . severe forms of pressure.”).
246. Minutes from Massachusetts Defenders Committee Meeting 2 (Oct. 23, 1964) (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 2, folder 2.
247. Cf. id. at 1 (providing data on widespread waivers of counsel among indigent
defendants in Lowell District Court).
248. Attachment to Letter from Edward J. Harrington, Jr. to William P. Homans, Jr.
(Jan. 6, 1967) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 4,
folder 3.
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Massachusetts Defenders Committee to indigent cases and then billed
the city of Boston for reimbursement.249
B.

Characteristics of the Hybrid Model

1. What’s Old: Low Pay, Low Status. — After Gideon, vestiges of the
charity model continued to shape working conditions for public defenders in Massachusetts, as demonstrated most concretely through defenders’ persistently low salaries.250 Chief Counsel Edgar Rimbold explained
in 1967 that he had to hire a revolving cast of recent law school graduates
“because we can not pay a high salary [sic].”251 As one Massachusetts
defender told a reporter: “The pay’s bad . . . but I live with my parents, so
I manage. A married man couldn’t really afford this job.”252 In 1972,
NLADA evaluators issued a withering report on the Massachusetts
Defenders Committee.253 Among many criticisms, the report lambasted
the agency’s “inexcusably low salaries” and recommended a pay scale
“roughly competitive” with law ﬁrms and “at least equivalent to . . . legal
service programs and the district attorney’s office.”254
249. See Minutes from Massachusetts Defenders Committee 1 (Mar. 13, 1969) (on ﬁle
with the Columbia Law Review) (noting “many close friends of Judge Troy’s had been
appointed”), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 5, folder 1; cf. Judges Say “Way Out of
Line”: Dorchester Court Fees Hit, Record American, Jan. 16, 1969, at 10 (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) (discussing “practice of appointing independent lawyers for the
poor” and not public defenders), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 5, folder 1. On reports
of Brighton and Charlestown district court judges not making MDC appointments, see
ABCD Uniﬁed Legal Service Program Committee Minutes (June 17, 1965) (on ﬁle with
the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 2, folder 12. In response to
these issues, the Supreme Judicial Court revised its rules to specify that the MDC should be
appointed in all cases absent “exceptional circumstances.” Sup. Judicial Ct. R. 10, 355
Mass. 803 (1969).
250. See Joseph M. Harvey, Case Crush Hits Public Defenders, Bos. Globe, Apr. 9, 1971
at 1 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (noting in 1971, Massachusetts Defenders’ salaries started at $7,935, whereas Boston law offices started at $12,000).
251. Minutes from Massachusetts Defenders Committee Meeting 3 (Nov. 16, 1967)
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Nov. 1967 Minutes], in LRB Papers,
supra note 7, box 3, folder 13. In 1974, a study of Legal Aid criminal lawyers in Brooklyn
similarly found that these lawyers tended to be young (averaging thirty-two years of age
and less than ﬁve years of legal experience). James P. Levine, The Impact of “Gideon”: The
Performance of Public and Private Criminal Defense Lawyers, 8 Polity 215, 222 tbl.2
(1975).
252. Richard Harris, Annals of Law: In Criminal Court—II, New Yorker, Apr. 21, 1973,
at 44, 58–60 [hereinafter Harris, In Criminal Court—II] (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review).
253. See Richard Connolly, Report Blasts Defender Unit on Pay, Case Load, Attitude,
Bos. Globe, Sept. 8, 1972, at 3 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing NLADA’s
“hard-hitting opinion” on MDC).
254. Nat’l Criminal Justice Reference Serv., Evaluation Report of the National Legal
Aid and Defender Association on the Massachusetts Defenders Committee 90, 131 (1972),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/26189NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SHLGNGU] [hereinafter NLADA Evaluation Report].
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Critics of the agency’s pay scale had a shallow understanding of why
defenders’ salaries were so low. Apparently unaware of the board’s internal budgetary debates just a few years before,255 the NLADA evaluators
interpreted the agency’s pay scale as a straightforward response to
inadequate legislative appropriations—in other words, as evidence of a
stingy state commitment to Gideon. “The responsibility to provide adequate and effective defender services is mandated by the Constitution,”
the NLADA report noted, citing Gideon and the just-decided Argersinger v.
Hamlin, which extended Gideon to misdemeanors punished by jail time.256
“It is obvious that the [Massachusetts] legislature has not provided the
resources requested to carry out this obligation.”257 Of course, the
NLADA report was right that defenders’ salaries were dictated by state
funding levels. But those funding levels partly reﬂected the path-dependent outcome of the board’s own post-Gideon decisions to start its budget
requests from a low baseline—over the objections of the ousted Wilbur
Hollingsworth, who urged a more aggressive lobbying strategy.258 And
those post-Gideon decisions reﬂected, in turn, board members’ decadeslong habit, under the charity model, of rationalizing low pay for indigent
defenders.259
2. What’s New: “Volume Representation.” — Now that defendants had a
right to counsel, the Massachusetts Defenders had to represent them
regardless of how “worthy” they seemed.260 While the Voluntary

255. See supra section III.A.1 (describing discussions on salary scale).
256. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972); NLADA Evaluation Report, supra
note 254, at 90.
257. NLADA Evaluation Report, supra note 254, at 90.
258. See supra section III.A.1 (addressing post-Gideon salary determinations).
259. Massachusetts defenders continue to earn comparatively low salaries, although in
a change from the 1960s—and one that makes Massachusetts quite atypical—
Massachusetts prosecutors now earn less than defenders. See John R. Ellement, Criminal
Justice Lawyers Are Becoming “Working Poor,” Study Says, Bos. Globe (May 8, 2014),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2014/05/08/mass-bar-association-study-says-crimin
al-justice-lawyers-are-becoming-working-poor/IXYXjmj4veKz8pLE2wuswJ/story.html (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“Massachusetts ranks dead last in annual salaries paid
to public defenders . . . .”); Gabrielle Gurley, Public Defender Blues, CommonWealth Mag.
(Jan. 15, 2014), http://commonwealthmagazine.org/uncategorized/004-public-defenderblues/ [http://perma.cc/CFE8-2TMR] (“The $40,000 starting salary of a full-time public
defender in Massachusetts is among the lowest in the country.”); Sacha Pfeiffer, Low Pay
Blamed for High Turnover Among Public Defenders, Bos. Globe ( Jan. 13, 2015),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2015/01/13/group-recommends-increasinglow-salaries-for-prosecutors-public-defenders/IoQGniSJ3Oml36mrWV77hN/story.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (“The Massachusetts Bar Association found that public
defenders in this state are paid the lowest salaries in the country . . . .”). While explaining
these recent developments is beyond the scope of this Article, defenders’ low pay may
partly reﬂect the enduring legacy of pre-Gideon views of indigent defense as charitable
rather than professional work.
260. By comparison, “worthiness”-type distinctions have historically factored into eligibility determinations for public beneﬁts not deﬁned as constitutional rights. See, e.g., Vale,
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Defenders Committee had occasionally referenced its “heavy case load,”
its fundraising materials also highlighted trial victories and the plight of
individual clients.261 The Massachusetts Defenders Committee board
spoke constantly about the agency’s “heavy case load.”262 Liberated from
the need to appease charitable benefactors, but also with more clients
than anyone could keep track of, the agency no longer published annual
reports with suspenseful narratives of individual cases. Instead, it made
grant reports in which clients merged into faceless sums.263 Nationwide,
too, numbers had replaced dramatic true-crime accounts as the currency
for measuring indigent defense. In the early 1970s, public defenders
reported processing 400 cases a month in Chicago; 922 cases at a time in
New York City; “merely” 300 cases in Oakland; and in Philadelphia, up to
ﬁfty cases a day.264
The agency’s budget also multiplied, increasing almost tenfold from
pre-Gideon levels within a few years, but in the long run, could not keep
pace with the increase in caseloads.265 Although caseload records are
spotty, it seems that per-case funding may have held roughly steady
initially after Gideon, particularly during the years when the agency had
outside foundation and federal funding. But, by 1971, the agency’s percase funding appears to have dipped below the Voluntary Defenders
Committee’s 1958 per-case spending—even as per-case litigation costs
might have been expected to rise, due to the growing body of constitutional criminal procedure law, which rendered even straightforward
criminal cases potentially complex.266 These rough estimates should be
taken as purely suggestive. Still, they suggest that defenders had some
material basis for their perception that post-Gideon caseloads outstripped
the available resources.
Defenders’ perceptions likely also had subjective dimensions. During the years of the Voluntary Defenders, Hollingsworth chose his
cases.267 He may have felt overworked, but he could console himself by
thinking about the rejected cases he was not working on. He may have
supra note 105, at 8–9 (discussing how Boston leaders used post–New Deal public housing
“to reward the most meritorious of the working poor”).
261. E.g., 1953 Annual Report, supra note 70 (referencing “heavy case load” but also
giving narratives of individual cases).
262. Minutes from Massachusetts Defenders Committee Meeting 1 (Nov. 16, 1964)
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 2, folder 7.
263. E.g., Mass. Defs. Comm., Second Report, supra note 229, at app. A.
264. Alschuler, supra note 181, at 1248.
265. See infra Table 3.
266. See William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and
Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L.J. 1, 55 (1997) [hereinafter Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship]
(positing constitutionalization of criminal procedure “ought to have raised litigation
costs”); Speech on Massachusetts Defenders Committee (1964) (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review) (observing growing complexity of motions practice in criminal cases due to
new constitutional doctrines), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 1, folder 13.
267. See supra Table 2 (tallying cases Hollingsworth declined).
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wished that he could help more clients, but that was a problem of resources, not constitutional enforcement. In contrast, the Massachusetts
Defenders controlled neither their resources nor their caseloads, as
Gideon established that each of their clients had a constitutional right to
their efforts. Instead of feeling that they had selected a subset of
“worthy” clients from some larger universe, they more likely felt the
opposite: that if they had not been burdened with so many cases, they
could have devoted more time to those clients with the strongest
defenses.
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TABLE 3: MASSACHUSETTS DEFENDERS COMMITTEE LEGISLATIVE
APPROPRIATIONS AND OUTSIDE FUNDING, 1960–1972
Pre-1960 Data for the Voluntary Defenders Committee (For Comparison)
Year

Nominal Total Real Total
Expenditures Expenditures
(2013 $)

1958

35,334

285,000

Total Cases
Handled

Nominal
Real
Expenditures Expenditures
per Case
per Case

1,120

32

258

Post-1960 (Note: complete data not available for all years)
Fiscal Nominal Legis.
Real Legis.
Nominal
Year(s) Appropriations Appropriations Outside
(2013 $)
Funds
1962

82,500

Real
Caseload Nominal
Real Funding
(est.) Funding per per Case (est.)
Outside
Funds
Case (est.)

635,000

1963

88,570

674,000

1964

100,847

757,000

1965

168,374

1,240,000

1966

250,500

1,800,000

85,261
612,000
(NLADA)

1967

357,335

2,490,000

169,051 1,670,000
(OEO)
70,056
(NLADA)

1968

586,920

3,930,000

1969

819,906

5,210,000

1970

952,474

5,710,000

1971

1,099,938

6,330,000

40,000

27.49

158

1972

1,140,162

6,350,000

42,000

27.15

151.19

189,902
(OEO)

1,270,000 18,128

32.37
(without
outside
funds)
42 (with
outside
funds)

217 (without
outside funds)
287 (with
outside funds)

Sources: Mass. Def. Comm., A Report of the Massachusetts Defenders Committee (1976),
https://archive.org/details/reportofmassachu00mass_1 [https://perma.cc/9JK8-NST5]; NLADA
Evaluation Report, supra note 254; OEO Proposal (Oct. 1966); State Auditor reports. The Measuring
Wealth simple purchasing power calculator, which multiplies by percentage change in adjusted CPI,
was used to convert nominal ﬁgures into real ﬁgures. For detailed calculations and data used for
citations, see Appendix.
Note: Because these ﬁgures were pulled from multiple sources that may not have been using
mutually consistent accounting conventions, they should be taken as rough estimates useful for getting
a sense of the order of magnitude of the organization’s budget growth more than as precise ﬁgures.
Similarly, the per-case funding estimates are intended to offer a very rough basis of comparison across
years, not as a literal estimate of resources expended on any individual case.
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3. Defenders as Plea Brokers. — Since they could not contain their
ballooning caseloads by rejecting clients, post-Gideon public defenders
instead redeﬁned their duties as triage.268 Moving away from their
charitable predecessors’ vision of intensive investigation and trial advocacy, they now conceptualized their work in terms of selecting a few cases
to investigate thoroughly and, in all of the remaining cases, facilitating
pleas. In 1970, the Boston Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights observed
that the Massachusetts Defenders used “plea bargaining” as “a necessary
technique to deal with an overwhelming caseload.”269 Of course,
Hollingsworth had also negotiated pleas for many clients, but there was a
difference—he did not describe plea bargaining as a caseload management technique, but rather as a secondary service he could offer to
clients who admitted their guilt, while reserving his primary service of
trial advocacy for other clients.270 Accordingly, he had measured his successes by tallying acquittals.271 Instead, the Massachusetts Defenders now
measured success not along a guilty–not guilty binary but in terms of
sentencing outcomes. For instance, in the low-level district courts, they
counted guilty pleas as “favorable result[s]” if they avoided jail time.272 In
1973, Edgar Rimbold explained to a reporter, “‘Our men know the
system. They know the judges, the prosecutors, and the best way to get a
good deal for their clients. That’s what attorneys from this office do—get
the best possible deal for their clients.’”273
This shift likely reﬂected changes in defenders’ conception of their
role—and perhaps changes in the rate of counseled defendants who pled
guilty—more than it reﬂected overall changes in plea rates or case
outcomes. Even if plea rates climbed higher after Gideon, they were
starting from a high baseline.274 There was never any golden age of

268. For descriptions of post-Gideon indigent defense as “triage,” see, e.g., Cara H.
Drinan, Getting Real About Gideon: The Next Fifty Years of Enforcing the Right to
Counsel, 70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1309, 1336 (2013) [hereinafter Drinan, Getting Real]
(“Budget constraints and excessive caseloads have made triage an essential component of
modern public defense.”); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in
Public Defender Triage, 122 Yale L.J. 2626, 2631–34 (2013) (addressing how defenders are
“forced by circumstances to engage in triage”); Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note
266, at 40 (“[D]efense lawyers’ most important job is triage.”).
269. Bing & Rosenfeld, supra note 134, at 32.
270. See supra section I.B.3 (discussing Hollingsworth’s conception of advocacy).
271. See supra section I.B.3 (discussing Hollingsworth’s pride in his office’s rate of
acquittals).
272. Bing & Rosenfeld, supra note 134, at 32.
273. Harris, In Criminal Court—II, supra note 252, at 45.
274. See Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 266, at 26 n.95 (comparing 1962
sample ﬁnding guilty plea rates of 74% for defendants with assigned counsel and 48% for
defendants with retained counsel to mid-1970s sample ﬁnding guilty plea rate “for defendants as a whole” had risen to 80%). But note that in 1962, there would also have been
more defendants without counsel at all, who may have pled guilty as well. Cf. Fisher, supra
note 46, at 14 (describing phenomenon of defendants pleading guilty because they “lack-
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adversary combat in Anglo American legal history. Most criminal cases
have always been resolved through guilty pleas or, at most, through quick
and perfunctory trials, and widespread plea bargaining predated the
public defender in many jurisdictions, including Massachusetts.275 As a
matter of historical causation, then, plea bargaining did not originate in
response to public defenders’ resource constraints.276 Still, if they were
not responsible for plea bargaining, public defenders had long been
associated with the practice—since the ﬁrst Progressive Era defenders
were praised for cooperating with prosecutors—and they certainly
helped to entrench its continued dominance.277
Initially in the late 1960s, Massachusetts was celebrated as a national
leader in implementing Gideon precisely because its public defender
agency displayed characteristics now identiﬁed as symptoms of Gideon’s
neglect: funding at the mercy of the state legislature, high caseloads, and
triage representation. Speaking at the 1967 NLADA convention, General
Decker of the Ford Foundation’s National Defender Project “singled out
the MDC” as “the best project in the country.”278 The next year, the
Massachusetts Defenders’ chief counsel, Edgar Rimbold, was elected
chairman of NLADA’s Defenders Committee.279 The agency’s evergrowing caseloads were not, in Rimbold’s view, a symptom of Gideon’s
betrayal. Rather, they reﬂected a shift to the “volume representation”
required “to conform with Gideon.”280 Rimbold assured his funders at the
NLADA that the “[q]uality” of representation “did not decrease with the
increase in volume.”281 He later implied that representation had actually
ed lawyers and [they] properly saw that they had little chance of winning if they went to
trial on their own”).
275. See Malcolm M. Feeley, Court Reform on Trial: Why Simple Solutions Fail 20–23
(1983) (discussing prevalence of guilty pleas in early American criminal trials). By 1900,
87% of Middlesex County criminal adjudications ended in guilty pleas. Fisher, supra note
46, at 12; see also id. at 1 (dating dominance of plea bargaining at least to 1920s, and
decades earlier “in some places”); id. at 6–8 (noting 1920s scholarly discovery of
widespread plea bargaining).
276. Scholars have offered a range of causal accounts for the rise of plea bargaining,
including “the ever-weightier burden of modern jury trials” and “the electoral pressure of
new immigrants.” Fisher, supra note 46, at 1–2. Based on careful analysis of Massachusetts
trial records, George Fisher concluded instead that plea bargaining began, and has
persisted, because it serves the interests of prosecutors and judges. Id. at 2.
277. See id. at 17, 198 (examining role of plea bargaining in creation and practice of
public defender offices).
278. Nov. 1976 Minutes, supra note 251.
279. April 1968 Mass. Defs. Comm. Minutes, supra note 237.
280. Mass. Defs. Comm., Second Report, supra note 229, at 4. For an indication of
how much Rimbold’s view differs from that espoused by scholars today, see Steven
Zeidman, Gideon: Looking Backward, Looking Forward, Looking in the Mirror, 11 Seattle
J. for Soc. Just. 933, 937 (2013) (lamenting “Gideon’s original request for a lawyer to be
appointed to represent him at trial has devolved into lawyers appointed to simply negotiate plea bargains”).
281. Mass. Defs. Comm., Second Report, supra note 229.
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improved, because, through repeat interactions with district attorneys,
public defenders “could secure more favorable bargains” than private
counsel.282 “We have been dealing with the prosecutors for a long time,”
Rimbold explained, and “we have a reputation for being able to evaluate
a case. They trust us.”283
But the Massachusetts agency’s reputation quickly tumbled from its
brief post-Gideon heights. Line defenders were less sanguine than
Rimbold about the service they offered. “I try to get back to the office at
the end of each afternoon and interview some of the people I’m going to
have to represent here,” one lawyer said, but usually “I can’t manage it.
So I meet the client here [in court] for the ﬁrst time and devote all of
ﬁve or ten minutes to him when he may face several years in prison. It’s
just not right.”284 By the early 1970s, the agency’s caseloads were widely
described as unsustainable, and courtroom observers disputed whether
plea-centered advocacy represented a gain for defendants.285 A reporter
from the New Yorker allowed that “the public defender who has any
intelligence quickly learns the ropes and discovers ways to help a client,”
but immediately added the caveat that defenders were “crippled by huge
case loads that often compel them to rush through cases.”286 A judge
granted that the Massachusetts Defenders did “as good [a job] as one
can expect, I suppose, under the circumstances,” but worried that “no
attorney can handle twenty cases a day.”287 The Boston chapter of the
Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights similarly disagreed about the virtues
of “volume representation.” Under this system, the Lawyers’ Committee
reported, “defendants are depersonalized. They become cases, charges,
numbers, instead of clients.”288
In 1973, the Massachusetts Defenders board responded to the
mounting complaints by replacing chief counsel Edgar Rimbold with a
young and idealistic Harvard Law graduate, Gerard Schaefer.289 The
282. Alschuler, supra note 181, at 1224.
283. Id.; see also Harris, In Criminal Court—II, supra note 252, at 45 (quoting
Rimbold’s statement that “[o]ur men know . . . the judges, the prosecutors, and the best
way to get a good deal for their clients”).
284. Harris, In Criminal Court—II, supra note 252, at 62 (quoting lawyer).
285. See, e.g., Connolly, supra note 253, at 3 (reporting NLADA evaluators’ ﬁndings
that “caseload is so high as to preclude meaningful representation”); Harvey, supra note
250 (reporting on Committee’s complaints of overwhelming caseloads).
286. Harris, In Criminal Court—I, supra note 2, at 80–81.
287. Harris, In Criminal Court—II, supra note 252, at 57 (quoting Judge King).
288. Bing & Rosenfeld, supra note 134, at 31. For a similar critique from a New Yorkbased reformer, see Harris, In Criminal Court—I, supra note 2, at 82 (quoting Vera
Institute’s Herbert Sturz, who complained “legal-aid lawyers . . . end up representing a
docket—that is, the system—just like a D.A. or a judge”).
289. See Harris, In Criminal Court—II, supra note 252, at 74; Law Appointment, Bos.
Globe, Aug. 18, 1972, at 2 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (noting Schaefer’s
appointment as “part of a move . . . to revitalize [MDC] leadership”). Rimbold remained
on staff as a trial lawyer. See Connolly, supra note 253, at 3.

72

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 116:15

NLADA, in its 1972 evaluation of the agency, had castigated Rimbold’s
leadership.290 Rimbold, like Hollingsworth before him, had attended
Suffolk Law, and he tended to hire fellow Suffolk alums; the NLADA
evaluators wondered why the agency did not hire more attorneys from
“the number of excellent law schools” in Boston.291 Just as the NLADA
report did not fully capture the longer-term causes for the agency’s low
salary scale, it also overlooked the deep roots beneath the office’s
personnel patterns. The evaluators personalized their assessment of the
office’s hiring practices into an attack on Rimbold for lacking vision,
rather than acknowledging that elite law schools had for decades
implicitly discouraged their students from considering indigent defense
as a career.
Rimbold’s replacement, like the NLADA evaluators, viewed the
Massachusetts Defenders’ staff lawyers as insufficiently zealous. Rather
than hiring recent graduates who wanted only “to get experience,”
Schaefer aimed to hire “young lawyers who . . . really want to be public
defenders.”292 By then, LaRue Brown had been dead for four years, and
William Homans, Jr., a Boston-area civil liberties luminary, had joined the
board.293 Unlike Brown, Homans had personal experience in criminal
defense.294 All of these changes presaged elite lawyers’ newfound interest
in indigent defense, which was gaining liberal cachet as part of the
burgeoning ﬁeld of poverty law.295 But beneath the speciﬁc personalities
and developments involved, the constant administrative turmoil within
the Massachusetts Defenders Committee reﬂected something deeper: the
basic instability of the legal profession’s efforts to graft longstanding
charitable understandings of indigent defense—understandings whose
origins were not always recognized at the level of conscious discussion—
onto the new, post-Gideon understanding of indigent defense as a constitutional right.
It had taken several years of legislative wrangling and grant writing
for Rimbold to get the Massachusetts Defenders Committee into the
290. NLADA Evaluation Report, supra note 254, at 9 (“The Chief Counsel displays
nothing which can in any sense be called leadership.”).
291. Id. at 12.
292. Harris, In Criminal Court—II, supra note 252, at 76 (quoting deputy chief
counsel Scott Harshbarger on changes to office under Schaefer).
293. See Obituaries: LaRue Brown Dies, supra note 51, at 31 (noting Brown’s date of
passing); Julia P. Bell, Yankee Lawyer, Bos. Globe, May 5, 1974, at A6 (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review) (describing William Homans’s career and noting his service on
Massachusetts Defenders Committee board since 1964).
294. See Mark S. Brodin, What One Lawyer Can Do for Society: Lessons from the
Remarkable Career of William P. Homans, Jr., 46 New Eng. L. Rev. 37, 37–42 (2011)
(highlighting Homan’s notable career as criminal defense and civil liberties lawyer); Bell,
supra note 293, at A6 (same).
295. See Martha F. Davis, Brutal Need: Lawyers and the Welfare Rights Movement,
1960–1973, at 1–2 (1993) (describing 1960s “explosion” of lawyer and law student interest
in representing poor people).
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district courts. Then, in 1972, the agency pulled back out of most of the
Boston area district courts, in order to pare down defenders’ caseloads.296
Limiting caseloads, Schaefer explained, would mean that “our lawyers,
interviewers, and investigators can spend the time that is necessary . . . to
do the job right. Of course,” he added, “the reshuffling was bad for the
defendants who now get no representation . . . except by private lawyers
appointed by the court, who are often worse than no lawyer at all.”297
Thus, within ten years of Gideon, the Massachusetts Defenders Committee
had already undergone the full cycle of Gideon’s implementation: administrative reorganization, rising caseloads, ﬁghts for legislative funding and
judicial recognition, internal debates over the ethics of indigent defense,
ending with another administrative reorganization. The speciﬁcs would
change, but this basic cycle has continued to repeat itself through the
present day.298
C.

The Gideon Consensus Goes National

The turbulent expansion of the Massachusetts Defenders Committee
represented one local iteration of a national trend. By 1973, virtually
every American city had some form of public defender office or private
equivalent, and 64% of Americans lived within the jurisdiction of an
organized defender.299 Even nominally private defenders usually now
operated with public funds.300 Both of the old ﬂagships of the charity
model of indigent defense—the New York Legal Aid Society and the
Defender Association of Philadelphia—had converted into government

296. Margo Miller, Defenders to Pull Out of Mass. Courts, Bos. Globe, Apr. 21, 1972, at
12 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
297. Harris, In Criminal Court—II, supra note 252, at 74 (quoting Schaefer).
298. In 1984, the Massachusetts Defenders Committee was reorganized into the
Committee for Public Counsel Services. The system now relies more on appointed counsel
than full-time public defenders. See Holly R. Stevens et al., Ctr. for Justice, Law & Soc’y at
George Mason Univ., State, County and Local Expenditures for Indigent Defense Services
Fiscal Year 2008, at 33–34 (2010) (“Bar advocates are appointed in the majority of district
court cases, which include misdemeanor cases and initial appearances in some felony
cases.”); see also Darryl K. Brown, Epiphenomenal Indigent Defense, 75 Mo. L. Rev. 907,
917–18 (2010) [hereinafter Brown, Epiphenomenal] (discussing Massachusetts litigation
in 2000s over inadequate indigent defense funding); Dan Ring, Massachusetts Gov. Deval
Patrick Faces Opposition to His Plan to Overhaul Indigent Defense, Mass Live (Feb. 26,
2012, 12:07 PM), http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2012/02/massachusetts_gov_
deval_patric_83.html [http://perma.cc/Q6FL-6A7S] (discussing recent proposals that
agency hire more full-time defenders to reduce reliance on appointed counsel).
299. Ellen Keller, Note, The Immunity of Public Defenders Under Section 1983, 27
Clev. St. L. Rev. 244, 246 n.20 (1978) (citing Other Face of Justice, supra note 34, at 13).
Given varying uses of the term “defender,” many of these new public defenders may have
functioned more like assigned counsel systems. See Goldberg, supra note 183, at 718–21
(describing variety of models under label of “defender”).
300. See Goldberg, supra note 183, at 723–24 (describing nonproﬁt defender systems
operating with public funding in different U.S. cities).
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contractors.301 The public defender model made much less progress in
the South and Southwest than in other regions, and all states continued
to rely on assigned counsel for some types of cases.302 But for indigent
defendants in much of the country, and especially in cities, the most
likely scenario by the mid-1970s was representation by a public defender.303
Massachusetts’s rocky efforts to lawyerize the low-level district courts
also reﬂected nationwide changes. Before Gideon, only ﬁve states attempted to provide counsel in “less serious criminal cases.”304 By 1970, that
number had mounted to thirty-one.305 If measured by the number of
states appointing counsel in felony cases, Gideon appears to have directly
implicated only a few Southern states.306 Measured instead by the number of states that responded by prophylactically providing counsel in
some set of lower-level cases, Gideon’s national inﬂuence reached beyond
a narrow reading of its doctrinal mandate, spanning every region and
including such populous bellwether states as California, Texas, and New
York.307 As two law students observed in 1970, “If the intent of the
Supreme Court in Gideon was to urge, without expressly commanding,
the states to extend the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel to defendants other than accused felons, the results have been very satisfactory.”308 In the long run, the results would prove less satisfactory than
they initially appeared, as many states have failed to maintain compliance
with misdemeanor counsel requirements.309 Still, the direction of the
301. See id. (noting New York Legal Aid Society and Philadelphia’s defender system
contract with local government to provide indigent defense); McConville & Mirsky, supra
note 44, at 694–95 (“In New York City, after 1965, the Legal Aid Society’s criminal defense
division became entirely dependent upon city and state funds.”).
302. See Brown, Epiphenomenal, supra note 298, at 912–13 (describing variety of state
systems); Worden et al., Patchwork, supra note 39, at 1428–30 (same). For a state-by-state
survey, see generally Stevens et al., supra note 298 (detailing indigent defense delivery,
spending, and structure in each state).
303. In 1999, ninety of the one hundred most populous counties had a public
defender while eighty-nine had an assigned counsel system (suggesting a great deal of
overlap), with public defenders handling 82% of cases overall. Carol J. DeFrances &
Marika F.X. Litras, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Indigent Defense
Services in Large Counties, 1999, at 1 (2000); see also Caroline Wolf Harlow, U.S. Dep’t of
Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, Defense Counsel in Criminal Cases 5 (2000) (ﬁnding
68.3% of state felony defendants in seventy-ﬁve most populous counties were represented
by public defender in 1996).
304. Decker & Lorigan, supra note 36, at 105–06.
305. Id. at 106.
306. See infra Figure 1.
307. See infra Figure 2.
308. Decker & Lorigan, supra note 36, at 105–06 (footnote omitted).
309. See Hashimoto, Problem, supra note 39, at 1019–21 (“[T]here is substantial
evidence—both anecdotal and statistical—suggesting that some jurisdictions routinely fail
to provide legal representation to those constitutionally entitled to it.”); Nat’l Ass’n of
Criminal Def. Lawyers, Minor Crimes, Massive Waste: The Terrible Toll of America’s
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momentum was clear: Lawyers, judges, and policymakers all interpreted
Gideon as a signal that their states should move towards providing more
counsel in more cases.310

Broken Misdemeanor Courts 8–9 (2009) (discussing barriers to and solutions for effective
representation in misdemeanor courts).
310. Lower federal courts also read Gideon this way. See, e.g., James v. Headley, 410
F.2d 325, 327 (5th Cir. 1969) (noting language of Gideon “is broad enough to apply to all
criminal offenses”).
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FIGURE 1. POST-GIDEON CHANGES IF MEASURED BY RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
FELONY CASES
Before

Provided counsel (by
statute and/or in practice)
Provided counsel only in
capital cases

After

Provided counsel in felony
cases (as required by
Gideon)

Source: Decker & Lorigan, supra note 36, at 133.
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FIGURE 2. POST-GIDEON CHANGES IF MEASURED BY RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN
SOME SET OF MISDEMEANORS
Before

Provided counsel in felony cases and
some “less serious cases”

Provided counsel only in felony cases
(by statute and/or in practice)

Provided counsel only in capital
cases

After

Provided counsel in felony cases and
some “less serious” cases

Provided counsel in felony cases (as
required by Gideon)

Source: Decker & Lorigan, supra note 36, at 133.
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IV. ORIGINS OF THE INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS
“With our organization in existence, no criminal defendant who is
without funds . . . need get an antisocial attitude from a feeling that
lack of money has prevented him from having a proper presentation of
his case.”311
“And even when they’re arrested, whites are ahead because more of
them can afford attorneys. A lot of black cats end up in prison solely
because they didn’t have someone to really present their case in court.
They’re left with the public defenders, whom prison inmates quite
accurately call ‘penitentiary deliverers.’”312
In the midst of its ongoing contretemps with the legislature, outside
funders, and its lawyer and journalist critics, the Massachusetts Defenders
Committee also began hearing doubts about its worth from a new source:
its own clients. One prisoner praised the organization as “a great champion of the poor,”313 but his does not seem to have been the majority
view.314 In the late 1960s, the agency ﬁelded complaints, especially from
the predominantly black neighborhood of Roxbury, that its lawyers were
culturally distant from their clients and, as “government lawyers,” could
not be trusted.315 This cultural divide converged with the turn to “volume
representation” in the observations of Boston University Professor Robert
Spangenberg, who ran a law student clinic in the Roxbury District Court.
In 1968, Professor Spangenberg shared with the Massachusetts Defenders
board the concerns of his staff and students that “the MDC [was] overworked and understaffed,” had no office presence or name recognition
in the neighborhoods it served, and employed no black attorneys.316
In part, these complaints reﬂected Boston-speciﬁc demographic
shifts that widened the gap between defenders and their clients. Between
1940 and 1970, Boston’s black population more than tripled, mostly
11.

311. 1943 Annual Report, supra note 128, in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 6, folder

312. Interview by Playboy with Eldridge Cleaver in S.F., Cal. (Dec. 1968), reprinted in
Nat Hentoff, Eldridge Cleaver: A Candid Conversation with the Black Panther Leader,
Playboy Kinja (Feb. 10, 2014, 10:00 AM), http://playboysfw.kinja.com/eldridge-cleaver-acandid-conversation-with-the-black-1518621816 [http://perma.cc/P7HJ-8NNC] [hereinafter
Playboy, Eldridge Cleaver Interview].
313. The Poor Are Pawn’s???, Insider (Inmates of the Norfolk County House
Correction & Jail, Dedham, Mass.) (1969) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB
Papers, supra note 7, box 5, folder 1.
314. See Connolly, supra note 253, at 3 (reporting NLADA ﬁndings that “most
prisoners interviewed believed that they had not received real representation”).
315. Minutes from Massachusetts Defenders Committee Meeting (Aug. 31, 1967) (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 3, folder 14.
316. Id. These concerns animated the establishment in 1971 of the Roxbury
Defenders Committee, which, until it was folded into the state public defender in 1984,
served as a community-based alternative defender. See Roderick I. Ireland, The Roxbury
Defenders Committee: Reﬂections on the Early Years, 95 Mass. L. Rev. 153, 153–55 (2013).
For a contemporary portrait of the Roxbury Defenders, see Harris, In Criminal Court—II,
supra note 252, at 78–87.

2016]

WHAT GIDEON DID

79

because of newcomers escaping the Jim Crow South, while almost a third
of its white population took advantage of racially structured federal
subsidies, market opportunities, and other incentives to move to the
suburbs.317 As a result, Boston transformed from an almost entirely
European–American city with a small and long-established black
population into a more typical Northern city with a sizable population of
black residents trapped by racist laws, policies, and practices in deteriorating “ghetto” enclaves like Mattapan and Roxbury.318 Meanwhile, as
more affluent whites moved away, the Irish Americans who remained in
South Boston and Charlestown suffered from poverty and social instability not dissimilar to conditions in Roxbury.319
But these local complaints also presaged mounting evidence of
defendant anger nationwide. Echoing their Boston counterparts, defendants in San Francisco groused that their city’s public defenders were
“‘reluctant to go to trial.’”320 In 1970, New York City inmates petitioned
the mayor with their grievance that Legal Aid lawyers opened every client
meeting by proposing a plea deal.321 Public defenders fared little better
in controlled studies, as criminologists began regularly publishing ﬁndings that indigent defendants felt pressured to plead guilty.322 In interviews with a political scientist, Connecticut prisoners described their
lawyers not as advocates but as middlemen who simply relayed plea
offers. “A public defender,” one prisoner explained, “is just like the prosecutor’s assistant.”323
317. Boston’s population was counted at 3% black in 1940 and 16% black in 1970.
Ronald P. Formisano, Boston Against Busing: Race, Class, and Ethnicity in the 1960s and
1970s, at 25 (2nd rev. ed. 2004); see also Vale, supra note 105, at 267–71, 301–16
(describing Boston’s transformation in 1960s away from “overwhelmingly white” city).
Although similar patterns played out in cities nationwide, Boston was somewhat unique in
the scale of the transformation as it had historically had one of the smallest black populations of any Northern city. On the growth of Boston’s suburbs, see Geismer, supra note
42, at 19–42.
318. Geismer, supra note 42, at 19–42 (discussing postwar demographic shifts in
Boston area).
319. See generally Formisano, supra note 317 (discussing Irish American communities
in South Boston and Charlestown in 1970s). For a memoir describing the persistence of
entrenched poverty in Irish South Boston well into the 1980s and 1990s, see generally
Michael Patrick MacDonald, All Souls (2007).
320. Alschuler, supra note 181, at 1206 n.84 (quoting San Francisco Committee on
Crime, A Report on the San Francisco Public Defender’s Office 4-7, A-2 (1970)).
321. Id. at 1241 n.176.
322. See Zeidman, supra note 280, at 939–40, 940 n.24 (assembling studies showing
“plea mentality and directive is deeply entrenched”); see also Alan F. Arcuri, Lawyers,
Judges, and Plea Bargaining: Some New Data on Inmates’ Views, 4 Int’l J. Criminology &
Penology 177, 183 (1976) (defendants “reported that they were pressured into pleading
guilty”); Glen Wilkerson, Public Defenders as Their Clients See Them, 1 Am. J. Crim. L.
141, 143 (1972) (reporting Denver defendants’ expressions of “widespread skepticism and
cynicism” about public defenders and “[r]eal or imagined pressure to plead guilty”).
323. Jonathan D. Casper, Did You Have a Lawyer When You Went to Court? No, I Had
a Public Defender, 1 Yale Rev. L. & Soc. Action 4, 6 (1971). Prior to Gideon, some lawyers
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If measured by sentencing outcomes, defendants were likely mistaken that they would have fared better with “a street lawyer.”324 Empirical
studies generally ﬁnd that public defenders perform no worse than private lawyers, and in some settings, they perform much better.325 In other
words, Edgar Rimbold may have been right that defenders’ familiarity
with “the system” beneﬁted their clients. Of course, whether it is a good
thing that public defenders effectively navigate the plea bargaining maze
depends on one’s views about plea bargaining, and whether it is a good
thing that public defenders’ clients receive roughly the same punishment
as everyone else depends on one’s views about substantive criminal and
sentencing laws.
If measured by subjective perceptions, however, the post-Gideon
transition to a public-charity hybrid model of indigent defense had real
costs both for defenders’ morale and for defendants’ beliefs about wheopposed to the public defender model had predicted that public defenders would “‘harden’ toward all defendants’ stories because of the volume of cases” and that defenders
would enjoy overly cozy relationships with prosecutors and judges. Beaney, supra note 56,
at 219.
324. Casper, supra note 323, at 7.
325. Early post-Gideon studies comparing public defenders with alternatives found no
signiﬁcant differences in outcomes. See Levine, supra note 251, at 224–26 (providing 1975
study ﬁnding Brooklyn Legal Aid lawyers investigated as diligently as private attorneys,
though they took fewer cases to trial); Gerald R. Wheeler & Carol L. Wheeler, Reﬂections
on Legal Representation of the Economically Disadvantaged: Beyond Assembly Line
Justice. Type of Counsel, Pretrial Detention, and Outcomes in Houston, 26 Crime &
Delinq. 319, 321–23 (1980) (summarizing literature as of 1979). Recent studies also report
no consistent, signiﬁcant difference between public defenders and appointed counsel. See
James M. Anderson & Paul Heaton, How Much Difference Does the Lawyer Make? The
Effect of Defense Counsel on Murder Case Outcomes, 122 Yale L.J. 154, 157 n.6 (2012)
(summarizing literature); see also Hartley et al., supra note 39, at 1065 (suggesting “type
of counsel is not a strong predictor of case processing decisions”).
In a study of Philadelphia murder cases, public defenders’ clients had lower
conviction rates and a much lower probability of receiving a life sentence than defendants
with appointed counsel (although in part because of Philadelphia’s extremely low compensation for appointed counsel). Anderson & Heaton, supra, at 159, 178–79; see also
Laurin, supra note 50, at 340 (showing North Carolina public defenders achieved “superior outcomes” to appointed counsel); Michael A. Roach, Indigent Defense Counsel,
Attorney Quality, and Defendant Outcomes, 16 Am. L. & Econ. Rev. 577, 602 (2014)
(explaining nationwide data suggests public defenders outperform assigned counsel);
Radha Iyengar, An Analysis of the Performance of Federal Indigent Defense Counsel 3
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 13187, 2007), http://www.nber.org
/papers/w13187 [http://perma.cc/4ECX-YCHK] (arguing federal defendants receive
shorter sentences with public defender than appointed attorney).
Comparisons of public defenders with retained counsel are more difficult to
control for selection bias. See generally Morris B. Hoffman et al., An Empirical Study of
Public Defender Effectiveness: Self-Selection by the “Marginally Indigent,” 3 Ohio St. J.
Crim. L. 223 (2005). Some studies suggest that retained counsel outperform public
defenders, but only under certain conditions. See Hartley et al., supra note 39, at 1065
(collecting references); id. at 1067–68 (ﬁnding attorney type had no overall signiﬁcant
effect in one year’s data from Cook County, Illinois, although private counsel
outperformed public defenders, and vice versa, under certain conditions).
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ther the courts were fair.326 Though plea bargaining resolved most cases
in practice, American legal culture still idealized adversary trial.327 The
gap between the adversary ideal and their day-to-day work blended, in
defenders’ minds, with their low salaries and high caseloads, causing
them always to feel as though they were doing less for each client than
they could have with more resources.328 Defendants, too, romanticized
trials and assumed “that if their attorneys were willing to ﬁght vigorously
on their behalf, they might be acquitted.”329 In 1974, legal scholar Albert
Alschuler described plea bargaining as a tragic machine that could only
produce different ﬂavors of bad outcomes: If a defender “refuses to
‘coerce his client,’ he insures his own failure” at trial, but if he “does
‘coerce his client’ . . . he damages the attorney-client relationship, conﬁrms the cynical suspicions of the client . . . and incurs the resentment of
the person whom he seeks to serve.”330
This outcome would surely have dispirited the Progressive Era philanthropists, and their Cold War successors, who touted legal aid as a way
to insulate the urban poor from radical politics.331 Of course, prisoners
complained about the criminal courts before Gideon. But now, public
defenders, far from alleviating defendants’ concerns, often became the
focus of those complaints. While Chief Justice Warren spoke fondly of
the Alameda County public defender in the late 1960s, another celebrity
denizen of Oakland advanced a different view. Black Panther Party
leader Eldridge Cleaver, in a 1968 interview, explained the Party’s appeal
by describing a typical black defendant who, “in a stupor of confusion,”
takes his public defender’s advice to plead guilty in exchange for a lesser
326. On the difficulty of quantifying subjective dimensions to a public defender’s
relationship with clients, see Worden et al., Patchwork, supra note 39, at 1435.
327. See Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. Conﬂict
Resol. 52, 52–53 (1967) (describing U.S. legal system’s norm of adversary conﬂict).
328. Already in the 1970s, some scholars observed low morale among public defenders
caused by “an expanding caseload and inadequate ﬁnancing.” Wilkerson, supra note 322,
at 146. In the 1990s, scholars and advocates identiﬁed “staggering caseloads, tremendous
time pressure, limited resources, and inadequate training” as factors causing public
defender “burnout.” Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justiﬁcations: Seeking Motivations to
Sustain Public Defenders, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1239, 1240–41 (1993); see also Robert L.
Spangenberg & Tessa J. Schwartz, The Indigent Defense Crisis Is Chronic, Crim. Just.,
Summer 1994, at 13, 15 (reporting 1990 survey ﬁndings that 60% of public defender
offices said heavy caseloads made it difficult to recruit attorneys).
329. Alschuler, supra note 181, at 1310; see also Harris, In Criminal Court—II, supra
note 252, at 80 (noting “many defendants have a mystique about trials”).
330. Alschuler, supra note 181, at 1310. Alschuler extended this model to both public
defenders and private defense attorneys, but arguably, public defenders had the added
burden of being seen as “government” lawyers. See id. at 1247 (excerpting clients’ complaints that public defender is “like prosecutor’s assistant” and “playing a middle game”);
see also Levine, supra note 251, at 235–36 (speculating Gideon created “vicious cycle” in
which defendants assumed their public defenders were “inadequate” and did not trust
them to go to trial, further diminishing number of trials); Skolnick, supra note 327, at 65
(observing clients and defenders have different understandings of attorney’s role).
331. See supra section I.A (discussing evolution of indigent defense).
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charge.332 Then he “wakes up in the penitentiary, starts exchanging
experiences with other guys who have been through the same mill; and if
he wasn’t a rebel when he went in, he’ll be a revolutionary by the time he
gets out.”333
For a time, legal scholars recognized cynicism about public defenders as a disconsonant note in the larger story of Gideon’s implementation.
In 1967, Abraham Blumberg, a lawyer-turned-sociologist and acerbic
critic of the legal profession, observed the tension between Gideon’s
celebration of “adversary, combative” lawyering and the reality that courts
were bureaucracies.334 This disconnect, in Blumberg’s prediction, would
yield “ironic” consequences: Doctrine aimed at protecting individual
rights would end up “enriching court organizations with more personnel
and elaborate structure, which in turn will maximize organizational goals
of ‘efficiency’ and production. Thus, many defendants will ﬁnd that
courts will possess an even more sophisticated apparatus for processing
them toward a guilty plea!”335 About a decade later, legal scholar
Malcolm Feeley placed a more positive but still ironic spin on Gideon’s
effects. By making the local courts more professionalized, Feeley wrote,
the expanding right to counsel had also “raise[d] expectations” and
“expose[d] practices to closer scrutiny . . . . Thus, an irony: as things
[got] better they appear[ed] to get worse.”336
But Gideon’s role in bureaucratizing (or professionalizing) the
criminal courts soon faded from memory. As Gideon receded into the
past, scholars and advocates reinterpreted public defenders’ high caseloads, volatile funding, and avoidance of trials not as “‘volume representation’ of the type that appears to be mandatory” under Gideon,337 but
as signs that Gideon’s mandates were being neglected. Gideon, in the title
of the American Bar Association’s 1983 report identifying a “crisis in

332. Playboy, Eldridge Cleaver Interview, supra note 312.
333. Id. To be sure, most California public defender offices (including Alameda
County’s) predated Gideon, but Cleaver’s rhetoric is archetypical of post-Gideon discourse
nationwide framing public defenders as bureaucrats.
334. Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Conﬁdence Game: Organizational
Cooptation of a Profession, Law & Soc’y Rev., June 1967, at 15, 18. For an overview of
Blumberg’s career, see Wolfgang Saxon, A.S. Blumberg, 75, Professor Concerned with
Equal Justice, N.Y. Times (Nov. 19, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/11/19/us/a-sblumberg-75-professor-concerned-with-equal-justice.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review). In the same year, Berkeley sociologist Jerome Skolnick similarly observed that
criminal court actors felt pressure to cooperate, even though doing so required appearing
to deviate from the courts’ ostensibly adversarial norm. Skolnick, supra note 327, at 52.
335. Blumberg, supra note 334, at 39.
336. Feeley, supra note 275, at 206. Unlike Blumberg, however, Feeley disagreed that
courts were bureaucracies in the classical social-scientiﬁc sense, since they lacked “rational
organization, hierarchical control, common purpose, and central administration.” Id. at
17–18.
337. Mass. Defs. Comm., Second Report, supra note 229, at 4.
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indigent defense funding,” had come “undone.”338 From that report on,
advocates have described indigent defense in a language of “crisis” that
has never abated.339 In the 1960s, Robert Spangenberg, as a young
Boston University law professor, had alerted the Massachusetts Defenders
Committee to his concerns about their impersonal advocacy. In the
1990s, Spangenberg—now the nation’s leading expert consultant on
indigent defense policy—expressed similar concerns on a national scale,
lamenting that “overburdened public defenders are often forced to pick
338. ABA Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, Gideon Undone: The
Crisis in Indigent Defense Funding (1983), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam
/aba/migrated/legalservices/downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/gideonundone.authche
ckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/YAW2-B4FP] [hereinafter ABA, Gideon Undone]. The
report’s text was more equivocal: “unless positive steps are taken to address these problems, the promise of Gideon v. Wainwright will indeed be undone.” Id.
339. See, e.g., Eve Brensike Primus, Am. Const. Soc’y for L. & Pol’y, Litigation
Strategies for Dealing with the Indigent Defense Crisis 1 (2010), https://www.
acslaw.org/ﬁles/Primus%20-%20Litigation%20Strategies.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TK2GXQY7] [hereinafter Primus, Litigation Strategies] (“The indigent defense delivery system
in the United States is in a state of crisis.”); Joel M. Schumm, Standing Comm. on Legal
Aid & Indigent Defendants, ABA, National Indigent Defense Reform: The Solution Is
Multifaceted app. B at 37 (2012), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publications/books/ls_sclaid_def_national_indigent_defense_reform.authcheckdam.pdf
[http://perma.cc/FG9A-MWZD] (reporting ﬁndings on “the indigent defense crisis in
America”); Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A
National Crisis, 57 Hastings L.J. 1031, 1039 (2006) (“To be sure, in a host of areas,
thoughtful commentators refer to the justice system, at least with respect to the right to
counsel, as being in critical disarray.”); Fairfax, supra note 25, at 2318–19 (“The failings of
Gideon have been thoroughly documented, and are properly attributed in large part to the
crisis in indigent defense funding.” (footnote omitted)); Richardson & Goff, supra note
268, at 2631 (“Indigent defense is in a state of crisis.”); Worden et al., supra note 39, at
1426–27 (noting consensus that “public defense is in a state of perpetual crisis”); David
Carroll, Gideon’s Despair: Four Things the Next Attorney General Needs to Know About
America’s Indigent Defense Crisis, Marshall Project (Jan. 2, 2015, 7:15 AM), https:
//www.themarshallproject.org/2015/01/02/four-things-the-next-attorney-general-needs-toknow-about-america-s-indigent-defense-crisis [http://perma.cc/8MKJ-6RUD] (“Fifty
years after . . . Gideon . . . the U.S. Department of Justice has found that right-to-counsel
services in America ‘exist in a state of crisis.’”); Andrew Cohen, Eric Holder: ‘A State of
Crisis’ for the Right to Counsel, Atlantic (Mar. 15, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com
/national/archive/2013/03/eric-holder-a-state-of-crisis-for-the-right-to-counsel/274074/
[http://perma.cc/9HAR-B4GP] (“America’s indigent defense systems exist in a state of
crisis.” (quoting Eric Holder)); U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs & Bureau
of Justice Assistance, Improving Criminal Justice Systems Through Expanded Strategies
and Innovative Collaborations, at ix (2000), http://www.sado.org/fees/icjs.pdf [http://
perma.cc/YEH6-6KPH] (“[I]ndigent defense in the United States today is in a chronic
state of crisis.”); Debra Carsens Weiss, Would Decriminalizing Minor Offenses Help
Indigent Defense Crisis? ABA Committee Weighs In, Am. B. Ass’n J. (Jan. 8, 2013, 2:00 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/decriminalizing_minor_offenses_could_help_indige
nt_defense_crisis_aba_commi/ [http://perma.cc/4Y3Q-5PKC] (noting “perpetual crisis in
indigent defense” (internal quotation marks omitted)). For early examples of articles
identifying an “indigent defense crisis,” see e.g., Paul Calvin Drecksel, The Crisis in
Indigent Criminal Defense, 44 Ark. L. Rev. 363, 381–82 (1991); Spangenberg & Schwartz,
supra note 328.
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and choose which cases to focus on.”340 That observation appeared in an
ABA report that was published in 1994, but could have been published in
any year since then: The Indigent Defense Crisis Is Chronic.341
Since the 1980s, the phrase “indigent defense crisis” has functioned
on two levels: as a description of observed conditions and as a conceptual
paradigm for all discussions of indigent defense policy. At the level of
observed conditions, advocates were likely correct that funding and
caseload pressures worsened in the 1980s and 1990s as states got “tough
on crime.”342 Although total funding for indigent defense increased in
those decades, caseloads grew faster than funding could catch up, so percase funding declined.343 In this sense, “crisis” identiﬁes acute funding
emergencies that are conceptually ﬁxable, if difficult politically. Yet,
“indigent defense crisis” could also function as a permanent paradigm—
a label for a “chronic” condition—because, in seed form, virtually every
perceived symptom of the crisis was already present in Gideon’s
immediate aftermath: “insufficient funding; high defender caseloads; low
levels of attention to individual cases; low client satisfaction,” and “high
plea rates.”344 At some level of magnitude, then, these symptoms may
simply be artifacts of what happens when Gideon is implemented in local
criminal courts. If so, then the persistent rhetoric of “crisis” might
340. Spangenberg & Schwartz, supra note 328, at 15; see also ABA, Gideon Undone,
supra note 338, at 10–12 (providing testimony of Robert Spangenberg on burdens on
public-defender system). On the Spangenberg Group’s consulting work, see Laurin, supra
note 50, at 335 n.52 (“[T]he Spangenberg Group . . . is typically called in to produce oneoff assessments of state systems in crisis, or nationwide surveys that provide only a very
high-level sketch of indigent defense trends.”); Worden et al., Patchwork, supra note 39, at
1459 (“[T]he Spangenberg Group [has] frequently been brought into states to examine
public defense systems and publish reports on their successes and failures.”).
341. Spangenberg & Schwartz, supra note 328.
342. On the “tough on crime” turn in state policy, see, e.g., Jonathan Simon,
Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American Democracy
and Created a Culture of Fear 3–6 (2007) (describing construction of “new civil and
political order structured around the problem of violent crime” between 1970s and 2000s,
resulting in historic growth of prison population).
343. See Stuntz, Collapse, supra note 4, at 57 (“[I]nﬂation-adjusted, per-case spending
on lawyers for indigent defendants fell by more than half from the late 1970s to the early
1990s.”); id. at 256 (“Per-case spending on lawyers for indigent defendants fell by half
between 1979 and 1990.”); Worden & Davies, Protecting Due Process, supra note 183, at
82–83 (noting overall increases in funding); Spangenberg & Schwartz, supra note 328, at
14 (concluding growth in caseloads outstripped funding increases). These conclusions are
based on aggregate nationwide ﬁgures and may mask different local patterns. For example, Louisiana cut aggregate defense spending in the 1980s. See Stuntz, Uneasy
Relationship, supra note 266, at 56 n.184 (“The Chief Justice of the Louisiana Supreme
Court has noted that his state’s spending on indigent defense was cut during the late 1980s
while the caseload was undergoing a 45% increase.”).
344. Worden et al., Patchwork, supra note 39, at 1456 (summarizing “familiar repertoire of problems” with indigent defense). Worden et al. also note “lack of state oversight”
as an oft-identiﬁed problem, which is more of a problem in states with highly localized
systems. Id.
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unwittingly reﬂect a much more fundamental challenge to the Gideon
consensus itself.345
V. GIDEON ’S MEANING AND LEGACY
A gulf separates popular and scholarly assessments of Gideon’s legacy.
The leading popular account remains Anthony Lewis’s panegyric and
proleptic Gideon’s Trumpet.346 A fervent and inﬂuential acolyte of the
Warren Court, Lewis expressed high hopes that Gideon would inspire the
reforms needed so that “every man charged with crime will be capably
defended.”347 Outside of museums and textbooks, however, “Gideon
discourse” has moved far away from Lewis’s initial optimism.348 In line
with larger historiographical developments that have tempered appraisals of the Warren Court’s inﬂuence, scholars have emphasized that
most states already recognized “a basic right to appointed counsel”
345. For a perceptive discussion of the limitations of “crisis” rhetoric in criminal
justice scholarship, see Feeley, supra note 275, at xi–xiv, 192–93 (arguing crisis frame often
lacks historical perspective and results in ﬂawed reform efforts).
346. See Powe, supra note 4, at 379–85 (describing Gideon’s Trumpet as “canonical
history of Gideon”); see also Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American
History 302, 527 n.26 (1993) (summarizing Gideon and citing Gideon’s Trumpet); Paul
Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 Yale L.J. 2176, 2195
(2013) [hereinafter Butler, Poor People Lose] (identifying Gideon’s Trumpet as Gideon’s
“creation myth”). The Gideon display at the National Constitution Center features an
image of the cover of Gideon’s Trumpet. See photographs by Sara Mayeux (Feb. 14, 2015)
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review). For examples of Gideon’s Trumpet being assigned
or recommended to students, see, e.g., New London High School Summer Reading List
2014 2, http://images.pcmac.org/SiSFiles/Schools/CT/NewLondon/NewLondonHigh/
Uploads/Publications/Summer%20Reading%20Packet%202014%20-%20Website.pdf [http://
perma.cc/SNF5-NFHB] (last visited Oct. 8, 2015); Before You Arrive: Summer Assignments,
Univ. of Cal., Irvine, Sch. of Law, http://www.law.uci.edu/orientation/pre-orientation.
html [http://perma.cc/W5HL-SZ8N] (last visited Oct. 8, 2015); Suggested Reading, Univ.
of Ala. Sch. of Law, http://www.law.ua.edu/admissions/accepted-students/suggestedreading/ [http://perma.cc/Y9D6-45Z7] (last visited Oct. 8, 2015). On Gideon as a
paradigmatic Warren Court case, see also Friedman, The Will of the People, supra note 4,
at 273 (“For many, Gideon crystallized all that was good about the Warren Court’s
activism . . . .”).
347. Lewis, Gideon’s Trumpet, supra note 16, at 205; see also Anthony Lewis, Supreme
Court Extends Ruling on Free Counsel: Holds States Must Provide Lawyers for All Poor in
Serious Criminal Cases, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1963, at 1 (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review) (predicting Gideon “should spur state efforts to set up new methods of providing
counsel”). On Lewis’s inﬂuence and stance toward the Warren Court, see generally Lyle
Denniston, Anthony Lewis: Pioneer in the Court’s Pressroom, 79 Mo. L. Rev. 902, 902–03
(2015) (“Tony Lewis was America’s witness to ‘the Warren Court’ . . . .”); Linda
Greenhouse, The Rigorous Romantic: Anthony Lewis on the Supreme Court Beat, 79 Mo.
L. Rev. 907, 907 (2015) (“[Lewis] chronicled the Warren Court’s progressive constitutional
revolution at the peak of its energy and transformative power.”); Dahlia Lithwick, Anthony
Lewis, 79 Mo. L. Rev. 971, 971–73 (2015) (“Tony Lewis changed everything about
Supreme Court reporting.”).
348. The phrase “Gideon discourse” comes from Butler, Poor People Lose, supra note
346, at 2179.
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before 1963.349 In the parlance of constitutional theory, then, Gideon was
not a heroic countermajoritarian ruling but an example of a case
imposing a national consensus upon a few remaining “outliers.”350 Meanwhile, criminal procedure scholars maintain that theoretical guarantees
of counsel have failed, in practice, to guarantee meaningful legal help
for the poor.351 Scholars, advocates, and journalists have published thousands of articles exposing Gideon’s “failed promise”352 or “muted trum349. Amar, supra note 9, at 112 (“[A] basic right to appointed counsel was already part
of the fabric of America’s lived Constitution [prior to Gideon].”). On changing scholarly
assessments of the Warren Court, see generally Kalman, supra note 178, at 2–5 (discussing
opinions of scholars with “faith in the transformative power of the Warren Court”);
Christopher W. Schmidt, Divided by Law: The Sit-ins and the Role of the Courts in the
Civil Rights Movement, 33 Law & Hist. Rev. 93, 103–05 (2015) (summarizing legal
historians’ changing assessments of impact of seminal Warren Court case Brown v. Board of
Education).
350. Driver, supra note 9, at 931–32; see also Amar, supra note 9, at 112, 115 (noting
Gideon “merely codif[ied] a preexisting national consensus”); Friedman, The Will of the
People, supra note 4, at 273 (“By the time of Gideon, forty-ﬁve states were requiring that all
indigents accused of felonies be provided counsel.”); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Revolutions, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1, 16–17 (1996) (including
Gideon as example of case “imposing” national consensus “on resisting local outliers”);
Lain, supra note 4, at 1398 (stating Gideon “validated a well-established national consensus,
suppressing Southern states that were out-of-step with the rest of the country’s enlightened
sense of fairness and equality”).
351. E.g. Drinan, Getting Real, supra note 268, at 1311 (“[E]ven the most basic
understanding of the right to counsel has never been fully implemented.”); see also
Fairfax, supra note 25, at 2318 (“[T]here is near-universal acceptance . . . that our system
of indigent defense is broken.”).
352. E.g. Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Justice Update: Gideon’s 50, Smarter Sequester Cuts
(Mar. 21, 2013), http://www.brennancenter.org/newsletter/justice-update-gideons-50thsmarter-sequester-cuts [http://perma.cc/NR3V-4Z2F] (listing events under heading
“Gideon’s Failed Promise”); Karen Houppert, Locked Up Without a Key in New Orleans,
Nation (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/locked-without-key-neworleans/ [http://perma.cc/VA97-7JE9] (introducing series of articles “investigating the
failed promise of Gideon”); An Unequal Defense: The Failed Promise of Justice for the
Poor, Seattle Times (Apr. 4–6, 2004), http://seattletimes.com/news/local/unequal
defense [http://perma.cc/3N9N-6DYA] (linking to numerous articles highlighting problems with public defense). For variations on the “promise” trope, see John H. Blume &
Sheri Lynn Johnson, Gideon Exceptionalism?, 122 Yale L.J. 2126, 2143 (2013) (underfunding makes “promise of Gideon a sham”); David Cole, Gideon v. Wainwright and
Strickland v. Washington: Broken Promises, in Criminal Procedure Stories 101, 102–03
(Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) (claiming “despite the promise of ‘effective assistance’ set
forth in Strickland, in actuality as long as the state provides a warm body with a law
degree . . . little else matters”); Marceau, supra note 24, at 2485 (describing “right to
counsel’s reality” as “an unfulﬁlled, illusory promise”); Rudovsky, supra note 195, at 372
(2014) (“[T]here is near unanimous agreement that the ‘promise’ of Gideon has been
systematically denied . . . .”); Eric A. Holder & Dick Thornburgh, Gideon—A Watershed
Moment, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, Champion Mag. (June 2012),
http://www.nacdl.org/Champion.aspx?id=24999 [http://perma.cc/U489-9F2W] (observing
“full promise of the rights guaranteed under Gideon has yet to be fully realized”); see also
Nat’l Right to Counsel Comm., Justice Denied: America’s Continuing Neglect of Our
Constitutional Right to Counsel 2 (2009), http://www.constitutionproject.org/wpcontent/uploads/2012/10/139.pdf [http://perma.cc/D9B4-SXKW] (arguing indigent
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pet.”353 Even Anthony Lewis concluded, in retrospect, that his optimism
had been misplaced.354
A.

Gideon’s Past

This Article offers a historical perspective that falls somewhere
between hopeful prolepsis and resigned pessimism about Gideon’s legacy.
Gideon mattered more than its skeptics claim, but the changes Gideon
catalyzed—such as the spread of the public defender model and the
expansion of lawyers’ presence in low-level criminal proceedings355—
cannot be categorized as uniformly progressive or uniformly retrograde.
defense systems “make a mockery of the great promise of the Gideon decision”). See
generally ABA Standing Comm. on Legal Aid & Indigent Defendants, Gideon’s Broken
Promise: America’s Continuing Quest for Equal Justice iv (2004), http://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_
bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf [http://perma.cc/T2
AT-PPXR] (concluding “thousands of persons are processed through America’s courts
every year either with no lawyer at all or with a lawyer who does not . . . provide effective
representation” and suggesting solutions); Thomas E. Daniels, Gideon’s Hollow Promise:
How Appointed Counsel Are Prevented from Fulﬁlling Their Role in the Criminal Justice
System, 71 Mich. B.J. 136 (1992) (discussing barriers to success of appointed counsel);
Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the
Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 Hastings Const. L.Q. 625 (1986)
(detailing how severe underfunding of agencies providing defense counsel endangers
Sixth Amendment); Note, Gideon’s Promise Unfulﬁlled: The Need for Litigated Reform of
Indigent Defense, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 2062 (2000) (suggesting litigated reform as means of
improving indigent defense). For other formulations describing Gideon as failed or
illusory, see Bright & Sanneh, supra note 19, at 2160 (arguing “right to counsel” is
“ﬁction”); Butler, Poor People Lose, supra note 346, at 2190 (“If Gideon was supposed to
make the criminal justice system fairer for poor people and minorities, it has been a
spectacular failure.”); Fairfax, supra note 25, at 2321 (“Falling Short of Gideon’s Dream.”).
See generally Dripps, Why Gideon Failed, supra note 4 (discussing reasons for Gideon’s
failure and suggesting reform agendas); Eve Brensike Primus, The Illusory Right to
Counsel, 37 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 597, 598 (2011) (arguing “criminal justice system essentially
prevents defendants from ever being able to challenge their counsels’ ineffective assistance,” and suggesting solutions).
353. Chester Fairlie, Gideon’s Muted Trumpet, 69 A.B.A. J. 172 (1983); Lewis R. Katz,
Gideon’s Trumpet: Mournful and Muffled, 55 Iowa L. Rev. 523 (1970); Victoria Nourse,
Gideon’s Muted Trumpet, 58 Md. L. Rev. 1417 (1999); Kim Taylor-Thompson, Tuning Up
Gideon’s Trumpet, 71 Fordham L. Rev. 1461 (2003); Paul Butler, Gideon’s Muted Trumpet,
N.Y. Times (Mar. 17, 2013) http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/18/opinion/gideonsmuted-trumpet.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review); see also Steiker, supra note
24, at 2697 (collecting examples).
354. Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; A Muted Trumpet, N.Y. Times (Aug. 16, 1991),
http://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/16/opinion/abroad-at-home-a-muted-trumpet.html
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“In the real world, the promise of Gideon is not
being kept.”); Anthony Lewis, The Silencing of Gideon’s Trumpet, N.Y. Times Mag. (Apr.
20, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/20/magazine/the-silencing-of-gideon-s-trumpet.
html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review) (“Clarence Gideon . . . would be disappointed
today at the imperfect realization of his dream.”).
355. See supra section III.C (noting number of states providing counsel in “less
serious criminal cases” increased from ﬁve before Gideon to thirty-one in 1970).
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Like most historical transformations, these changes entailed gains as well
as losses, their costs and beneﬁts fell unevenly, and there is no way to
know what would have happened in a counterfactual world in which they
were managed differently. Nor could these post-Gideon changes wash
away the pre-Gideon past. Gideon should be understood not only as a
promise to individual defendants and an exhortation to outlying states,
but also as a political tool that has been used in different ways in
different places, always within the context of preexisting local traditions
and hierarchies.
Along the way, the history described in this Article also suggests
more speciﬁc revisions to both the “outlier” and “failed promise”
accounts of Gideon. Although the tally that Gideon abrogated doctrine in
only ﬁve “outlier” states is too schematic,356 it does capture an important
point about Gideon: For a Warren Court criminal procedure case, Gideon
met with little official state-level opposition. By contrast, Miranda v.
Arizona imposed a rule that only three states had previously adopted and
that twenty-six states formally opposed in an amicus brief.357 But measuring by formal support alone underestimates Gideon’s reach. Nationwide, elite commentators, state-level policymakers, and local lawyers
interpreted Gideon to require a variety of legal and institutional changes.
If Anthony Lewis’s romantic prose has fallen out of fashion, he was not
wrong to predict that Gideon’s implementation would prove an “enormous social task” throughout the “vast, diverse country.”358
In carrying out that task, lawyers grappled not only with political
resistance but also with the conceptual and institutional remnants of
356. See Yale Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the Fourteenth Amendment: A
Dialogue on “The Most Pervasive Right of an Accused,” 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 19 (1962)
(originating assertion that only ﬁve states did not require court-appointed attorneys for
indigent felony defendants). Abe Fortas relied upon Kamisar’s article in his brief to the
Court, Brief for Petitioner, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (No. 105), 1962 WL
115120, at *30–31, and it is often cited by scholars as well. See, e.g., Friedman, The Will of
the People, supra note 4, at 273 n.346; Lain, supra note 4, at 1392 n.163. However,
Kamisar ranged the states on a spectrum, with thirty-seven states with an express felony
right to counsel; eight states that appeared to provide counsel in practice despite lacking
an express provision; and ﬁve states with no statewide right to counsel in law or practice,
although some urban counties in those states did provide counsel. Kamisar, supra, at 17–
20. Kamisar allowed that “rules and statutes do not necessarily reﬂect practices at the trial
level.” Id. at 18. And Kamisar may have overlooked some local variation; for instance, he
counted Pennsylvania as a state that provided counsel in practice primarily based on
information from Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. Id. at 19.
Even at the level of formal rules, the 45/5 split underestimates Gideon’s reach. For
example, the pre-Gideon Massachusetts rule requiring the appointment of felony counsel
applied only in the superior courts. See supra note 56. But the lower-level district courts
also had jurisdiction to try some felonies. So, in that sense, Massachusetts should be
included as a sixth state where Gideon required changes to state-level, felony right-tocounsel doctrine. Presumably, there may have been other, similar intra-state nuances.
357. See Lain, supra note 4, at 1399–400 (noting “only three states required police to
warn suspects of their rights prior to custodial interrogation” prior to Miranda).
358. Lewis, Gideon’s Trumpet, supra note 16, at 205.

2016]

WHAT GIDEON DID

89

their own pre-Gideon indigent defense efforts. That path dependence
suggests modiﬁcations to the “failed promise” narrative of Gideon.
Particularly within the criminal procedure literature, most scholars
attribute present-day indigent defense funding levels to political indifference or even outright legislative deﬁance of the Gideon mandate.359
Others invoke variants of interest-group theory to present the underfunding of indigent defense as almost inevitable, given that public
resources are limited and criminal defendants are an unsympathetic
lobby.360 There is surprisingly little empirical literature testing these
assumptions about the politics of indigent defense; to the contrary, stateby-state comparisons of indigent defense funding raise questions about
how universally the assumptions apply.361 But even assuming that political
359. See, e.g., Bright & Sanneh, supra note 19, at 2160 (accusing state governments of
disregarding obligations under Gideon); Dripps, Why Gideon Failed, supra note 4, at 924
(“Legislators have consistently failed to provide the levels of funding that would be
required for even minimally adequate representation.”); Richardson & Goff, supra note
268, at 2628 (citing “lack of political will to fulﬁll Gideon’s promise”). For anecdotal
evidence of one legislator’s indifference to funding indigent defense, see Deborah L.
Rhode, Access to Justice, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 1785, 1791 (2001) (quoting one legislator as
saying “he [did not] care if indigents [were] represented or not” (alterations in original)).
Scholars reserve some blame for the Burger Court, which they accuse of backtracking on
Gideon by setting minimal standards for effective assistance of counsel in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See, e.g., Blume & Johnson, supra note 352, at 2142
(claiming Strickland rendered Gideon “ephemeral”); Bright & Sanneh, supra note 19, at
2170 (arguing Strickland “eroded the reach of Gideon”). But see Israel, From a 1963
Perspective, supra note 26, at 2056 (arguing Strickland was fully compatible with Gideon).
360. See, e.g., Primus, Litigation Strategies, supra note 339, at 3 (describing how
voters will punish state legislators who support “defense-friendly reforms”); Chemerinsky,
supra note 23, at 2692 (“Neither the poor nor their attorneys have sufficient political
inﬂuence to ensure adequate resources.”); Donald A. Dripps, Up from Gideon, 45 Tex.
Tech L. Rev. 113, 121 (2012) [hereinafter Dripps, Up from Gideon] (“[I]ndigent defense
competes for public funds with other urgent priorities.”); Steiker, supra note 24, at 2700
(stating “it is not surprising” that indigent defense is low political priority); see also Bright
& Sanneh, supra note 19, at 2153 (“[G]overnments have no incentive to provide competent representation, which could frustrate their efforts to convict, ﬁne, imprison, and
execute poor defendants.”); Fairfax, supra note 25, at 2322 (positing legislators view “law
enforcement and corrections . . . as more central to the state’s core criminal justice function” than indigent defense).
361. State-level indigent defense funding is not correlated with incarceration rates.
Brown, Epiphenomenal, supra note 298, at 915–16; see also Worden & Davies, Protecting
Due Process, supra note 183, at 98 (“[I]ncarceration rates did not prove strongly
predictive of low investment in indigent defense . . . .”). As Darryl Brown notes, that does
not mean there is no “ideological linkage” between the two, but if so, it is not straightforward. See Brown, Epiphenomenal, supra note 298, at 922 (“[T]here [may be] alternate
and competing ideologies, with some prevailing in certain jurisdictions and others predominating elsewhere.”).
More generally, empirical studies suggest weak ties between partisan politics and
indigent defense policy. One longitudinal analysis found no correlation between state-level
indigent defense funding and “the ideology of political elites” (as measured by a state’s
governor and legislative party leaders); this analysis did ﬁnd an association between “racial
composition,” “political illiberality,” and “lower rates of spending on indigent defense,”
although the association was strongest during the 1980s’ “punitive turn.” Worden &
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conditions for indigent defense are unfavorable, this Article shows that
lawyers played an outsized role in shaping those conditions.362 Today’s
levels of government provision for indigent defense reﬂect not only
present-day political judgments but also the cumulative legacy of decades
in which many lawyers themselves rejected the idea of governmentsubsidized indigent defense.
B.

Gideon’s Future

Reframing our historical narratives of Gideon can also open up new
conversations about how to move forward, both for criminal procedure
scholarship and for indigent defense policy. Scholars have prescribed
myriad cures for what they diagnose as Gideon’s failure.363 These range
from doctrinal adjustments to the appellate standard for ineffective assistance of counsel364 and structural reform litigation365 to more aggressive
bar oversight of defense attorneys366 and the expansion of law school

Davies, Protecting Due Process, supra note 183, at 89, 97–98; see also Davies & Worden,
State Politics, supra note 39, at 211 (“In short, the politics of indigent defense are driven
less by straightforward economic factors than by the forces that appear to have inﬂuenced
punishment policies over the last three decades.”); Alissa Pollitz Worden & Robert E.
Worden, Local Politics and the Provision of Indigent Defense Counsel, 11 Law & Pol’y 401,
413–15 (1989) [hereinafter Worden & Worden, Local Politics] (comparing county indigent defense spending within Georgia and ﬁnding ﬁscal pressures, bar association activity,
and judicial preferences were more determinative than public’s preferences); Worden et
al., Patchwork, supra note 39, at 1455 (suggesting indigent defense policy trajectories are
better explained by economic rather than political factors).
362. On this point, see also Worden & Worden, Local Politics, supra note 361, at 405,
407, 413–15 (noting political power of bar associations and local legal communities may
have felt threatened by public defender systems). In Houston, judicial opposition helped
prevent the adoption of a public defender in the 1970s. See Wheeler & Wheeler, supra
note 325, at 325.
363. See Dripps, Up from Gideon, supra note 360, at 121 (noting academics have
developed numerous “plausible argument[s] for reform” of indigent defense).
364. E.g., Blume & Johnson, supra note 352, at 2147; Primus, Effective Trial Counsel,
supra note 20, at 2607–08 (celebrating dialogue between federal and state courts, which
may “result in more realistic opportunities for defendants to raise ineffective assistance of
trial counsel claims in state courts”).
365. E.g., Primus, Litigation Strategies, supra note 339, at 8 (arguing “Congress should
add a new chapter to Title 28 that would create a speciﬁc habeas corpus cause of action for
systemic right-to-counsel violations”); see also Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of
Indigent Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 427, 462–75 (2009) (suggesting structural litigation strategies). For an account from a lawyer involved in litigating
one such case in Michigan, see Costello, supra note 25, at 1968–75. For news coverage of a
recent high-proﬁle example, see James C. McKinley, Jr., In New York, Cuomo Pledges
More Aid for Lawyers of the Indigent, N.Y. Times (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.
nytimes.com/2014/10/22/nyregion/in-new-york-cuomo-pledges-more-aid-for-indigents-in
-court.html (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review).
366. Steiker, supra note 24, at 2705 (“These organizations could do more to police
attorney quality through bar discipline, especially in some of the lowest-performing jurisdictions that produce the horror stories that are all too easy to ﬁnd.”).
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clinics focusing on criminal defense.367 For every proposal, one can ﬁnd
countervailing critiques pointing out its shortcomings.368 In recent years,
a few scholars have advanced a still more pessimistic counternarrative of
“Gideon skepticism.” They argue that courts and commentators have
ﬁxated on the right to counsel instead of dismantling deeper causes of
inequality in criminal justice, such as racist policing, excessive criminal
laws, and draconian sentencing.369 Some call for lawyers to relinquish
their “ambitions for lawyerizing the world” and instead try to simplify
court proceedings so that lawyers are less necessary.370
By emphasizing Gideon’s institutional effects rather than its doctrinal
limits or its political neglect, this Article offers two possible ways of
synthesizing and selecting from the literature’s panoply of policy
solutions. In one sense, this history reinforces “Gideon skepticism” as a
more promising pathway towards meaningful equity in the criminal

367. Bright & Sanneh, supra note 19, at 2173 (“More [clinics] are needed so that
students see the desperate needs of poor people accused of crimes and learn to provide
competent and ethical representation.”).
368. E.g., Bibas, supra note 19, at 1293–96 (questioning prioritization of legal rather
than institutional solutions); Drinan, Getting Real, supra note 268, at 1325, 1331–32
(arguing systemic litigation diverts resources and should only be used as “measure of last
resort”); Steiker, supra note 24, at 2700 (questioning focus on appellate doctrine).
369. Alexandra Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, 70 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1049, 1051–52
(2013) (“In other words, the treatment, conviction and punishment of individuals may be
unfair in ways that their attorney, no matter how skilled, cannot meaningfully address.”);
see also Bibas, supra note 19, at 1293–96 (questioning prioritization of legal rather than
institutional solutions); Butler, Poor People Lose, supra note 346, at 2179 (“Even full
enforcement of Gideon would not signiﬁcantly improve the wretchedness of American
criminal justice.”); id. at 2191, 2195, 2203–04 (“[E]ven if the defender community were
victorious in getting what it wanted out of Gideon . . . American criminal justice would still
overpunish black and poor people.”); Chin, supra note 22, at 2240, 2259 (“The critical
problem of the criminal justice system now, and the one that particularly burdens African
Americans, is not the wrongful conviction of the innocent . . . . The problem is a lack of
fairness in deciding what to criminalize and how to enforce those prohibitions.”); Dripps,
Up from Gideon, supra note 360, at 114 (arguing “lingering fantasy that the Court someday, somehow, will force legislatures to pony up the resources for effective indigent
defense . . . has failed and should be declared a failure”); Fairfax, supra note 25, at 2320
(“By pursuing strategies that reconsider our reliance on criminalization and incarceration,
we can move toward a regime with fewer indigent criminal defendants in need of
representation . . . .”); cf. Steiker, supra note 24, at 2700–01 (arguing full funding for
indigent defense is unlikely so reformers should consider alternative goals like
decriminalizing low-level offenses).
370. Bibas, supra note 19, at 1290, 1300–07; see also Drinan, Getting Real, supra note
268, at 1336–37, 1339–44 (arguing for differentiated professional roles within criminal
defense, analogous to the medical profession’s use of nurse practitioners); Dripps, Up
from Gideon, supra note 360, at 127–28 (advocating for lay representation in juvenile and
misdemeanor cases). Dripps also ﬂoats the more “radical” proposal of creating a separate,
non-J.D. career track for public defense. Id. at 129–30; see also Rhode, supra note 359, at
1806, 1814–16 (advocating for simpliﬁed legal procedures and opening routine legal work
to nonlawyers in both civil and criminal contexts).
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courts than another generation of Gideon jeremiads.371 In some contexts,
poor people might be better served by reforms to make lawyers less
necessary, and also to reduce the consequences of having an ineffective
lawyer, than by continued and possibly counterproductive attempts to
expand Gideon’s reach beyond the capacity (or will) of existing institutions.372 There would be fewer situations in which poor people suffered
from the lack of an effective lawyer if there were fewer situations in which
poor people were charged with a crime to begin with, and for the cases
that would remain, the resulting declines in caseloads might enable
public defenders to revive what both lawyers and defendants valued
about the pre-Gideon charity model—its emphasis on intensive factual
investigation and trial advocacy.373
In another and perhaps paradoxical sense, however, this Article’s
historical account could also encourage a renewed Gideon optimism. On
the recent occasion of Gideon’s ﬁftieth anniversary, Stephen Bright and
Sia Sanneh challenged lawyers “to lobby for poor people accused of
crimes,” arguing that the profession’s monopoly on legal services entails
“a responsibility to ensure that the criminal justice system has integrity.”374 Bright and Sanneh could have offered a more direct justiﬁcation
than the profession’s monopoly. The legal profession has not passively
acquiesced to legislative neglect of indigent defense. Rather, lawyers
themselves have been historically responsible both for many of the
371. See Bibas, supra note 19, at 1289 (describing “expansionist dream” of Gideon as
“unattainable mirage”); Drinan, Getting Real, supra note 268, at 1312 (arguing lawyers
“should be more realistic in our efforts to enforce the right to counsel”); Dripps, Up from
Gideon, supra note 360, at 114 (describing “lingering fantasy” courts will force legislatures
to adequately fund indigent defense); Natapoff, Gideon Skepticism, supra note 369, at 1054
(arguing defense counsel alone cannot remedy institutional injustice in criminal process).
For a related argument on access to justice in both civil and criminal contexts, see Rhode,
supra note 359, at 1790, 1815–16 (criticizing legal profession for relying on “ceremonial
platitudes” rather than advocating “realistic objectives”).
372. See Drinan, Getting Real, supra note 268, at 1339 (citing example of pyrrhic
victory in Maryland litigation to provide counsel at bail hearings to show “that suing to
expand the right to counsel when the existing contours of that right have yet to be fulﬁlled
can be risky”).
373. For similar arguments, see id. at 1326 (suggesting decriminalization would “relieve some of the pressure on the public defense function”); Spangenberg & Schwartz,
supra note 328, at 52 (arguing “decriminalizing minor misdemeanors” would help reduce
defender caseloads); see also Bibas, supra note 19, at 1298 (endorsing “grand bargain, in
which legal services were deeper but more focused, with a narrower but more rigorously
policed mandate”). Bibas proposes reaching this arrangement by reducing the complexity
of litigation and opening low-level criminal proceedings to paraprofessionals, but decriminalization could promote similar results by reducing the overall number of criminal cases.
But for an important exploration of the downsides to decriminalization, see Alexandra
Natapoff, Misdemeanor Decriminalization, 68 Vand. L. Rev. 1055, 1055 (2015) (arguing
decriminalization “preserves many of the punitive features and collateral consequences of
the criminal misdemeanor experience, even as it strips defendants of counsel and other
procedural protections”).
374. Bright & Sanneh, supra note 19, at 2173.
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developments that heightened criminal defendants’ need for lawyers and
for the long tradition of assumptions, rhetoric, and material allotments
devaluing the lawyers who actually meet that need.375 If the indigent
defense crisis derives not from intransigent political realities but from
contingent choices made by lawyers, then lawyers may retain not only
more responsibility but also more power than they realize to mitigate the
conditions they diagnose as crisis.
CONCLUSION
Reading through generations of memos, articles, policy reports, and
court decisions about the right to counsel, it can start to seem like
someone is always getting Gideon wrong. Wilbur Hollingsworth thought
the Massachusetts Defenders Committee board was underestimating
what Gideon required, while the board, in turn, thought the
Massachusetts legislature was doing the same. Constitutional theorists
think that Warren Court acolytes are wrong to celebrate Gideon as a brave
and pioneering decision. It was merely suppressing outliers. Public
defenders think that schoolchildren and law students are naive to believe
that Gideon is a meaningful standard. It is violated every day. Criminal
procedure scholars think the appellate courts get Gideon wrong when
they uphold convictions over plausible claims of incompetent counsel,
that legislators get Gideon wrong when they allocate meager funds to
indigent defense, and that voters get Gideon wrong when they grouse that
funding defenders amounts to “coddling criminals.” Pace Judge Elijah
Adlow, almost no one declares that the Supreme Court itself got Gideon
wrong, but beyond that, no one agrees on what exactly Gideon means or
requires.
What would it mean to get Gideon right? As a matter of legal history,
as this Article has illustrated, that is not a useful question. Instead of
trying to divine some transhistorically correct meaning of Gideon against
which to measure present-day actors, lawyers and legal and constitutional
historians should recognize that Gideon’s meaning has always been both
contested and contestable and seek to understand the political and social
conditions that have empowered certain understandings of Gideon to
prevail in particular local contexts. The present disconnect between
widespread celebration of a Supreme Court decision and widespread
cynicism about its implementation, rather than a lamentable but
predictable disconnect between platonic ideals and messy reality, is itself
a historical phenomenon worth investigating. What larger political and
social structures enable a polity’s legal rhetoric and material enforcement
of that rhetoric to diverge so substantially? What work has Gideon been
doing in the criminal courts, if not the work that indigent defense
375. For a related argument that the legal profession is complicit in devaluing publicinterest lawyering, see Rhode, supra note 359, at 1808–15 (claiming “access to justice is a
favorite theme in bar rhetoric but a low priority in reform agendas”).
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advocates think it should be doing? Similar questions could and should
be asked not just about Gideon but about all of the Warren Court’s
criminal procedure cases.376 Rich archival sources exist and enough time
has passed to develop a more complex understanding of how these cases
both took part in and contributed to broader historical changes, such as
the rise of mass incarceration.
Still, there is valuable moral electricity coursing through the vast
body of literature in which people accuse one another of getting Gideon
wrong.377 If not a useful question for legal history, Gideon’s meaning
implicates urgent questions of law and policy. Economic inequality is only
getting worse.378 Through their conversations about Gideon, lawyers and
legal scholars confront the challenge of whether and how it is possible to
devise a system of criminal process that, if it does not ameliorate inequality, at least does not systematically exacerbate it. Perhaps no process
can eliminate the built-in “wealth effect” of the American choice to rely
on lawyers, rather than neutral state actors, to investigate and present the
evidence in criminal proceedings.379 But, as lawyers have long recognized
in debates over indigent defense both before and since Gideon, there are
better and worse ways of mitigating that wealth effect. Voters and legislators may or may not follow, but lawyers and legal scholars should take
the lead in advocating for the better ways. On an ordinary morning in
1973, Boston police court judge Elijah Adlow wondered about two ordinary women who appeared before him that day, “What’s the Supreme
Court got to do with them?” The answer, at least as concerns Gideon, is
both more and less than scholars have sometimes assumed. But the
answer is not nothing.

376. Scholars have periodically noted the relative lack of historical scholarship
contextualizing the Warren Court’s criminal procedure cases. E.g., Klarman, supra note
350, at 62 (describing “scholarship seeking to provide a positive, as opposed to a normative, account of the dramatic doctrinal innovations of this period” as practically nonexistent); Lain, supra note 4, at 1364 (describing scholarship considering these cases in
social and political context as “virtually nonexistent”).
377. See, e.g., Bright & Sanneh, supra note 19, at 2155 (arguing criminal courts
“lack[] legitimacy” and calling for “courts, legislatures, executives, and members of the
legal profession . . . to respond with a sense of urgency”).
378. For recent discussions of this phenomenon by legal scholars, see David Singh
Grewal, The Laws of Capitalism, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 626, 632–41 (2014) (reviewing Thomas
Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century (2014)) (summarizing Piketty’s empirical
ﬁnding of increasing economic inequality); Samuel Moyn, Thomas Piketty and the Future
of Legal Scholarship, 128 Harv. L. Rev. Forum 49, 49 (2014) (commenting on Piketty’s
documentation of income inequality and subsequent legal scholarship analyzing his
ﬁndings).
379. For the phrase “wealth effect,” see John H. Langbein, The Origins of Adversary
Criminal Trial 102–03 (A.W. Brian Simpson ed., 2003) (arguing adversary criminal procedure is “intrinsically skewed to the advantage of wealthy defendants”); cf. Bright &
Sanneh, supra note 19, at 2156 (arguing in practice system is only truly adversarial for
wealthy).
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APPENDIX
A.

Sources of Data for Tables 1 and 2

Fiscal Year 1935–36
 Report of the Voluntary Defenders Committee (June 1, 1936)
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note
7, box 6, folder 11.
 “During its ﬁrst year of operation [June 1, 1935, to June 1, 1936],
the Voluntary Defenders Committee received 151 acceptable
cases and appeared in court in behalf of defendants 82 times.”
 Expenses: $1,976.97
Fiscal Year 1936–37
 Report of the Voluntary Defenders Committee (June 1, 1937)
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note
7, box 6, folder 11.
 “From June 1, 1936 to June 1, 1937, 193 applicants were accepted
by the Committee . . . . The defender appeared in Court in one
hundred and thirteen cases.”
 Expenses: $2,767.10
Fiscal Year 1937–38
 Report of the Voluntary Defenders Committee (Sept. 1, 1938)
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note
7, box 6, folder 11.
 During the period June 1, 1937, to September 1, 1938, “we
received 395 applications . . . .We refused to represent nineteen
of them because they could afford to retain private counsel or
because they wanted to be defended in a trial although admittedly guilty . . . . A number of applicants only needed advice of
one sort or another—there were seventy-eight such cases.”
 Expenses: $4,924.32
Handwritten note : “No report on Sept. 1, 1938 to Jan. 1, 1939 made—
next report was made on calendar year basis.”
1939



Report of the Voluntary Defenders Committee (Jan. 1, 1940) (on
ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7,
box 6, folder 11.
“During 1939 [January 1, 1939, to January 1, 1940], 480 persons
appealed to the Committee for help . . . . Of the 480 persons who
came to us in 1939, 55 needed legal advice only. Fifty-four were
refused aid because of their ability to retain private counsel and
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ﬁfty were refused for reasons conﬁdential between applicant and
counsel.”
Expenses: $5,502.17
1940 Annual Report of The Voluntary Defenders Committee
Incorporated (Jan. 1, 1941) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 6, folder 11.
“During the year 1940, the Committee received ﬁve hundred
and eight applications for assistance . . . . Of this number, ﬁftyeight were in need of legal advice only. Fifty-one were refused
assistance because of their ﬁnancial ability to retain counsel and
one hundred and nineteen were refused for reasons conﬁdential
between applicant and counsel . . . .”
Expenses: $5,490.82

1941 Annual Report of The Voluntary Defenders Committee
Incorporated (Jan. 1, 1942) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 6, folder 11.
“During the year [January 1, 1941, to January 1, 1942], 466
requests for assistance were received . . . . Of the 466 applicants,
60 were in need of legal advice only. 55 were refused assistance
because of their ﬁnancial ability to retain counsel, and 85 were
refused for reasons conﬁdential between applicant and counsel.”
Expenses: $5,788.67

1942 Annual Report of The Voluntary Defenders Committee
Incorporated (Jan. 1, 1943) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 6, folder 11.
“During the year [January 1, 1942, to January 1, 1943], 403
applications were made to the Committee. Of these, 47 applicants were in need of legal advice only. Thirty-eight were refused
because of their ﬁnancial ability to retain counsel and 61 were
refused for reasons conﬁdential between applicant and counsel.”
Expenses: $5,570.19

1943 Annual Report of The Voluntary Defenders Committee
Incorporated (Jan. 1, 1944) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 6, folder 11.
“During the year [January 1, 1943, to January 1, 1944], 427
applications for aid were made to the office . . . . While 38 of the
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applicants were in need of legal advice only . . . . Fifty-six
applicants were refused because of their ﬁnancial ability to retain
counsel and 70 were refused for reasons conﬁdential between
applicant and counsel. The remaining 263 cases . . . ”
Expenses: $6,224.06

1944 Annual Report of The Voluntary Defenders Committee
Incorporated (Jan. 1, 1945) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 5, folder 2.
“During the year [January 1, 1944, to January 1, 1945], four
hundred and ﬁfty applications for assistance were made to the
office . . . . Ninety-two of the applicants were in need of legal
advice only . . . . Thirty-eight applicants were refused because of
their ability to retain private counsel, and sixty-six were refused
for reasons conﬁdential between applicant and Counsel.”
Expenses: $6,951.39

1945 Annual Report of The Voluntary Defenders Committee
Incorporated (Jan. 1, 1946) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 6, folder 11.
“Three hundred and ninety-seven applications for assistance
were received during the year [January 1, 1945, to January 1,
1946]. Seventy-two of these applicants were in need of legal
advice only . . . . Twenty-ﬁve applicants were refused because of
their ability to retain private counsel, and seventy were refused
on the merits of the case.”
Expenses: $7,597.37

1946 Annual Report of The Voluntary Defenders Committee
Incorporated (Jan. 1, 1947) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 6, folder 11.
“During the year [January 1, 1946, to January 1, 1947], 444
applications for assistance were received. Eighty-four of these
applicants were in need of legal advice only . . . . Thirty-two
applicants were refused because of their ability to retain private
counsel and 81 were refused on the merits of the case.”
Expenses: $9,518.64.
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1947 Annual Report of The Voluntary Defenders Committee
Incorporated (Jan. 1, 1948) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 5, folder 2.
“Of the 603 applications received [from January 1, 1947, to
January 1, 1948], 115 of the applicants were in need of legal
advice only . . . . 43 applicants were refused after investigation
because of their ability to retain private counsel, and 102 were
refused on the merits of the case or because the applicant did
not come within the group of non-professional criminals for
whose defense the Committee is organized.”
Expenses: $9,924.09

1948 Annual Report of The Voluntary Defenders Committee
Incorporated (Jan. 1, 1949) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 6, folder 11.
“During the year [January 1, 1948, to January 1, 1949], we
received 667 applications for assistance . . . . 182 were in need of
advice . . . . Fifty-seven eventually retained other counsel, and 13
more were refused because of our belief that they were
ﬁnancially able to hire counsel. Twenty-eight were refused on the
merits of the case.”
Expenses: $13,263.53

1949 Annual Report of The Voluntary Defenders Committee
Incorporated (Jan. 1, 1950) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 5, folder 2.
“We received 733 new cases during the year [January 1, 1949, to
January 1, 1950] . . . . We classiﬁed 215 cases as “Advice” . . . .
Fifty-four clients eventually retained private counsel . . . . We
refused to accept the cases of fourteen applicants because we
were of the opinion that they had sufficient means to employ
private counsel. The Voluntary Defenders Committee obviously
does not wish to compete with the Bar . . . . Twenty-two clients
were refused because we did not believe that their cases had
sufficient merit . . . . The Committee will not defend individuals
who admit that they are guilty but insist on having their case
tried, in the hope that they may be acquitted.”
Expenses: $16,138.93
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1950 Annual Report of The Voluntary Defenders Committee
Incorporated (Jan. 1, 1951) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 6, folder 11.
“We received 740 new cases during the year [January 1, 1950, to
January 1, 1951] . . . . We classiﬁed 232 cases as ‘Advice.’ Fifty-one
clients eventually retained private counsel . . . . We refused to
accept the cases of ﬁfteen applicants because we were of the
opinion that they had sufficient means to employ private counsel.
The Voluntary Defenders Committee has no desire to compete
with the Bar . . . . Forty-three clients were refused because we did
not believe their cases had sufficient merit for the Committee to
undertake to represent them. The committee will not defend
individuals who admit that they are guilty but nevertheless insist
on pleading innocent and having their cases tried, in the hope
that they may be acquitted.”
Expenses: $16,164.19

1951


1951 Annual Report of the Voluntary Defenders Committee
Incorporated For the Year (Jan. 1, 1952) (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 5, folder
2.
 “Our counsel and his two assistants conducted 91 trials in
1951 . . . . [These trials] do not reﬂect the labor devoted to the
remaining 655 cases. Of these, 31 were refused because the
defendant was able to employ counsel or was not the type of
person whom we are willing to represent, i.e., professional
criminals, or persons who though plainly guilty wish to force a
trial upon the off chance of a sympathetic jury. In 25 cases the
Grand Jury refused to indict; in 13 instances the defendant was
released by action of the court or the District Attorney; in 52
cases private counsel eventually undertook representation of the
defendant.”
Note: The table gives a total of 625 cases, which was calculated by adding
91 trials to the 655 remaining cases, then subtracting the 31 refused
cases, the twenty-ﬁve non-indicted cases, the thirteen dismissed cases, and
the ﬁfty-two private counsel cases. Arguably, the nonindicted and dismissed cases could be included in the total, which would yield 663 cases.
 Expenses: $19,671.30
1952


1952 Annual Report of the Voluntary Defenders Committee
Incorporated For the Year (Jan. 1, 1953) (on ﬁle with the
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Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 1, folder
5.
“In 1952 . . . we handled 735 cases . . . . Because we determined
that the defendant could obtain private counsel or should not
receive our services for various other reasons, we refused 31
requests for assistance. In ﬁfty-six cases defendants were able to
retain private counsel.”
Expenses: $21,407.68

The Voluntary Defenders Committee, “‘I Confess’ [Annual
Report for 1954]” (Jan. 1, 1954) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 5, folder 2.
“During the year 1953 we received 915 cases . . . . Because we
determined that the defendant could obtain private counsel or
should not receive our services for various other reasons, we
refused 36 requests for assistance. In 35 cases defendants were
eventually able to retain private counsel.”
Expenses: $24,062.80

Annual Report of the Voluntary Defenders Committee
Incorporated For the Year 1955 (Jan. 1, 1955) (on ﬁle with the
Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 5, folder
2.
“In 1954, we received 1185 cases . . . . We refused to handle 61
cases because we determined that the defendant could obtain
private counsel or should not receive our services for various
other reasons. In 94 cases, defendants were eventually able to
retain private counsel.”
Expenses: $24,405.18

Annual Report of the Voluntary Defenders Committee (1955)
(on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note
7, box 5, folder 2.
“In 1955 [January 1, 1955, to January 1, 1956] we received 1,250
cases . . . . We refused to accept 90 cases because we felt that the
defendant in each case was able to afford private counsel or for
various reasons was not eligible for our services.”
Assets: $17,701.36
Income: $24,585.06
Expenses: $29,729.78
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Net Loss: $5,144.72

The Indigent Defendant [Annual Report of the Voluntary
Defenders Committee for 1958] (1959) (on ﬁle with the Columbia
Law Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 5, folder 3.
For the period January 1, 1958 to January 1, 1959:

New Cases: 1,368
 Not Indicted: 28
 Dismissed by Court: 43
 Refused—Ineligible: 16
 Refused—Out of Jurisdiction: 31
 Refused—Financial Reasons: 39
 Retained Other Counsel: 91
 Expenses: $35,333.77
B.

Sources of Data for Table 3

Legislative appropriations for the years 1962–1964 are taken from:
 Voluntary Defenders Committee, Inc., Office of Economic
Opportunity Application for Community Action Program 4 (May
10, 1966) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in LRB Papers,
supra note 7, box 3, folder 3.
Legislative appropriations for the years 1965–1972 are taken from:
 National Criminal Justice Reference Service, An Evaluation
Report of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association on
the Massachusetts Defenders Committee 91 (1972), https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/26189NCJRS.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3569-BS96].
 These two sources provide overlapping data for ﬁscal 1965 and
1966. For ﬁscal 1965, there is a slight discrepancy between the
two sources, which may simply be a typographical error. The
OEO application lists appropriations for 1964–65 of $169,574
while the NLADA report lists appropriations for ﬁscal 1965 of
$168,374. For the other year that the two sources overlap (ﬁscal
1966) they both list the same ﬁgure, $250,500.
Figures on outside funding are taken from:
 The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Department of the State
Auditor, Report on the Examination of the Accounts of the
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Massachusetts Defenders Committee from May 25, 1965 to June
6, 1966 (Oct. 10, 1966) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review), in
LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 3, folder 2.
Schedule No. V, Suffolk County Model Defender Project Receipts
and Disbursements May 25, 1965 to June 6, 1966.
o Total cash on hand plus receipts: $85,261.03
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Department of the State
Auditor, Report on the Examination of the Accounts of the
Massachusetts Defenders Committee from June 6, 1966 to April
12, 1967 (Sept. 15, 1967) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law Review),
in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 3, folder 2.
Schedule No. V, Suffolk County Model Defender Project Receipts
and Disbursements June 6, 1966 to April 12, 1967.
o Total cash on hand plus receipts: $70,056.02
Schedule No. VI, Comprehensive Program for Legal and Related
Services for the Poor—Federal Grant Receipts and
Disbursements August 1, 1966 to April 12, 1967.
o Total Receipts from Federal Government: $169,051.15
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Department of the State
Auditor, Report on the Examination of the Accounts of the
Massachusetts Defenders Committee from April 12, 1967 to
March 27, 1968 (June 28, 1968) (on ﬁle with the Columbia Law
Review), in LRB Papers, supra note 7, box 4, folder 12.
Schedule No. II, Receipts and Disbursements April 20, 1967 to
March 27, 1968.
o Total Receipts from Federal Government: $189,802.40

Caseload estimates are taken from:
 1968
o Edgar A. Rimbold, Public Defender of Indigents in
Criminal Cases: “No Tub Thumping,” 14 Bos. B.J. 7, 11–
12 (1970).
o “In the ﬁscal year ending June 30, 1968, the number of
cases (defendants) assigned by the courts of the
Commonwealth to the Massachusetts Defenders
Committee amounted to 18,128.”
 1971
o Massachusetts Defenders Committee, A Report of the
Massachusetts
Defenders
Committee
(1976),
https://archive.org/details/reportofmassachu00mass_1
[https://perma.cc/NZ47-NVWU].
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“In 1971, the number of defendants represented reached
nearly 40,000 while the budget was only $1,099,938 and
the staff numbered 62.”
Richard Harris, Annals of Law: In Criminal Court—II,
New Yorker 44 (Apr. 21, 1973).
Rimbold “went on to explain that the M.D.C. currently
had a staff of seventy-ﬁve lawyers—part-time and fulltime—who had handled forty-two thousand cases the
year before.”

104

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 116:15

